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ABSTRACT 
A theory of transportation clubs 
with special application to the domestic aviation system 
Michael Aaron Lipsman 
Major Professor: Todd Sandler 
Iowa State University 
This dissertation employs the theory of clubs and the 
theory of multi-product enterprises to develop a set of three 
general transportation pricing and investment models. These 
models incorporate costs related to operating and maintaining 
transportation facilities, the capital investment required to 
provide such facilities, the congestion that arises from use of 
these facilities, and the adverse impacts and benefits 
associated with external impacts imposed on or provided to 
individuals who do not directly use the facilities. The models 
are presented in both a one-period and two-period context. In 
additional, the models address the sharing of transportation 
facilities by more than one group of users. 
Among the principal findings derived from these models are 
a set of conditions which relate the cost characteristics of 
tranportation facilities to requirements for the optimal pricing 
of facility use. For example, in the absence of non-user 
externalities, for transportation facilities which are shared by 
multiple user groups and which experience different levels of 
use over time, it was determined that a cost structure 
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characterized by constant ray economies of scale and the absence 
of scope economies is required for the provision and operation 
of the facility to be fully and efficiently funded through user 
fees. 
To test the extent to which the general models can be 
applied to real world situations, an airport club model which 
explicitly takes into consideration sharing of the facility by 
different types of transportation vehicles, which reflect 
differences in user preferences, was developed. Optimal pricing 
rules were developed for this model and tested using a sample of 
financial and operation data from large tower controlled U.S. 
airports. The empirical analysis found that ray economies of 
scale vary by size of airport. However, due to the discovery of 
a "crowding out" effect between commercial and non-commercial 
aircraft, no definitive findings regarding economies of scope 
were obtained. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1960s annual investment in public capital 
has fallen from 4 percent of gross national product (GNP) to 
only about 2 percent of GNP by the late 1980s (Winston and 
Bosworth, 1992). Recognition of this trend, which contrasts 
sharply with that of the United States' major trading part­
ners, who have increased their shares of national income going 
into public capital investment, has attracted much attention 
from both economists and politicians in recent years 
(Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990a, 1990b; U.S. House of Repre­
sentatives, 1991; Congressional Budget Office, 1991, 1992; 
Lynde and Richmond, 1992). Focusing on core infrastructure 
(e.g., highways, bridges, airports, mass transit systems, 
sewer and water systems, and electric and natural gas produc­
tion and distribution systems) Winston and Bosworth (1992) 
show that the stock of such facilities has declined in compar­
ison to the nation's GNP from 26 to 20 percent. The Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress estimates that for the period 
1983-2000 investment in core infrastructure will experience a 
shortfall relative to anticipated needs of over $440 billion 
measured in terms of a constant 1982 dollar. Attracting 
further attention to this issue are the findings of several 
recent studies that claim such investment may yield annual 
returns as high as 60 percent compared to annual returns only 
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half as large for private capital investment (Aschauer, 1989; 
Munnell, 1990a). 
Thus, it is not surprising that in recent years signifi­
cant attention has been focused on the need to increase the 
federal government's investment in infrastructure. Proposals 
calling for additional federal spending of $20 billion per 
year have been suggested by members of the Clinton Administra­
tion. However, there is not universal agreement on the magni­
tude of the need for added public infrastructure investment. 
Even proponents of some increase in spending in this area have 
begun to question the validity of the high rates of return 
associated with public infrastructure investment claimed by 
the previously mentioned studies. Also, given the history of 
"pork barrel" politics associated with federal public works 
programs, some economist have begun to question whether addi­
tional funds dedicated to public infrastructure investment 
will be used efficiently. 
One of the more prominent members of this group of skep­
tics is Clifford Winston, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution. Winston (1991) maintains that much of the pro­
posed investment in transportation infrastructure can be 
either avoided or delayed if current construction and pricing 
practices are changed. Among the existing practices Winston 
targets for special attention are deficient pavement construc­
tion standards used on the nation's major highways, federal 
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program funding priorities which favor new construction over 
maintenance, and inefficient pricing practices associated with 
the use of transportation infrastructure. Winston, like many 
others before him (Walters, 1961; Sharp, 1966; Vickery, 1969; 
Levine, 1969; Park, 1971; Henderson, 1974; Morrison, 1983) 
proposes that road and airport user fees need to be modified 
to take into consideration the costs associated with conges­
tion caused by the concentration of use of major elements of 
the nation's transportation system during relatively short 
time periods, while the same facilities remain underutilized 
much of the remainder of each day. 
The research presented in this dissertation similarly 
focuses on the issue of how the pricing of transportation 
services and the financing of transportation investment may be 
modified to promote the more efficient use and provision of 
transportation infrastructure. Unlike prior research in this 
area, this dissertation addresses not only the issues of 
congestion and peak period pricing, but also pricing issues 
associated with the sharing of transportation facilities by 
different types of users and externalities which provide 
justification for imposing charges on non-users in some in­
stances while dictating the payment of compensation to non-
users in other cases. 
To provide the means for developing a model that is 
sufficiently flexible to encompass the broad range of issues 
addressed in this dissertation an approach significantly 
different from that used in most prior research into the 
subject of transportation infrastructure pricing and invest­
ment has been adopted. The approach used is based on the 
theory of clubs. Although the initial models presented in this 
dissertation are general, illustration of their application to 
current policy issues is accomplished through analysis of the 
domestic air transportation system. 
statement of Research Objectives 
Traditionally, in the United States the problem of traf­
fic congestion has been met by the addition of capacity to the 
nation's road, airport, railroad and other transportation 
systems. The initial development and later expansion of these 
systems is extremely capital intensive. Also, their use 
varies significantly over time, so that major portions of 
these systems are underutilized during most time periods. 
Unlike telecommunications or electric power transmission, 
which are services generally provided by private enterprise, 
transportation systems, which are mostly publicly provided and 
subject to the political decision-making process, are rarely 
priced in a manner which would encourage the spreading out of 
use over longer time periods. As previously mentioned, peak-
load pricing has been proposed by numerous economists as at 
least a partial solution to transportation system capacity 
problems. Yet, until recently technological and political 
barriers have prevented its serious consideration as a solu­
tion to the problem of traffic congestion experienced by the 
users of urban freeways and the national air transportation 
system. 
To a great extent the technological barriers to the 
implementation of peak-load pricing for transportation system 
use have now been overcome (Taylor-Radford, 1982; Hensher, 
1991). However, problems of political acceptability still 
remain. Part of the political dimension of this problem can 
be traced to a lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework 
for determining how the use and cost of transportation facili­
ties should be shared among different groups of users, as well 
as non-users, in order to optimize this nation's transporta­
tion infrastructure investment in terms of scale, scope of 
services provided, location, accessibility and environmental 
impacts. The models presented in this dissertation provide a 
general theoretical framework for addressing such a broad 
range of policy issues in an integrated manner. Prior re­
search has tended to focus narrowly on one or two issues 
(e.g., the pricing of urban freeways or airport runways) while 
ignoring or assuming away other related considerations. 
Club theory provides a structure which is particularly 
well suited for addressing how market pricing mechanisms may 
be used to obtain a more socially optimal allocation of public 
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infrastructure. First, the concept of a club as a voluntary 
association of individuals captures the shared nature of most 
transportation infrastructure. Second, the recognition that 
the benefit of club membership is subject to diminution as the 
number of club members increases provides a basis for incorpo­
rating the congestibility feature of most transportation 
facilities. 
Similarly, the theory of multi-product enterprises pro­
vides a convenient basis for modeling the cost structure of 
most transportation infrastructure. The large capital invest­
ment and shared use, which characterize highways, airports and 
other transportation infrastructure, make the concepts of ray 
economies of scale and economies or scope particularly useful 
in developing an understanding of what conditions must be 
satisfied in order for user charges to result in efficient 
levels of investment. 
Organization 
Chapter 2 provides a review of theoretical and empirical 
research upon which this dissertation is based. This litera­
ture review covers prior research from three fields of econom­
ics; transportation economics, club theory and the theory of 
multi-product enterprises. 
Chapter 3 consists of the development of three general 
transportation club models. The first model presents the 
foundation for using club theory to identify optimal pricing 
and investment rules for transportation infrastructure. This 
is done in the context of a one-period, single capacity 
constrained transportation club and ignores the impact of non-
user externalities. The second model replicates the first 
model with the exception that non-user externalities are taken 
into consideration. The third model expands on the prior two 
models in two major respects. In this last general transpor­
tation model the single club good is shared by two user groups 
and use of the club good over both peak and off-peak usage 
periods is taken into consideration. However, to keep this 
last model as uncomplicated as possible, the impact of non-
user externalities is again ignored. 
Next, in Chapter 4 the various features of the three 
previously developed general transportation club models are 
combined and customized to address the special pricing and 
investment considerations of airports. This model takes into 
consideration two club goods (i.e., airport runways and a 
passenger terminal), used by patrons of both scheduled commer­
cial air carriers and general aviation over peak and off-peak 
traffic periods. The model also addresses both the benefits 
non-users of the airport derive from its existence and the 
adverse impacts they experience due to the airport's use. 
Furthermore, the model addresses how these non-user externali­
ties should be taken into consideration in establishing air­
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port fees and taxes in order to promote more efficient infra­
structure investment. In addition, the financing implications 
of the degree to which the cost structure of airports is 
characterized by economies of scale and economies of scope is 
analyzed. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical analysis of the cost 
structure of a sample of large domestic airports. This analy­
sis investigates the relationship between airport operating 
costs and both measures of airport use and airport capacity. 
The degree to which different size airports exhibit economies 
of scale and economies of scope is also investigated. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of additional avenues for 
empirical analysis related to the pricing implications of 
economies of scope and non-user externalities and the data 
needed to conduct such research. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of findings, a 
discussion of their policy implications, and an agenda for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
General Review of Transportation Pricing Research 
Most research in the area of transportation infrastruc­
ture pricing traces its ancestry to works by Pigou (1920) and 
Knight (1924) who employed road pricing examples as a means 
for addressing issues related to the inefficient pricing of 
industries exhibiting increasing marginal costs or decreasing 
marginal products. In such cases Pigou proposed the interven­
tion of government to reconcile the difference between the 
social and private costs associated with use of congested 
facilities through the imposition of a tax as a means of 
redistributing traffic between overused and underused roads. 
Knight generally agreed with Pigou's contention that road 
facilities may be inappropriately priced in order to promote 
efficient investment in such facilities. However, unlike 
Pigou, who proposed that a congestion tax would have to be 
imposed to the extent the average costs associated with the 
use of facilities exhibiting constant and decreasing returns 
would be made equal, Knight showed that optimal use of such 
facilities would occur when the marginal products associated 
with the use of each type of facility achieved equality. 
Following the work of Pigou and Knight, almost four 
decades elapsed until efforts were initiated to develop quan­
titative models of optimal transportation facility pricing and 
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investment. The first major effort in this area is credited 
to Herbert Mohring and Mitchell Harwitz (1962). The analyti­
cal framework presented by Mohring and Harwitz obtains condi­
tions for optimal traffic flow on a transportation facility 
through the maximization of net user benefits with respect to 
the travel demand. The short run optimality condition ob­
tained by the authors is given by the following equality; 
F(D') - g(D*) = D*-
^ dD 
This condition states that total [short-run] highway 
derived benefits will be maximized if a level of traffic, D*, 
is selected at which the difference between the value placed 
on a trip, F(D*) , and the average travel time cost of a trip 
at this traffic level, g(D*), just equals the added congestion 
costs imposed by the marginal traveler on all users of the 
highway, D** (dg/dD) . 
The authors also derived a long-run optimality condition 
which equates the benefit of added highway capacity enjoyed by 
all users of the facility, -D*(3g/0S), where S is a measure of 
highway capacity and dg(S)/dS < 0 denotes a reduction in 
traffic congestion, to the opportunity cost associated with 
adding to highway capacity, r*(dK/dS), where K(S) is the 
amount of capital investment and r is the discount rate for 
public capital. 
Furthermore, Mohring and Harwitz found that for user fees set 
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equal to marginal congestion costs to cover the cost of adding 
to highway capacity, the long-run travel time cost function, 
g(D, S), must be homogeneous of degree zero, and that there 
must be neither economies nor diseconomies of scale in highway 
construction. 
Following Mohring and Harwitz's work, interest focused on 
the subject of applying peak-load pricing to roads. Much of 
the research on this subject coincided with the development of 
the interstate highway system in the United States and the 
accompanying establishment or expansion of freeway systems in 
most of the nation's larger urban areas. During the same two 
decades, the 1960s and 1970s, the automobile became the pre­
vailing mode of choice for most Americans while usage of 
public transit systems declined. This latter trend was viewed 
negatively by many urban planners and economists. Also, as 
Federal environmental rules restricting air and noise pollu­
tion, adverse impacts on environmentally sensitive lands, 
cultural landmarks, and areas of low cost housing were imple­
mented, during this period interest in market-based alterna­
tives to adding road capacity increased. 
A leading advocate for the imposition of congestion taxes 
on users of high traffic volume roads since this time has been 
William Vickrey. In numerous articles (Vickrey, 1963, 1967, 
1968, 1969) he presents theoretical justification for the 
imposition of congestion taxes on road users as a means for 
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spreading traffic between congested and uncongested roadways. 
His work also addresses the use of congestion tolls to encour­
age highway users to divert travel from peak to off-peak 
traffic periods. 
During the 1970s numerous efforts were made to employ 
econometric techniques to estimate optimal congestion tolls 
for urban highways (Henderson, 1974; Boardman and Lave, 1977; 
Keeler and Small, 1977). In one such study, Keeler and Small 
found that in the San Francisco Bay area road user charges 
were substantially below an optimal peak period toll level. 
They also found that urban freeways in the San Francisco Bay 
area exhibited constant economies of scale with respect to 
roadway width. Another interesting finding of this study is 
that a low time value results in a higher peak period optimal 
toll than does a high time value. 
A good recent survey of road pricing research is present­
ed by Morrison (1986). This survey presents estimates of 
optimal long-run congestion tolls ranging between 1.2 cents 
and 34.3 cents per auto-mile, and optimal short-run congestion 
tolls ranging between 4 cents and 38 cents per auto-mile. 
Morrison's article also discusses legal and political issues 
associated with efforts to impose congestion tolls in the 
United States, and he presents information on the experiences 
of Singapore and Hong Kong where such tolls have been imple­
mented . 
13 
Review of Air Transportation System Pricing Research 
The volume of literature dealing with air transportation 
system pricing and investment is not quite as rich as that 
dealing with highways. However, beginning with a paper by 
Levine (1969) increased attention has been focused on the 
inefficient manner in which air transportation infrastructure 
is priced. That paper describes how landing fees are set at 
most of the nation's airports on the basis of aircraft weight, 
which is supposed to serve as a surrogate for value of service 
pricing. Levine further describes the practice of setting 
landing fees at a level just adequate to cover the portion of 
airport operating and capital costs that are not covered by 
terminal space rents and concession charges. As a result, the 
fees paid by commercial carriers and general aviation general­
ly do not cover the operating and maintenance costs they 
impose on airports. Even more importantly, landing fees do 
not reflect the congestion costs associated with airport use 
during high traffic periods nor the costs associated with 
adverse environmental impacts airport use imposes on individu­
als residing in their vicinity. This manner of residual 
pricing for use of airside facilities by commercial air carri­
ers and general aviation results in user charges being set 
substantially below optimal levels. More recent articles by 
Walter (1978) and Golaszewski (1992) confirm these inefficient 
airport pricing practices continue to prevail in the United 
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States today. 
Similarly, a recent study by the Congressional Budget 
Office (1992) points out that taxes paid by users of the 
domestic air transportation system do not generate adequate 
revenues to cover air traffic control system operating and 
capital costs nor the administrative costs associated with 
management of the Federal Aviation Administration. Also, the 
taxes imposed by the federal government on air transportation 
system users do not reflect the costs associated with the 
congestion that arises from concentrating a large share of 
traffic into a few hours each day. Consequently, current air 
transportation system user fees and taxes do not reflect 
either private or social marginal costs associated with system 
use. However, none of these studies present a theoretical 
basis for altering the manner in which air transportation 
facility use is priced. 
A second body of research, though, does replicate much of 
the previously cited theoretical work in the pricing of high­
ways for air transportation infrastructure. Most of this 
research focuses on the derivation of optimal pricing and 
investment rules for airport runways (Carlin and Park, 1970; 
Park, 1971; Morrison, 1982, 1983). Like much of the highway 
pricing research during the 1970s, the article by Carlin and 
Park determines the optimality of marginal cost pricing for 
runway use, but then proceeds to discuss institutional factors 
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Which would likely thwart imposition of such a pricing system. 
Park (1971) further explores alternative means for implement­
ing optimal airport tolls through investigation of the impacts 
of assessing such charges on air carriers versus as a "head-
tax" on passengers. This analysis found imposition of conges­
tion tolls directly on the air carriers is superior to an 
added "tax" on passengers because the added carrier charge 
would result in higher aircraft load factors. 
Morrison derives optimal pricing rules for both uncon-
gested airports (1982) and congested airports (1983). He also 
estimates optimal toll levels in these two cases. For the 
uncongested airport case he finds a Ramsey type pricing system 
to be optimal. A major finding of the second article is that 
current weight-based fees do not vary by time of day and 
consequently tend to result in the misallocation of traffic 
between peak and off-peak periods of air transportation ser­
vice demand. 
Review of Club Theory Research 
As defined by Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) a club is a 
voluntary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing produc­
tion costs, the members' characteristics, and/or a good char­
acterized by excludable benefits. They also trace the roots 
of club theory to Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) whose works 
have been previously cited as the foundation for research into 
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the issue of congestion pricing for transportation facilities. 
Thus, a common source is established for the application of 
club theory to the development of a theory of transportation 
facility pricing and investment. However, to date there have 
been only a few efforts to treat transportation pricing and 
investment issues from a club theory perspective (Oakland, 
1972; Littlechild and Thompson, 1977; Berglas and Pines, 
1981). 
The first formal development of club theory is credited 
to James Buchanan (1965). He presented the club concept as a 
bridging of the gap between purely private and purely public 
goods. The principal result of Buchanan's initial club model 
is that there exist goods members of society consume jointly 
which are subject to congestion beyond some finite size of the 
sharing group. Consequently, the optimal size group of con­
sumers for such goods falls somewhere between one and the 
total population. Buchanan derived this result by maximizing 
the utility of a representative member of a homogenous group 
of consumers of the club good simultaneously with respect to 
the quantity of the club good to be provided and the number of 
members of the sharing group. 
Buchanan's model, which only takes into consideration the 
interests of a representative club good consumer, is commonly 
characterized as presenting a within-club perspective. Subse­
quent research by Ng (1973) extends the treatment of club 
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goods to encompass an overall societal perspective in which 
both consumer and non-consumer preferences are taken into 
consideration. However, both Buchanan's and Ng's models 
suffer from the treatment of the size of the group of club 
good consumers as a discrete variable. This problem results 
from the assumption that membership of the group of club good 
consumers is characterized by homogeneous preferences and that 
every member of the group has to consume the same amount of 
the club good. 
The problem of discrete club size was solved by Oakland 
(1972) who developed a model in which the amount of club good 
consumption is permitted to vary among club members. The 
allowing of club members to possess a heterogeneous array of 
preferences yielded a toll, or utilization rate/ condition. 
This condition provides the basis for determination of optimal 
pricing rules for shared goods which are used in varying 
amounts by members of the consuming group. 
A further significant modification of the club good model 
by Oakland consists of replacement of the group size variable 
as an argument in the utility functions of club members with a 
congestion function. Employing this form of the club model 
Oakland expresses the utility of a representation club member 
as a negative function of congestion, which in turn is ex­
pressed as a negative function of total club good use and as a 
positive function of club good size, capacity or quantity. 
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Using this form of the club model Oakland and others (DeSerpa, 
1978; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980, 1984) show that expressing 
congestion as a ratio of club good use to the quantity of the 
club good (i.e., a congestion function that is homogeneous of 
degree zero with respect to club good use and quantity) leads 
to the finding that the club can be fully financed from user 
fees if the club's cost structure is characterized by constant 
economies of scale. This form of the club model possesses 
particularly attractive features for application to the analy­
sis of transportation systems where a traffic volume to trans­
portation facility capacity ratio serves as the principal 
argument for the congestion, or delay, function. 
Aside from the work by Oakland, few other attempts have 
been made to explicitly address transportation pricing and 
investment issues from a club theory perspective. Berglas and 
Pines (1981) presented what they claimed was a unified club, 
local public good and transportation model. Among their 
findings, they claimed that for a heterogeneous population 
Pareto optimally required a distribution of the population 
over a set of segregated clubs. Sandler and Tschirhart 
(1984), though, show that this finding resulted from Berglas 
and Pines' assumption that club members must fully finance 
provision of the club good. Sandler and Tschirhart also show 
that Berglas and Pines/ findings only apply to the case of 
replicable clubs in which every member of the population 
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belongs to some club. Sandler and Tschirhart claim this 
condition does not hold for transportation facilities, which 
are generally non-replicable, and as a result, leave some 
members of society excluded from club membership. In this 
case, they claim heterogeneous club membership is optimal. 
The issue of whether segregated or mixed club membership is 
optimal is of particular importance in identifying under what 
conditions economies of scope are associated with the use of 
transportation facilities. 
In another paper, Littlechild and Thompson (1977) use 
club theory to explore the sharing of airport runway capital 
costs among different types of aircraft. Employing a game 
theory model they show that in the absence of congestion 
optimal landing fees should reflect both variable operating 
and maintenance costs associated with different types of 
aircraft plus a share of the common costs associated with 
runway capital costs. In the conclusion to this article the 
authors suggest a number of possible extension to their model. 
Among these extensions the authors suggest the club approach 
may be applied to a network of airports as well as to single 
airports. They also suggest that the model could be modified 
to incorporate the impact of externalities. However, they 
recognize that this modification would require making passen­
gers the decision makers in the model rather than the air­
lines. 
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Review of Multiproduct Enterprise Research 
Recent research related to the economics of multiproduct 
industries and network externalities provides additional 
support for expanding the theory of transportation system 
pricing and investment. Given that most transportation facil­
ities are used to provide a wide variety of services, single 
output models are incapable of adequately addressing those 
pricing and investment issues related to the sharing of trans­
portation facilities and systems by a population characterized 
by heterogeneous travel preferences. Also, evaluation of 
conditions under which cross-subsidization among different 
elements of a transportation system may be justified requires 
the consideration of network externalities. 
The most comprehensive treatment of multiproduct industry 
economics to date is provided by Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1988). Although ostensibly concerned with the presentation 
of the theory of contestable markets, this work also serves as 
a treatise on theoretic and empirical issues associated with 
the economics of multiproduct industries. Most of the con­
cepts of multiproduct industry cost analysis used in this 
dissertation are derived from this source or from other works 
by these authors or others with whom they have collaborated 
on doing related research (Baumol and Bradford, 1970; Panzar, 
1976; Panzar and Willig, 1977, 1981; Willig, 1979; Bailey and 
Friedlaender, 1982). 
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Among the multiproduct industry cost concepts presented 
by Baumol, Panzar and Willig used in this dissertation are 
multiproduct (ray) economies of scale, average incremental 
cost, product-specific economies of scale, and economies of 
scope. For each of these cost concepts the authors present 
measures which provide a basis for conducting empirical re­
search. 
The measure developed for ray economies of scale is S^(Y) 
= C(Y)/E,-Yj* C. (Y) , where C(Y) is the cost associated with 
producing a vector of outputs, Y, and Cj(Y) is the marginal 
cost associated with producing output i. In the single output 
case this measure becomes simply the ratio of average cost to 
marginal costs. As in the single product case, Sj,(Y) may take 
values greater than, equal to or less than one which signify 
increasing, constant or decreasing ray economies of scale, 
respectively. 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig define product-specific econo­
mies of scale in terms of the ratio of the average incremental 
cost associated with producing a specific product to the 
marginal cost associated with producing that product, i.e., 
Sj(Y) = AIC(Y|)/Cj (Y) , where AIC(Yj) denotes the average incre­
mental cost associated with producing output Y,. In this 
measure, average incremental cost is defined as the difference 
between the cost of jointly producing the entire vector of 
outputs and the cost of producing all outputs except output i 
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divided by the quantity of output i that is produced, i.e., 
AIC(Y,) = [C(Y) - C(Y^.,) ]/Y,. Values for S,. (Y) greater than, 
equal to or less than one denote increasing, constant or 
decreasing product-specific economies of scale, respectively. 
When it is less costly to produce n outputs jointly than 
to produce the outputs separately, or at least not all togeth­
er, economies of scope are said to exist. The degree of 
scope economies, denoted SCj(Y), exhibited by a multiproduct 
production process may be measured by the following ratio; 
SC,(Y) = [C(Y,.) + C(Y^.,) - C(Y)]/C(Y), 
Where C(Yj) is the cost of producing output set i, C(Y^.j) is 
the cost of producing the remainder of outputs in vector Y and 
C(Y) is the cost of producing the entire vector of n outputs 
jointly. Economies (diseconomies) of scope are said to exist 
when SCj (Y) > (<) 0. 
The last of these multiproduct cost concepts is particu­
larly important in determining under what conditions the 
sharing of transportation facilities by multiple user groups 
is advantageous and when it is not advantageous. Panzar and 
Willig (1981) suggest that economies of scope arise from the 
existence of a quasi-public factor of production in an 
industry's input requirement set. They also show that the 
existence of economies of scope is necessary and sufficient 
for the joint production of outputs by firms in the industry 
to result. 
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Industries offering services over an interconnected 
network, which may be thought of as a quasi-public good, 
generally exhibit production costs characterized by economies 
of scope. Also, as shown by Artie and Averous (1973), servic­
es offered over a network yield external benefits to users 
which increase with the size of the network. This feature of 
network industries provides justification for cross-subsidiza­
tion among elements of the network. An additional interesting 
feature of this article is that the optimality condition 
derived by the authors associated with the addition of a new 
user to the network resembles a combined club model type 
membership and provision condition. These results are pre­
sented in the context of the national telephone network. 
However, the authors maintain that similar findings could be 
expected for other industries which offer their services over 
an interconnected network, such as the motor carrier and air 
transportation industries. 
Thus, both club theory and the theory of multiproduct 
industries offer ideas which can be used to expand the analy­
sis of transportation infrastructure pricing and investment 
issues. This is done through the presentation of three gener­
al transportation models in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3:GENERAL TRANSPORTATION CLUB MODELS 
Previous transportation infrastructure pricing and in­
vestment models have focused almost exclusively on the use of 
congestion taxes as a means for more efficiently allocating 
the use of transportation way facilities (i.e., urban freeways 
or airport runways, and for financing the expansion of these 
facilities). And although much prior research has addressed 
both the temporal and spacial dimensions of the problem, 
models addressing these dimensions of the problem in the 
context of scope economies have only recently begun to appear 
(Brueckner and Lee, 1991; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1993). 
Furthermore, existing models ignore the interaction between 
way and non-way (i.e., terminal, communication and traffic 
control) facilities in the provision of transportation servic­
es, and they fail to consider how the sharing of facilities by 
multiple user groups affect the determination of conditions 
required for efficient pricing and resource allocation. 
Finally, although prior models implicitly recognize the exis­
tence of that portion of the population that consists of non-
users of the transportation infrastructure, they do not pro­
vide a means for addressing the pricing and investment impli­
cations of the external impacts of transportation facility 
existence and use on these individuals. 
The models presented in this chapter develop a framework 
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for addressing the omissions of existing transportation pric­
ing and investment models cited above. Another major depar­
ture from prior work in this area, is that the models present­
ed in this chapter approach the derivation of optimality 
conditions from a comprehensive social welfare maximization 
perspective rather than the perspective of net user benefit 
maximization or user cost minimization, which have been the 
dominant approaches employed by others since the pioneering 
work of Mohring and Harwitz (1962). Consequently, the ap­
proach followed here can be viewed as providing a theoretical 
foundation for the more applied approaches employed by prior 
researchers. 
The remainder of this chapter presents three general 
transportation club models. The first model replicates the 
findings of Mohring and Harwitz for a single transportation 
facility that serves a single group of users, who are homoge­
neous in their tastes and preferences, and who are subject to 
a binding capacity constraint. The second model expands the 
analysis by taking into consideration non-user externalities. 
The third model further extends consideration to multiple time 
periods and user groups. 
One-period. One User Group. Capacity Constrained Single 
Transportation Club Model without Non-user Externalities 
For this model the total population of the transportation 
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facility's service area, P, is divided between two internally 
homogeneous groups. One group of M individuals consists of 
those members of the service area population who each use the 
transportation facility v"" times during a single time period. 
The other group consists of the remainder of the service area 
population, P-M individuals, who do not use the transportation 
facility. The utilities of representative members of the two 
groups increase with the consumption of a composite private 
good, y, which serves as a numeraire good, i.e., for non-users 
of the transportation facility dU^/dy^ > 0 and for users of the 
facility SuV^y"" > 0. Also, non-users of the transportation 
facility are affected neither beneficially nor adversely by 
the existence of the facility or by its use by others, i.e., 
u' = U^(y^, 0, 0). The utility of a representative member of 
the group of transportation facility users, i.e., U"* = U'"[y"', 
v"", c(F'", X)] , where F" = v'"*M, increases with his or her own 
use of the facility, i.e., SuV^v"* > 0, while it decreases as 
the facility becomes more congested, i.e., dV'^/dc <0. 
The transportation facility is subject to congestion, 
cCF"™, X), which increases with the total volume of use, or 
traffic flow, F"", and decreases with the provision of added 
capacity, X, i.e., dc/dF"' > 0 and dc/dx < 0. Total use of the 
transportation facility during the period is constrained by 
the capacity of the facility, i.e., F*" < X. Also, the cost of 
providing and operating the transportation facility, C = C(X, 
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F"") , increases both with the size of the facility and with the 
volume of use, i.e., dC{.)/dX > 0 and 3c(.)/3F'" > 0. 
The model that results from these assumptions consists of 
the maximization of an equally weighted Benthamite social 
welfare function subject to a societal budget constraint and 
to the transportation facility capacity constraint. The 
objective function for this model is 
W = (P-M) • U^(y^ 0, 0) + M- U'"[y'", v"", cCF"", X) ]. (1) 
The societal budget constraint, 
I = (P-M) • y^ + M- y"" + C(X, F""), 
( 2 )  
indicates the total income of the service area population, I, 
is spent on consumption of the private good by members of both 
segments of the population, as well as for the provision and 
operation of the transportation facility. The second con­
straint, 
F"" < X, (3) 
requires the volume of traffic served by the transportation 
facility not exceed the traffic carrying capacity of the 
facility. 
The Lagrangean function, comprised of the objective 
function and the two constraints. 
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Max. L= (P-M) • U'(y^ 0, 0) + M-U"" [y"", v"", c(F™, X)] 
+ X.- [I - (P-M) • y^ - M- y*" - C(X, F"") ] (4) 
+ (X - F"") , 
is optimized with respect to the consumption of the composite 
private good by both transportation facility users and non-
users, the size of the group of users, the capacity of the 
transportation facility, the number of trips taken by each 
user, and the two Lagrange multipliers. 
Optimization of the Lagrangean function results in seven 
first-order conditions. First, optimization with respect to 
the quantities of the composite private good consumed by 
representative members of both the user and non-user groups 
results in the equality of the marginal utility of the private 





This equality condition is dependent on the form of the social 
welfare function, which for this model has the utility func­
tions for all members of the population equally weighted. The 
significance of this result is that maximization of the wel­
fare of society requires the marginal rate of social substitu­
tion be equal across all members of society (see Boadway and 
Bruce 1984, pp. 139-42), i.e., (dW/dU^) (dV^/dy^) = 
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(^W/SU"") (SuV^y"") . This condition provides a standard unit of 
measure for the conditions derived from the optimization of 
the Lagrangean function with respect to the size of the trans­
portation facility user group, the capacity of the transporta­
tion facility, and the number of trips made by each member of 
the user group. Given that the composite private good is 
designated the numeraire good in this model, this unit of 
measure can be thought of as the social marginal utility of 
income. 
Optimization of the Lagrangean function with respect to 
the number of members in the group of transportation facility 
users yields what is commonly referred to in club theory as a 
membership condition, 
u^.) _ u^.) = _ euyac. 8c . 
8u"'/0y"' 0uV8y^  au'V8y" (6 )  
,  ac( . ) .  F" , y. F" , 
SF" M Ti M ' ' ' 
This condition states that the benefit a marginal user derives 
from the transportation facility, which is given by the ex­
pression on the left-hand-side (LHS) of the equation, equals 
the marginal costs imposed by that individual's use of the 
facility and a reallocation of income between the user and 
non-user groups, which is given by the right-hand-side (RHS) 
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of the equation. Given the number of users of the transporta­
tion facility is positive, this condition holds with equality. 
More specifically, the benefit a marginal user derives 
from the transportation facility is expressed as the differ­
ence between the utilities of a user and non-user measured in 
terms of the marginal utility all members of the population 
derive from their last unit of consumption of the composite 
private good. The costs imposed by the marginal user of the 
transportation facility consists of three components. First, 
the additional usage of the facility increases congestion 
experienced by all users. Second, the cost required to 
operate and maintain the transportation facility increases as 
the user group is increased by one member. Third, there is an 
added cost associated with increasing capacity of the trans­
portation facility to accommodate the marginal user. 
The last RHS term in equation (6) represents a change in 
the amount of the private good consumed, which can be thought 
of as a reallocation of income, by the marginal user of the 
transportation facility. This condition is required to main­
tain equality between the marginal rates of social substitu­
tion for all members of the population by maintaining the 
marginal utility derived from the private good for the margin­
al transportation facility user. As explained by Cornes and 
Sandler (1986, p. 178) this change will be positive if the 
private good and use of the transportation facility are viewed 
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as complements by the marginal transportation facility user. 
On the other hand, the change will be negative if these two 
goods are viewed as substitutes by the marginal user of the 
transportation facility. 
Optimization of the Lagrangean function with respect to 
the size of the transportation facility yields a provision 
condition for the club good, the transportation facility, 
euyac.  ac ^ ec( . )  _ m (7)  
au*"/ Sy*"  ^  ^* 
This condition shows that optimal provision of the transporta­
tion facility occurs when the sum of benefits derived by all 
users of the facility, given by the LHS of the equation, 
equals the marginal cost associated with a change in the size, 
or capacity, of the facility, minus the benefits associated 
with expanding the facility's capacity, given by the ratio of 
the two Lagrange multipliers. Since the capacity of the 
facility is assumed to be positive, this condition holds with 
equality. 
Optimization of the Lagrangean function with respect to 
the number of trips taken by each member of the transportation 
facility users group results in a toll, or usage, condition 
for the transportation facility. 
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au'"/av"' ^  jduvdc . ^  + iShl + 
3U"'/3y'" au'"/3y'" F^"" SF"" 
(8) 
This condition states that the benefit derived from one addi­
tional trip made using the transportation facility, given by 
the LHS of the equation, equals the additional costs associat­
ed with the increased traffic congestion that trip imposes on 
all users of the facility, plus the additional operating and 
maintenance costs occasioned by that trip, plus the benefits 
that would be derived from relaxing the constraint on the 
traffic carrying capacity of the facility through added capi­
tal investment. Since the number of trips made by each member 
of the group of transportation facility users is assumed 
positive, this condition holds with equality. 
Finally, given that the capacity constraint is an in­
equality, optimization of the Lagrangean function with respect 
to that constraint's multiplier yields the Kuhn-Tucker condi­
tions, 
X - F"* > 0 (9) 
These conditions indicate that when the traffic volume is 
strictly less than the capacity of the transportation facili 
ty, the Lagrange multiplier, equals 0. However, if the 
M > 0 (10) 
fi' (X - F"") = 0. (11) 
33 
traffic volume is constrained by the capacity of the facility, 
then the Lagrange multiplier takes on a positive value and 
equation (9) holds with equality. This latter case where the 
constraint becomes of consequence gives rise to the need for 
users of the transportation facility to take into consider­
ation the cost of new capital investment, represented by the 
last RHS terms in the provision and toll conditions, as well 
as the costs associated with operating and maintaining the 
transportation facility. 
Optimization of the Lagrangean function with respect to 
the other Lagrange multiplier, A, returns the societal budget 
constraint, equation (2), which is assumed to hold with equal­
ity. 
Equations (5) through (11) establish the conditions 
required for the optimal use and provision of the transporta­
tion facility. However, from a public policy perspective, 
what is even more important is their implications for the 
pricing of use of the facility and the financing of investment 
in facility capacity. 
Transportation facility financing considerations 
Given this model assumes only users of the transportation 
facility benefit from its existence, it is logical to ask 
whether the facility can be financed solely from user fees. 
If one assumes that users of the facility are willing to pay 
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an amount equal to the benefits they derive from the facility, 
then the toll per use of the facility, f", would equal the 
marginal rate of substitution between making a trip and con­
sumption of the composite private good when membership of the 
users group, the number of trips made by each user group 
member, and the capacity of the transportation facility are 
simultaneously optimized. Given these assumptions, full 
financing of the transportation facility by users yields the 
following condition, 
pm. auyav'" ^  pm.^m = C(F'",X) . (12) 
auv^y"" 
To determine what conditions must be satisfied for full 
user financing to be feasible, it is necessary to take into 
consideration both the toll condition, equation (8), and the 
provision condition, equation (7). First, multiplication of 
the RHS of the toll condition by the optimal total number of 
trips made using the transportation facility, F"", and substi­
tution of the resulting expression for the LHS of equation 
(12), gives equation (13), 
-M- ^ • F" + ££lll • F" -I-  ^• F*" = C(F'", X) . (13) 
auV^y"" Sf"" SF"" ^ 
This equation states that the sum of marginal congestion costs 
and marginal operating and maintenance costs associated with 
use of the transportation facility, plus the marginal benefits 
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that would result from adding capacity to the facility, must 
equal the total cost of providing, operating and maintaining 
the facility at the optimal levels of use and capacity. 
Next, in order to relate the toll and provision condi­
tions, it is necessary to make an assumption about how conges­
tion of the transportation facility is dependent on the total 
use and the capacity of the facility. Typically, the planning 
and design of transportation facilities consists of two major 
steps. First, planners forecast travel demand for a horizon 
date 20 or more years in the future. Then, based on the 
function the proposed transportation improvement is intended 
to serve a "level of service" standard is adopted. This level 
of service standard is often expressed as a ratio of the 
forecasted traffic, adjusted for vehicle mix, to the design 
capacity of the proposed transportation facility at the plan­
ning horizon date. This ratio is commonly referred to as the 
volume to capacity ratio. As presented both in the Highway 
Capacity Manual published by the Transportation Research Board 
(1985) and Ashford and Wright (1992), Airport Engineering. 3rd 
Edition, delay time costs, or congestion costs, are generally 
modeled as a function of the volume to capacity ratio either 
in deterministic or stochastic form. Thus, the congestion 
function in this model, in the absence of non-user externali­
ties, can be assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in 
traffic flow and capacity, i.e., c(F"', X) = c(F"'/X), and by 
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Euler's theorem, 
5c . pm _ _ 3c. y 
"^x/* (14) 
This condition states that when use and provision of the 
transportation facility are in equilibrium the congestion 
caused by the last trip taken on the facility will just be 
offset by the final unit of traffic capacity provided by the 
facility. 
Now, combining equations (13) and (14) with the transpor­
tation facility provision condition shows that for the facili­
ty to be solely financed by user fees the transportation 
facility must exhibit constant economies of scale. First, 
substituting the RHS of equation (14) into equation (13) one 
obtains equation (15), 
M- • -1^  • X + • F"" + • F"" = C(F"', X) . (15) 
Then, substituting the RHS of equation (7), the provision 
condition, into the first LHS term of equation (15), the 
condition for ray constant economies of scale is obtained, 
dCM . X + • F"" - • (X - F"") = C(F"', X) . (16) 
dX A ^ ' 
This shows that the transportation facility cost function is 
homogeneous of degree one with respect to its utilization and 
capacity. This condition obtains because the last term on the 
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LHS of equation (16) equals the Kuhn-Tucker condition derived 
in equation (11), which equals zero. Alternatively, dividing 
the RHS of equation (16) by its LHS yields the following ratio 
form condition for ray constant economies of scale, as pre­
sented in Bailey and Friedlaender (1982), 
=1. (17) 
[8C(.)/3F"'] • ?"> + [30(0 /5X] • X 
Therefore, if all benefits associated with use of the 
transportation facility accrue only to the population of 
users, and if the facility is characterized by a cost struc­
ture that exhibits constant ray economies of scale, pricing 
each use of the facility equal to the marginal rate of substi­
tution between use of the facility and the composite private 
good will result in adequate revenues to cover all costs 
associated with provision of transportation services by the 
facility. Furthermore, letting t'"(*) stand for the optimal 
usage toll, one sees in equation (18) that if the facility 
exhibits constant ray economies of scale this toll will equal 
the average cost associated with providing the transportation 
service, as well as the marginal cost associated with the 






auv^y"" aF"" ar"" 
Or more precisely, substituting from the provision condi­
tion, equation (7), for the ratio of Lagrange multipliers, as 
shown in equation (19), one sees that the optimal toll must 
take into consideration both the costs and benefits, given by 
the last two RHS terms, respectively, associated with expan­
sion of the transportation facility when its use is at capaci­
ty ,  
t"'(*) = 
auyac.  ac ,  ac( . )  ,  ac( . )  _ auyac .  ac 
au^/ay"* a?"" au™/ay™ 
Alternatively, if the transportation facility exhibits 
increasing economies of scale, setting the toll equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution between use of the facility and 
the composite private good will not yield revenues adequate to 
cover the cost of providing the service. In this case the RHS 
of equation (16) becomes strictly greater than the LHS of the 
equation. Therefore, if the transportation facility cost 
function exhibits increasing economies of scale, the average 
cost associated with transportation facility provision and use 
will exceed the marginal cost arising from one more trip. On 
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the other hand, setting the toll in this manner when the 
transportation facility exhibits decreasing economies of scale 
will yield a revenue surplus. 
Summarizing the results of this model one can state, 
Proposition 1: In the absence of non-user externalities, full 
user financing of a transportation facility requires a cost 
structure for the facility characterized by constant ray 
economies of scale. 
Generally, transportation facilities do exhibit constant 
economies of scale over a broad range of output levels. Thus, 
full user financing is feasible in many cases. However, if 
non-user externalities associated with the provision and use 
of a transportation facility do exist, then as the next model 
shows optimal pricing requires internalization of the costs 
and benefits associated with the transportation facility 
impacts experienced by those individuals who do not use the 
facility. 
One-period. One User Group. Capacitv Constrained Transporta­
tion Facility Club Model with Non-user Externalities 
All of the assumptions upon which this second model is 
based are the same as those for the first model, with one 
exception. Non-users of the transportation facility are 
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assumed to be adversely affected by use of the transportation 
facility while at the same time benefiting from its existence, 
i.e., < 0 and > 0. The rationale for this 
change is that users of a transportation facility often cause 
air and noise pollution that adversely affect people who do 
not use the facility. On the other hand, the existence of a 
transportation facility, such as an airport or freeway, often 
benefits non-users by increasing economic activity in the 
service area and by making the service area more accessible to 
friends, relatives, customers and suppliers. 
As a result of this one new assumption, the objective 
function from the first model is modified to make the utility 
function of the representative member of the group of trans­
portation facility non-users dependent on both the total 
number of trips made using the facility and on the traffic 
carrying capacity of the facility, 
W = (P-M) • u^(y^ 0, 0, F"", X) + M- u"'[y'", v"", cCF"", X) , 0, 0] . (^ A) 
Also, as expressed above, the utility functions of both trans­
portation facility users and non-users are assumed to be of 
the same functional form. The differences among the arguments 
included in the two utility functions reflect the distinguish­
ing characteristics of members of the two groups. Since by 
definition members of the group of non-users are assumed to 
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not directly use the airport, their utility functions reflect 
no impact from the trip and congestion arguments. Similarly, 
although users of the airport may also experience either 
adverse or beneficial impacts resulting from the use and 
existence of the airport, the direct influence of the airport 
usage and capacity arguments is omitted to emphasize more 
explicitly the distinction between the two segments of the 
population. 
The societal budget constraint and the transportation 
facility capacity constraint remain the same as presented in 
equations (2) and (3) in the first model. Thus, the Lagran-
gean function for this model is only slightly modified rela­
tive to the first model's Lagrangean function, equation (4), 
Max. L = (P-M) • U^(y^ 0, 0, F"',X) + M* U"" [y"", v"", c (F"", X) , 0, 0 ] 
+ X* [I - (P-M) • y^ - M- y"" - C(F'", X) ] (4A) 
+ M- (X - F"*) 
The first-order conditions for the marginal utility of 
the composite private good and for the capacity constraint in 
this model are the same as for the first model. However, 
since the external impacts of transportation facility exis­
tence and use depend on the number of facility users, M, the 
number of trips made by each user, v*", and on the capacity of 
the facility, X, the membership, provision, and toll condi­
tions all require modification. 
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The revised membership condition now includes a fourth 
cost factor, which is equal to the disbenefits non-users 
experience as a result of an additional transportation facili­
ty user. This additional cost is reflected in the first RHS 
term of equation (6A), 
U^(.) _ uU.) -
(6A) - (p - M) • • Z! - . F"* 
auVay^ " auvay"" ar"" 
+  a C M .  F_ -  ^  M . i :  ^  ( y - n - y l ) .  
apm M I M ^ ' 
The remainder of this equation is the same as the membership 
condition for the first model. The added cost associated with 
expanding the membership of the transportation facility user 
group implies that the benefit a new member derives from using 
the transportation facility must be greater in this case than 
in the model without non-user externalities. 
The benefits associated with expansion of the transporta­
tion facility also increase as the result of taking into 
consideration the value non-users place on the existence of 
the facility. This change from the provision condition in the 
first model is reflected by the first LHS term in equation 
(7A), 
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(P - M) • 4- M- ^ - B. (7A) 
3uV9y^ d\3^/dy^ ^ 
The benefits derived from an additional trip made using 
the transportation facility also must increase. This change 
results from the need to offset the disbenefits experienced by 
non-users when traffic on the facility increases. The added 
cost associated with an increase in transportation facility 
use is reflected by the first RHS term in the revised toll 
condition presented in equation (8A), 
euvav*" , auVaF"- auyac.  dc ^ ac( . )  ,  n 
auVSy"" auV^y' auv^y"" ar"" ar"" 
These revisions made to the first model to accommodate 
the impacts the existence and use of the transportation facil­
ity have on non-users result in several significant implica­
tions for the financing of this type of public infrastructure. 
Transportation facility financing considerations 
The existence of non-user externalities does not change 
the nature of the congestion function for the transportation 
facility. The assumption that the congestion function is 
homogeneous of degree zero still holds. However, incorpora­
tion of non-user externalities in this model does change the 
condition required for full user financing of the transporta­
tion facility. 
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Letting t'"(**) denote the per trip toll, the requirement 
that users fully finance the provision and operation of the 
transportation facility now reflects the need to provide for 
compensation to non-users to offset the adverse impacts asso­
ciated with transportation facility use. This revised full 
user financing condition is presented in equation (13A), 
• F"" = 3U"'/5v"'. pin _ X) 
au"" / Sy"" 
= - [-p - m) • . ptn dV^/dc . dc . pm (13A) 
auV5y^ auV^y"* dF^ 
+ dc(.) . pm ^ M . pni_ 
0pm "X 
In this equation the first RHS term reflects payments users of 
the transportation facility would have to make to non-users in 
order for the adverse impacts associated with transportation 
facility use to be internalized. 
Next, using the zero degree homogeneity of the congestion 
function and the provision condition, equation (7A), one finds 
that full user financing of the transportation facility no 
longer implies a facility cost function that is homogeneous of 
degree one. This is shown by equation (16A), 
d£M . pm + dC ( . ) , ^  _ (p _ ji) 
gpm dX 
auVaF"*. pn, ^ auVax . 
dU^/By^ auVSy' (16A) 
= CCF"", X) . 
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This equation implies that depending on the net value 
non-users of the transportation facility place on the external 
impacts the facility has on them, the cost function for the 
facility could exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing ray 
economies of scale. In the case where the value of the ad­
verse impacts associated with use of the transportation facil­
ity exceed the value of the benefits associated with the 
existence of the facility, full user financing requires a cost 
function that exhibits increasing ray economies of scale. 
This condition results because then the third LHS term in 
equation (16A) is positive which implies the cost of providing 
and operating the transportation facility exceeds the sum of 
the first two LHS terms in that equation. Consequently, the 
degree of homogeneity of the transportation facility cost 
function in this case is less than one. Furthermore, this 
implies the transportation facility would be smaller than in 
the case where non-user externalities are absent. On the 
other hand, if the net value non-users place on external 
impacts of the transportation facility is positive, then the 
cost function would have to exhibit decreasing ray economies 
of scale for full user financing to be feasible, and the 
facility would be larger than in the case of no non-user 
externalities. 
Finally, combining the provision and toll conditions for 
this model, equations (7A) and (8A) respectively, one obtains 
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= - ( P - M) auyaF"* ^  auyax 
auVsy^ auV^y^ 
- M- . Is. 
au™/ ay™ ar" 
+ i£iil + - M- 1^ . nsA) 
ap"* auv^ y" 
This optimal toll condition equals the condition derived in 
the first model, equation (19), with the exception of the 
first RHS term. This term represents the net value of the 
external impacts of the transportation facility on non-users. 
Therefore, the introduction of non-user externalities 
into the one-period transportation model results in the fol­
lowing modification to the findings of the first model. 
Proposition 2: In the case where the adverse impacts associ­
ated with use of the transportation facility are greater than 
the benefits associated with the existence of the facility, 
the optimal toll for transportation facility users will in­
crease over what it would be in the non-externality case. If 
the net value of external impacts is positive, then the con­
verse will be true. 
The previous two models show the basis for setting the 
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toll for use of a transportation facility in the context of a 
single time period when the facility serves a single homoge­
neous group of users. Comparison of the two models also shows 
how the optimal toll condition changes when non-user external­
ities are taken into consideration. However, most transporta­
tion facilities are not dedicated to the exclusive service of 
a single group of users. Neither are most transportation 
facilities used uniformly every hour of the day. These fac­
tors are taken into consideration in the next model. 
Two-period. Two User Group. Capacitv Constrained Single Trans­
portation Facility Club Model without Non-user Externalities 
This third model expands upon the first by including two 
time periods and a second group of transportation facility 
users. This is done to permit consideration of peak-load 
pricing issues and to investigate the implications of the 
sharing of a transportation facility by a heterogeneous popu­
lation. These changes make the model more representative of 
how transportation facilities are actually used. Modifying 
the model to include two time periods reflects the uneven use 
transportation facilities experience during different hours of 
the day, during different days of the week, and during differ­
ent weeks of the year. These variations in use result in 
different levels of traffic congestion during different time 
periods. Consequently, the benefits derived and the costs 
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imposed by a marginal user of a transportation facility simi­
larly vary according to when that individual makes use of the 
facility. 
Also, most transportation facilities are shared by a 
variety of users. Most highways and airports, as well as many 
railroad lines, serve both passenger and freight traffic. 
Even those facilities that are dedicated exclusively to either 
passenger or freight service serve populations of users that 
vary in their service requirements and preferences. For 
example, urban freeways carry passengers traveling by a wide 
variety of transportation modes (e.g., private automobile, 
bus, van, taxi and limousine). These vehicle choices can be 
taken to reflect differences in the preferences of their 
occupants with respect to the value they place on trip charac­
teristics, such as travel time, waiting time, privacy, com­
fort, and convenience. Similarly, airports serve business 
travelers and those traveling for pleasure, individuals and 
families, the young and the old, users of commercial airlines 
and owners of private aircraft. Thus, modification of the 
model to incorporate two groups of users enhances its general­
ity. 
Reflecting these changes, the population of the transpor­
tation facility's service area is now distributed among three 
groups, two user groups consisting of M and N individuals, and 
the remainder of the population, P-M-N in size, that does not 
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use the transportation facility. Also, the utility functions 
of representative members of the two user groups are modified 
to depend explicitly on trips taken during each of two time 
periods, a peak-load traffic period denoted by the subscript 
'p' and an off-peak traffic period denoted by the subscript 
'o', i.e., U' = U'[y',Vp',c(.) ] for i = m,n. Again, the 
utility functions of the representative members of each of the 
three population groups are of the same functional form. 
However, the manner in which the functions' arguments impact 
utility varies to reflect the distinctive characteristics of 
each group. (See Appendix A, Part 1 for an alternative treat­
ment of the non-user group.) 
Similarly, the transportation facility congestion and 
cost functions are expanded to accommodate both peak and off-
peak traffic flow variables for menibers of the two user 
groups, i.e., c(F„^Fp^F„^Fp^X) and C(F„^Fp^F„^Fp^X), where 
V = Fp"" = Vp""*!!, F^" = v^"*N and Fp" = Vp"»N. Finally, the 
model now includes both peak period and off-peak period capac­
ity constraints which require that the weighted sums of trips 
made by members of both user groups each period not excf^ed the 
capacity of the transportation facility, i.e., Fp*" + k*Fp" < X 
and Fj,™ + k*F^" < X, where k is a factor representing a ratio 
between measures of transportation facility occupancy for 
members of group N to members of group M. These changes made 
to the one-period, one-user group model yield the objective 
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function presented in equation (IB), 
W = (P-M-N) • U^(y^ 0, 0, 0) 
+ M•U"ty^ V™, vj, C(F^, Fj, F^, FJ, X)] (IB) 
+ N-U"[y", v^, vj, c(F^, Fj, F^, fJ, X)]. 
This objective function is again subject to a societal 
budget constraint, 
I = (P-M-N) • y' + M- y" + N- y" + C(F^, FJ, F^, fJ, X) . (2B) 
This constraint requires the total income earned by all mem­
bers of the transportation facility's service area population 
be expended on the acquisition of private goods by members of 
the three groups and for the provision and operation of the 
transportation facility. 
Maximization of the objective function is also con­
strained by the capacity of the transportation facility. This 
constraint applies separately to the peak and off-peak time 
periods and thus requires satisfaction of the conditions 
presented in equations (3B.1) and (3B.2) during the respective 
periods, 




The Lagrangean function for this model, 
(4B) 
Max. W = (P-M-N) • U^(y^ 0, 0, 0) 
+ M-ir"[y", vj, c(F^, FJ, F^, FJ, X)] 
+ N - U"[y", v^, vj, C(F^, fJ, F^, fJ, X) ] 
+ A,- [I - (P-M-N) • y' - M- y™ - N- y" 
- C(F^, FJ, F^, FJ, X)] 
+ M- [X - Fj - k- Fj] + 5- [X - F^ - k-F^], 
is optimized with respect to the consumption of the composite 
private good by members of all three segments of the popula­
tion, the number of members in each of the two transportation 
facility user groups, the capacity of the transportation 
facility, the number of trips taken during each time period by 
members of the two user groups, and the three Lagrange multi­
pliers. 
Optimization of the above Lagrangean function results in 
the following first-order conditions. First, as shown in 
equation (5B), 
iH! = in: = «!L" = X, (5B) 
ayl 3yin ay" 
the addition of the second user group results in the inclusion 
of one more term in the marginal utility condition for the 
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private good. The interpretation of this condition remains 
the same as in equation (5) of the first model, i.e., that the 
marginal rates of social substitution be equal across the 
entire population. 
Next, optimization of the Lagrangean function with re­
spect to the sizes of the two transportation facility user 
groups yields two membership conditions which are presented in 
equations (6B.1) and (6B.2). For members of group M, 
U"(.) _ U'(.) _ 
dlT/d-f dU^ /dy^  
dlS^/dc . Be . pin _ 3u"/8c . 9c . pm 
duydy^  apj  ^ aif/ay" " 
_ N. duydc . ac . pm _ N. dvydc . Be (6B.I) 
M auV8y" aPp ^ " auv3y" ar^ ° 
^ 
M ai^ni M "X M "X M 
+  ( y "  -  y l ) .  
arl" " arT P 0 
and for members of group N, 
U"(.) _ U^.) = 
au"/ay" auVsy' 
auyac . ac . „n _ auyac . 9c _n pn _ . pn (6B.2) 
au"/ay" arj '' auvay" ar^ ° 
_ M, au"/ac . . pn _ M. au"/ac . ac . pn 
N au"/ay" arj ^ air"/ay" ar^ ° 
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^ 8C(.) . Fj ^  dC{.). ^ 
8Fj N 
+ ( y "  -  y i ) .  
Like equation (6) in the first model, these conditions indi­
cate that membership in each of the two user groups is opti­
mized when the benefits derived by the marginal users, given 
by the LHS of each equation, are just equal to the costs those 
individuals' use of the transportation facility impose on all 
other users, plus any redistribution of the private good 
required to maintain the equality of the marginal rate of 
social substitution among all members of the population. 
However, the RHS of each of these membership conditions con­
sists of nine rather than the four terms derived in the first 
model. In this case the first two RHS terms in each equation 
represent the additional congestion costs the marginal user of 
the transportation facility imposes on members of his or her 
own group during the peak and off-peak periods, respectively. 
The third and fourth RHS terms similarly represent peak and 
off-peak period congestion costs imposed by the marginal user 
on members of the other user group. The fifth and sixth RHS 
terms equal the additional peak and off-peak period operating 
costs associated with the increased use of the facility. 
Whereas the seventh and eighth RHS terms represent the addi­
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tional capital investment necessitated by increased peak 
period and off-peak period use of the transportation facility 
when traffic during either of the periods reaches or exceeds 
the facility's capacity. Finally, like in equation (6), the 
last term accounts for adjustments in the allocation of the 
private good, or income, between the marginal users and non-
users. Since each group of users is assumed to contain at 
least one member, the conditions hold with equality. 
Similarly, optimal provision of the transportation facil­
ity requires recognition of the benefits derived by members of 
both user groups from the reduction in congestion that would 
result from facility expansion. As shown in equation (7B), 
jj. au^/ac . Be ^ dvydc . ac ^ ac ( . )  _n _ s 
au"/ay™ ^ au"/ay" ^ ax i 
the LHS of the provision condition now consists of the sum of 
benefits received by members of the two user groups which 
result from the reduction in traffic congestion when the 
capacity of the transportation facility is expanded. Similar­
ly, the RHS of the revised provision condition now includes 
three terms. As in equation (7), the first term represents 
the marginal cost associated with expansion of the facility's 
capacity. The other two terms consist of ratios of the peak 
period and off-peak period capacity constraint Lagrange multi­
pliers to the budget constraint Lagrange multiplier. These 
55 
two ratios of Lagrange multipliers are interpreted to repre­
sent the marginal benefits associated with relaxing the capac­
ity constraints for each of the two time periods measured in 
terms of the marginal utility of the private good. If the 
capacity of the transportation facility is not being fully 
used during either of the periods, then the magnitude of the 
corresponding ratio of Lagrange multipliers for that period is 
zero. 
Optimization of the Lagrangean function with respect to 
use of the transportation facility results in four toll condi­
tions. These conditions, one for members of each user group 
during each time period, are presented in equations (8B.1) 




a t f " /ac .  dc  _  auyac .  ac  ^  ac ( . )  ^  n^  
au"/ay" arj au"/ay" arj arj 
and the off-peak period toll condition is 
au"/av" _ 
au"/ay" 
au"/ac . jSc _ JJ. auyac . jc ^ ac ( . )  ^  s^  
au^/ay" ai^ au"/ay" ar^ ar^ ^ 
(8B.1) 
(SB.2) 





euyac . ^  au^/ac . ^  ^ ac ( . )  / x .  
au"/ay" 3Fp au"/ay" SFp aPp ^ 
and the off-peak period toll condition is 
au"/av^ _ 
auvay" 
auyac . _ac _ au^/ac . _ac ^ ac ( . )  +  « .  
au"/ay" 3f" au"/ay" 3f" ar^ ^ 
(8B.3) 
(8B.4) 
Each of the toll conditions follows the same general 
form. The term on the LHS of each equation equals the margin­
al rate of substitution between use of the transportation 
facility and consumption of the composite private good. Or 
alternatively, the LHS of each equation represents the addi­
tional benefit a user of the transportation facility derives 
from taking one more trip during a given time period. Given 
the assumptions that members of the two user groups differ in 
terms of their tastes and preferences and that travel during 
the two time periods is represented separately in the utility 
functions of the representative user group members, the four 
equations will not generally be equal. 
Similarly, the RHS of each of the toll conditions con­
sists of four terms. The first RHS term in each case repre-
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sents the increased congestion cost an additional trip by a 
member of one of the user groups imposes on the members of his 
or her own group. The second RHS term equals the increase in 
congestion cost the same trip imposes on members of the other 
user group. The third RHS term equals the increase in trans­
portation facility operating cost associated with the added 
trip. Finally, the last RHS term represents the benefit the 
individual making the additional trip would derive from expan­
sion of the transportation facility if it is already being 
used to capacity during the time period when the individual 
wants to make the trip. This last RHS term equals zero if the 
facility is not being used to capacity during the time period 
when the desire for additional travel arises. This may be 
expected to be the case most of the time for the off-peak 
period. However, when demand for the use of the transporta­
tion facility during the peak traffic period becomes excep­
tionally high the overflow will often spill over into the off-
peak period and cause the capacity of the facility to be 
reached during that period as well. Finally, the weighting of 
the last RHS tterm by the factor k in the two toll conditions 
for members of group N reflects the prior assumption that 
members of the two groups do not use the transportation facil­
ity with the same intensity. For example, in traveling on an 
urban freeway members of group M may travel alone whereas 
members of group N carpool. 
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The last set of first-order conditions derived for this 
model results from differentiating the Lagrangean function 
with respect to each of the Lagrange multipliers. For the 
multiplier X the result is the societal budget constraint in 
implicit form which is assumed to hold with equality. But for 
H and S, the Lagrange multipliers for the peak period and off-
peak period capacity constraints, respectively, which are not 
assumed to hold with equality, one derives the following Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. For the peak traffic period. 
X - Vp-M - k-vj-N = X - fJ - k- fJ > 0 (9B.1) 
M > 0 (lOB.l) 
M- (X - fJ - k- fJ) = 0, (llB.l) 
and for the off-peak traffic period, 
X - v"- M - k- v"- N = X - F^ - k- F" > 0 (9B.2) O O O 0 
^ > 0 (X0B«2) 
5- (X - F^ - k- F^) = 0. (11B.2) 
Equations (9B.1) and (9B.2) hold with equality when the 
transportation facility is being used to capacity during the 
period which corresponds with each of these constraints. 
Otherwise, if excess capacity exists during either of the time 
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periods, then the corresponding Lagrange multiplier equals 
zero signifying there is no benefit to be derived by users of 
the transportation facility during that period from expanding 
the capacity of the facility. 
The first-order conditions for the two-period, two user 
group model show several differences from those derived for 
the one-period, one user group model. However, in all cases, 
the differences can be characterized as the expansion of terms 
in the first model to reflect the finer differentiations of 
the population and the division of time into distinct periods. 
The more significant findings associated with the first-order 
conditions derived from this model are revealed by looking at 
their implications relative to the financing of the transpor­
tation facility. With the expansion of the model, the issues 
of economies of scale and economies of scope both must be 
considered to determine when full user financing of the trans­
portation facility is feasible. 
Transportation facility financing considerations 
Full user financing of the transportation facility in the 
context of this model requires that payments from members of 
both user groups for travel made during the two time periods 
entirely cover both operating and capital costs. Letting tj^ 
represent the toll paid per trip during period i by a member 
of group j, full user financing of the transportation facility 
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requires satisfaction of the condition presented in equation 
(12B), 
fT- t; + F^- t™ + F"- t" + F^- t^ = C(F" F^, F" F^, X) . (12B) 
If one again assumes users of the transportation facility 
are willing to make payments equal to the benefit they derive 
from each trip, substitution from the various toll conditions, 
equations (8B.1) through (8B.4), for the t.^ terms in equation 
(12B) yields equation (13B), 
M-
auffl/aym au"/ay". 
_£E. • F" +-£E. • F" • • oc . „n 
^ dFl ° SF" o p 
F"+ • F"
5Fo 
( • ) . 5^+ ( *) . p'''+ . pn_j^ dC ( . ) . pO 
aFj SfT bf; 3F^ (13B) 
^•Fp + |-F^+^-k-Fj + |-k-FS 
= C(Fj, F^, FJ, F^, X). 
Next, to relate the toll and provision conditions in this 
model, it is necessary to make an assumption about how conges­
tion of the transportation facility is dependent on the total 
use and the capacity of the facility when multiple user groups 
and time periods are involved. As previously explained in the 
one-period, one user group model, the key relationship em­
ployed in planning for new transportation facilities or for 
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the expansion of existing facilities is the desired ratio 
between forecasted use of the facility and the capacity of the 
facility at some future date. 
The prior model assumed a single homogeneous group of 
users that implicitly also assumed the transportation facility 
would serve a single type of transportation vehicle. However, 
the use of most transportation facilities is shared by a 
variety of transportation vehicles, which due to differences 
in their size and operating characteristics contribute differ­
ently to the congestion of the facility as their number and 
share of the total traffic flow increase. This model explic­
itly recognizes that in practice the volume-to-capacity ratio 
used in planning transportation facility improvements must 
take into consideration vehicle mix as well as vehicle count. 
Furthermore, this model provides the basis for relating indi­
vidual use of the transportation facility to the flow of 
transportation vehicles served by the facility since assump­
tion of multiple user groups distinguished on the basis of 
their members' utility functions encompasses differences in 
mode and vehicle preferences. 
In practice, as explained in standard transportation 
engineering references, such as the Hiahwav Capacity Manual 
(1985) and Airport Engineering (Ashford and Wright, 1992), 
volume-to-capacity ratios for mixed use facilities are deter­
mined by weighting the contribution of different types of 
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vehicles to congestion of the facility in terms of a standard 
design vehicle. For example, for highway planning purposes 
the contributions of different size trucks and busses to 
traffic congestion are measured as multiples of the contribu­
tion of a standard automobile. In this model the factor k 
reflects the difference in contribution to transportation 
facility congestion attributable to members of the two user 
groups. 
Also, consideration of two time periods within a single 
congestion function reflects how traffic in one period can and 
does affect traffic in other periods. This is particularly 
true when extreme congestion during peak traffic periods can 
result in travel delays during subsequent time periods. For 
example, congestion at a major hub airport often results in 
air traffic controllers ordering approaching aircraft to slow 
their speed, or in the worst cases, prohibiting additional 
aircraft destined for the congested airport from taking off. 
Thus, in the two-period, two user group case, as in the 
single user group case, in the absence of non-user externalit­
ies, the model's congestion function can be assumed to be 
homogeneous of degree zero in traffic flow and capacity, i.e., 
cCFp"", F^"", Fp", F„", X) = cCCFp"" + F^"" + k-Fp" + k»F„")/X]. Conse­
quently, by Euler's theorem the following equality can be 
expected to hold. 
63 
dc . pin  ^ dc . pin  ^ 3c . „n  ^ dc 
ap" " ap" ° I 
P o 
FII , V w nH a O + • K = — ' 
P gpn o -Jx (14B) 
Now, substituting the RHS of equation (14B) into the LHS 
of equation (13B) one obtains equation (15B), 
jj. au"/ac ^ jj, duydc 
du^/dy^ au"/ay". 









F" + ^ • F" 
M.pj, «.p-. M . If. p" + ^ • k • F" ^ K I-p + JC 
(15B) 
= C(FJ, F^, FJ, F^, X) 
The first LHS term in equation (15B) equals the LHS of 
the provision condition for the model, equation (7B). Thus, 
substituting the RHS from the provision condition into equa­
tion (15B) and regrouping terms yields the condition for ray 
constant economies of scale presented in equation (16B), 
(*) . p™ + (•) . p™ + (•) . p" + (•) . p" + ») 
SFj arl! bf; sf" 
X 
(16B) 
- (X - FJ - k- FJ) - (X - F^ - k- F^) 
= C(FJ, F^, FJ, F^, X). 
But by the complementary slackness conditions presented 
in equations (llB.l) and (11B.2) the last two LHS terms of 
equation (16B) equal zero. Consequently, the condition for 
ray constant economies of scale, which implies a transporta-
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tion facility cost function that is homogeneous of degree one, 
is again obtained, i.e.. 
Therefore, full user financing of the transportation 
facility is feasible if the toll charged for each trip during 
each time period is set equal to its marginal cost. However, 
since the facility provides service jointly to two groups of 
users over two time periods, the existence of a cost structure 
characterized by ray constant economies of scale does not 
provide adequate information to reveal whether each toll is 
separately optimal. Optimal pricing of the transportation 
facility requires that each group's toll per time period equal 
both the marginal cost and the average incremental cost asso­
ciated with each trip type. Thus, letting tjj(*) denote the 
optimal toll for trips made during period i by members of 
group j, the conditions for optimal pricing of the transporta­
tion facility are presented in equations (18B.1) through 
(18B.4). 




= C(Fj, F^, Fj, F^, X) 
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t^*) = o^' X)-C(0, Fg, X') 
P F" 
(18B.1) 
= - M -  dif'/dc . dc _^ , auyac . dc^dcj.)^^ 
axjm/aym 3pm au"/ay" ar^ arj 
where X' < X represents the transportation facility capacity 
required to serve all users except members of group M during 
the peak period. For the off-peak period the optimal toll 
condition is, 
C(Fj, F^, Fj, F^, X) - C(FJ, 0, FJ, F^, X") 
^o\*l ~ ;;;; 
(18B.2) 
= -M- 5UV^. j!£-N- • 8c ^ dC(.)^S 
au«n/ayni 3pm auv^y" aF^ ar^ 
where X" < X represents the transportation facility capacity 
required to serve all users except members of group M during 
the off-peak period. Similarly, for members of group N the 
optimal peak period toll condition is, 
C(F;, F^, FJ, F^, X) - C(F;, F^, 0, F^, X^'O 
r, - — 
K ^
 (18B.3) 
= _N. iUViS.. d\f"/dc . ac , dC{.) 
auv3y" aF" au"/ay" ap" aF" p p p 
where X"' < X represents the transportation facility capacity 
required to serve all users except members of group N during 
the peak traffic period. And for the off-peak period the 
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optimal toll condition is, 
to(*) 
where X"" < X represents the transportation facility capaci­
ty required to serve all users except members of group N 
during the off-peak traffic period. 
From these conditions one can ascertain that the trans­
portation facility's cost function must exhibit neither econo­
mies of scope nor diseconomies of scope, as well as be charac­
terized by ray constant economies of scale, for marginal cost 
pricing to be optimal. To show this one must consider oppor­
tunities for sharing the transportation facility both within 
one time period and between time periods. 
Focusing first on the within time period case, one finds 
that if the incremental costs associated with serving the two 
user groups separately relative to the costs associated with 
serving the two groups jointly is subadditive then economies 
of scope exist. (See Appendix A, Part 2 for proof of the 
relationship between subadditive incremental costs and econo­
mies of scope.) For the peak traffic period this condition 
becomes 
C(f;, F^, F;, F^, X) - C(F;, F^, F;, O, x"") 
K (18B.4) 
_JJ. au"/ac . , dc ^  dC(.) 6^ 
du"/dy" 3f" 3U*"/0y" 0f" 3f" ^ 
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K' + f"- t"(*) = p  p * '  p  p ^ '  
pin. 
P 
where X' + X"' > X. This implies that if the two groups 
share some of the capacity of the transportation facility 
during the peak traffic period, then the condition for intra-
period economies of scope results, i.e., 
C(0, F^,FJ,F2,X') + C(FJ,F^,0,F^, X'^^) - C(FJ,F^,FJ,F^, X) > 0.(20B) 
By similar reasoning it can be shown that economies of 
scope would exist under the same conditions during the off-
peak traffic period. For both time periods, the key factor 
that must exist for economies of scope to arise from the joint 
use of the transportation facility is the ability of the 
facility to accommodate joint use without substantial conflict 
occurring between the two groups. If substantial conflict 
does arise, then the simultaneous accommodation of the two 
user groups may necessitate the expansion of the transporta­
tion facility so that the sum of the capacities required to 
C(f;,F^,FJ,F^,X) - C(O,F^,FJ,F^,X') 
(19B) 
f! 
C(F;,f''"',F;,F^ ,X) - C(F;,F;, O,F^ , x'") 
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serve the two user groups on a stand alone basis is less than 
the required capacity under joint use, i.e., 0 < X' + X''' < 
X. In this case, again focusing on the peak traffic period, 
the sum of intra-period incremental costs would exceed the 
cost associated with providing service jointly, i.e., 




> C(Fj,F^, Fj,F^,X). 
Under these conditions, the inequality in equation (2OB) is 
reversed signifying the transportation facility exhibits 
diseconomies of scope, i.e., 
C(0, F^, Fj, F^, X') +C(F;, F^, 0, F^, X'^ ) -C(FJ, F^, FJ, F^, X) <0. (22B) 
An example of a situation under which diseconomies of 
scope could arise is the mixing of automobile and truck traf­
fic on a highway characterized by high traffic volume and 
steep grades. Due to differences in acceleration rates and 
stopping distance requirements, the mixing of the two vehicle 
types under the described conditions would likely require 
additional investment in climbing lanes and a larger number of 
C(FT, F™, F" F" X) - C(0, F^, F" F" x') 
C(f;,F;,F;,F^ ,X) - C(F;,F^ ,O,F^ ,X^ ^^ ) 
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through lanes to achieve the same level of service and level 
of safety as highway facilities designed to serve automobile 
and truck traffic on a mutually exclusive basis. Similarly, 
highly congested airports that serve both commercial air 
carriers and general aviation aircraft often have to invest in 
more peak period runway capacity than would be required to 
serve the two types of traffic on an exclusive basis. This 
additional investment is required to allow increased aircraft 
spacing during take-offs and landings to prevent the smaller 
general aviation aircraft from being adversely affected by air 
turbulence caused by the larger commercial carrier aircraft. 
Even when during peak usage periods a transportation 
facility is characterized by diseconomies of scope, it is 
possible on an inter-period basis for economies of scope to 
exist. As for the intra-period case, the degree of inter-
period economies of scope depends on the relationship between 
the sum of incremental costs associated with serving peak and 
off-peak period traffic and the joint costs associated with 
serving all traffic over both time periods. When excess 
capacity exists during the off-peak traffic period, and some 
element of the transportation facility is used during both the 
peak and off-peak traffic periods, the sum of per period 
incremental costs will be less than the two period joint cost. 
To illustrate this one begins by focusing on a single group of 
users over the two time periods. For example, for members of 
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group M, 
Fp- tj(*) + K- to(*) = 
+ F^ . 
where X' + X'" > X. 
This subadditivity of incremental costs relative to the 
joint cost associated with serving members of group M over 
both time periods directly yields the condition for inter-
period economies of scope, i.e., 
+C(O,F^,FJ,FS,XO-C(FJ,F^,FJ,F^,X) >0. (24B) 
similar conditions will result in inter-period economies of 
scope relative to use of the transportation facility by mem­
bers of group N. 
Now, turning to the issue of serving each group of users 
on an exclusive basis over the two time periods versus serving 
them jointly with a single transportation facility, economies 
of scope exist if the sum of the group specific incremental 
costs are subadditive with respect to the cost associated with 
serving both groups of users jointly, i.e., 
C(f;,F^,F;,F^,X) - C(O,F^,F;,F^,X^) 
pm 




+ [C(FJ,F^,FJ,F^,X) - C(FJ,F^, 0,0,X'")] (25B) 
< C(FJ,f^,FJ,F^,X), 
where X" and X" are the transportation capacities required to 
serve members of group M and group N, respectively, on a stand 
alone basis. This condition occurs when the sum of the stand 
alone transportation facility capacities is greater than the 
capacity required to serve the members of both groups jointly, 
i.e., Xf + X" > X, which implies some sharing of transportation 
facility capacity when joint use occurs. This subadditivity 
of group specific incremental costs directly yields the condi­
tion for economies of scope, i.e., 
C(Fj,F^, 0,0,X") + C(0,0,FJ,FS,X„) - C(FJ, F^, FJ, F^, X) > 0. (26B) 
Finally, if conditions required for inter-period economies of 
scope exist for each group of users, X' + X'" > X and X" + 
X'''' > X, and if the conditions for inter-group economies of 
scope also hold, Xp" + X^," > X", where Xp" and X^^"* are the user 
group M stand alone peak period and off-peak period transpor­
tation facility capacities, and Xp" + X,," > X", where Xp" and X^ ," 
are the user group N stand alone peak period and off-peak 
period transportation facility capacities, then overall econo­
mies of scope among the two user groups over the two time 
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periods also exists, i.e., 
C(Fj,0,0,0,Xj) +C(0,F^, 0,0, X^) +C(0,0,Fj, 0,XJ) 
(27B) 
+ C(0,0,0,F^,X^) - C(FP",F™,FJ,F^,X) >0. 
When these conditions hold, the sum of group and period 
specific incremental costs will be less than the cost associ­
ated with providing all transportation services jointly. In 
this case pricing usage of the transpotation facility on a 
marginal cost basis will not generate adequate revenues from 
user fees to fully fund the provision and operation of the 
facility. These findings yield the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Both ray constant economies of scale and the 
absence of economies of scope are required for marginal cost 
pricing to result in the optimal provision of capacity for the 
shared transportation facility. 
On the other hand, usage fees set equal to marginal costs 
would yield more than adequate revenues to fund provision and 
operation of the transportation facility when the facility 
exhibits a cost structure characterized by overall disecono­
mies of scope and ray constant economies of scale. When 
neither overall economies of scope or diseconomies of scope 
characterize the cost structure of the facility findings 
regarding the optimality of marginal cost pricing of facility 
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use are ambiguous. Such a situation would arise when heavy 
use of the facility during the peak traffic period results in 
diseconomies of scope and light traffic during the off-peak 
traffic period results in economies of scope. In this situa­
tion marginal cost pricing would not be optimal, but it could 
encourage traffic to shift from the peak period to the off-
peak period, which would result in an improvement of efficien­
cy in use of the facility. 
Additional insight into the optimal pricing of shared 
transportation facilities which experience variable usage over 
different time periods is obtained by comparing intra-period 
optimal tolls between the user groups and by comparing inter-
period optimal tolls for each group. The intra-period toll 
comparison for the peak traffic is 
tp(*)-tj(*) = - M . dlf/Bc . 3U"/3c . 5c _ dc 
Bvr/dy^ au"/ay"J arj arj 
(28B) 
and for the off-peak traffic period the comparison is 
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M- . +N-
au"/ay" au"/aY"J ar^ ar^ 
(29B) 
+ iSiil -iSiil +[i-k]-
 ^Tn'W  ^t:,n ar^ ar" 0 0 
s 
J 
Both of these equations show that the difference in the 
tolls charged members of the two transportation facility user 
groups will arise from three sources. First, differences in 
the marginal congestion caused by trips taken by members of 
the two groups would justify different per trip tolls. The 
difference in marginal operating and maintenance costs imposed 
by an additional trip taken by members of the two groups 
provides the second source of justification for differential 
pricing. The difference in capital costs assignable to mem­
bers of the two user groups provides the third source of 
justification for differential pricing within periods. 
Similarly, sources of differential pricing for use of the 
transportation facility between periods by members of the same 
group can be seen by taking the difference between equations 
(18B.1) and (18B.2) for members of group M and by taking the 
difference between equations (18B.3) and (18B.4) for members 
of group N. These conditions are presented in equations (3OB) 
and (3IB), respectively. 
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t;(*) - t^(*) = - M- au^/ac ^ au"/ac . ac _ ac 
au^/ay"" au"/ay"j arj ar^ 
(30B) 
t;(*) - t^(*) jj, aif/ac ^ jj. au"/ac , _ ac 
au*"/ay" au"/ay"J arj ar^ 
(31B) 
The differences between peak period and off-peak period 
tolls for members of the two user groups again both arise from 
three sources. First, since congestion is assumed to be an 
increasing function of traffic flow, higher volumes of traffic 
during the peak period than during the off-peak period dic­
tates that tolls charged for peak period use of the facility 
exceed tolls charged for off-peak period use. Differences in 
marginal operating and maintenance costs associated with use 
of the transportation facility during the two periods provides 
a second potential justification for differential pricing. 
However, in this case, since a large portion of operating and 
maintenance costs are unrelated to traffic volume, this poten­
tial source of differential pricing for trips taken by members 
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of the same user group during different time periods can be 
expected to contributed little or no justification for inter-
period toll differences. Third, differences in marginal 
benefits associated with the expansion of the transportation 
facility for the two time periods provides another potential 
justification for charging different tolls during peak traffic 
periods versus off-peak periods. Furthermore, in those cases 
when traffic is capacity constrained during the peak period, 
while traffic is not at capacity during the off-peak period, 
only users of the facility during the peak period should bear 
any of the cost of facility expansion. 
Thus, extension of the model to include multiple time 
periods and multiple user groups shows that justification does 
exist for charging different rates for use of transportation 
facilities at different times. In addition, charging differ­
ent tolls to different types of users during the same time 
period is similarly justified. This model also establishes 
that the cost function associated with the provision and 
operation of a transportation facility must exhibit both ray 
constant economies scale and zero economies of scope for 
financing of the facility solely by users to be feasible. 
This third model completes the presentation of the gener­
al theory of transportation clubs. In the next chapter appli­
cation of this theory to the special case of air transporta­
tion is presented. 
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CHAPTER 4: AIRPORT PRICING AND INVESTMENT MODEL 
The previous chapter yielded a general transportation 
pricing and investment model which is based on the theory of 
clubs. The current chapter extends the general transportation 
club model to the special case of airport infrastructure 
pricing and investment. The model developed below incorpo­
rates two transportation club goods (i.e., airport runways and 
a passenger terminal) which are used by two groups of travel­
ers (i.e., those who use scheduled commercial air carriers and 
those who use general aviation services) over peak and off-
peak traffic periods. 
The significance of the airport model is two-fold. 
First, it illustrates the versatility of the general model 
through its application to issues relevant to the special case 
of air transportation. Second, the airport model provides a 
real world application of club theory to the practical prob­
lems associated with making more efficient use of transporta­
tion infrastructure at a time when transportation planners and 
engineers are finally beginning to accept that it is not 
possible to address infrastructure congestion solely through 
the addition of new capacity. 
The recently released Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) 1991-92 Aviation System Capacity Plan strongly supports 
this second point through its advocacy of greater reliance on 
78 
pricing mechanisms in the management of use of airport infra­
structure in the United States (FAA, 1991). Similar support­
ing evidence and arguments are presented in a more broadly 
focused study by the Congressional Budget Office, Paving for 
Hiahwavs. Airwavs and Waterwavs; How Can Users Be Charged? 
(CBO, 1992). 
The specific theoretical and practical issues addressed 
in this chapter include: 
(1) What criteria should be employed to establish 
how airport costs are shared among different groups 
of users? 
(2) What conditions justify requiring non-users of 
the airport to contribute to the financing of air­
port construction and operation? 
(3) Under what conditions should airport user fees 
be used to compensate non-users for adverse environ­
mental impacts associated with the existence and 
operation of the airport? 
(4) What conditions must exist for the sharing of 
airport facilities by multiple user groups to be 
mutually beneficial? 
(5) What criteria should be employed in establishing 
an efficient schedule of demand sensitive user fees? 
However, to provide a basis for understanding the rele­
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vance of these issues, it is first necessary to describe the 
United States domestic air transportation system. This back­
ground discussion will include a description of the nation's 
system of airports, the financing of airport operations and 
capital improvements, and the relationship between the engi­
neering of airports and their operating and construction 
costs. 
Therefore, this chapter consists of the following five 
sections. Section one presents an overview of the domestic 
system of airports and problems associated with the current 
operation of this system. In section two, current airport 
service pricing practices and sources of funds for financing 
airport capital improvements are described. In section three, 
the relationship between the engineering characteristics of 
airport runways and terminals and the construction and operat­
ing costs associated with these elements of airport infra­
structure are discussed. In section four, an airport club 
model is presented. Finally, the last section discusses the 
policy implications of this model regarding how the pricing of 
airport services and the allocation of investment capital may 
be modified to improve the efficiency of the domestic air 
transportation system. 
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Description of the Domestic System of Airports 
As of June 30, 1990, the Unites States domestic air 
transportation system consisted of 17,451 civil landing areas 
(i.e., airports, heliports and seaplane bases). However, only 
about one-third of these airports (5,598) are available for 
public use. The remainder (11,853) are classified as private 
use facilities which have been constructed and are maintained 
by corporations and individuals for their own use. 
Approximately three-fourths (4,169) of the airports 
available for public use are owned and operated by governmen­
tal or quasi-governmental organizations, generally city or 
county governments or regional transportation authorities. 
The other 1,429 public use airports are privately owned. 
Of the airports available for public use, 3,285 are 
included in the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems 
(NPIAS), which determines eligibility for federal funding of 
capital improvements. Of these NPIAS airports 568 serve 
commercial aircraft while the remaining 2,717 provide only 
general aviation service (FAA, 1991; 1-3). 
This chapter focuses primarily on those airports which 
provide commercial air service and those general aviation 
facilities located in close proximity to major commercial 
airports, referred to as reliever airports. Although they 
represent less than 10 percent of all domestic airports, they 
provide all of the nation's commercial air service and serve 
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the vast majority of general aviation operations as well. 
Similarly, these airports account for the majority of capital 
investment needs for the domestic air transportation system 
and they account for most of the social costs associated with 
travel delays attributable to the congestion of the domestic 
air transportation system. 
Even among the commercial service and reliever airports, 
severe traffic congestion problems are experienced by only a 
relative few. These problem airports are generally those 
classified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as 
large hubs, meaning each accounts for at least one percent of 
annual revenue passenger enplanements in the United States. 
In 1990, these 27 busiest airports accounted for 72.42 percent 
of all U.S. passenger enplanements (FAA Airport Activity 
Statistics, 1990). 
As shown in Table 4.1, the concentration of air passenger 
operations in the United States has remained relatively stable 
over the past decade. However, the costs associated with 
traffic congestion at large hub airports has increased sub­
stantially during this period because the number of people 
travelling by air has increased by over 60 percent. Further­
more, forecasts of air transportation demand through the end 
of the century indicate the problem is likely to get worse 
with passenger enplanements predicted to grow by another 40 
percent and aircraft operations predicted to grow by another 
82 
Table 4.1: U.S. Passenger Enplanements by Airport Size, 
1979 - 1989 
Part A: Enplaned Passengers (1,000) 
Year Large Medium Small All Hub Non-
Hub Hub Hvib Airports hub Total 
1979 221,614 49,341 25,717 287,671 11,363 299,034 
1980 197,549 51,779 23,357 272,685 8,724 281,409 
1981 186,048 50,233 19,934 256,215 9,568 265,783 
1982 194,703 55,550 19,443 269,696 8,055 277,751 
1983 220,501 53,455 20,957 294,913 8,808 303,721 
1984 238,617 58,343 22,288 319,249 8,522 327,771 
1985 264,513 65,765 24,344 354,621 8,720 363,341 
1986 294,406 68,801 27,201 390,408 9,600 400,008 
1987 316,271 70,851 30,304 417,426 9,390 426,816 
1988 321,750 68,423 31,493 421,666 9,750 431,416 
1989 313,777 76,092 30,033 419,901 9,753 429,655 
Part B: Percent of Emplaned Passengers 
Year Large Medium Small All Hub Non-
Hub Hub Hub Airports hub Total 
1979 71.1 16.5 8.6 96.2 3.8 100.0 
1980 70.2 18.4 8.3 96.9 3.1 100.0 
1981 70.0 18.9 7.5 96.4 3.6 100.0 
1982 70.1 20.0 7.0 97.1 2.9 100.0 
1983 72.6 17.6 6.9 97.1 2.9 100.0 
1984 72.8 17.8 6.8 97.4 2.6 100.0 
1985 72.8 18.1 6.7 97.6 2.4 100.0 
1986 73.6 17.2 6.8 97.6 2.4 100.0 
1987 74.1 16.6 7.1 97.8 2.2 100.0 
1988 74.6 15.9 7.3 97.8 2.2 100.0 
1989 73.0 17.7 7.0 97.7 2.3 100.0 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, Aiport Activity 
Statistics of Certificated Route Air Carriers, 1979 -
1989. 
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30 percent (FAA, 1991; 1-2). 
A measure of the magnitude of the economic cost associat­
ed with airport congestion is the number of airports experi­
encing more than 20,000 hours of annual aircraft delay, which 
equates to $32 million of aircraft cost for each airport so 
affected. In 1990, the number of airports experiencing at 
least this amount of aircraft delay was 23. This number is 
expected to increase to 40 by the year 2000. Thus, by 2000, 
aircraft operators alone will suffer over $1.2 billion in 
delay costs unless substantial measures are taken to relieve 
congestion at the nation's busiest airports (FAA, 1991). 
Three types of delay may be encountered by passengers and 
aircraft operators at airports: taxi-in delay, gate-hold 
delay, and taxi-out delay. Nearly 80 percent of all flights 
are delayed from 1 to 14 minutes during the taxi-in or taxi-
out phases of airport operations. While only 5 percent of 
flights experience a gate-hold delay (FAA, 1991: 1-11). 
Statistics on the number of aircraft operations delayed 
more than 15 minutes have been collected by FAA air traffic 
controllers since 1984. According to this delay reporting 
system, known as the Air Traffic Operations Management System 
(ATOMS), weather is the principal cause of aircraft delay, 
followed by air traffic control (ATC) center capacity con­
straints, and then by airport terminal constraints. During 
1990, 404,367 flights experienced delays exceeding 15 minutes. 
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Weather was recorded as the cause of 53 percent of these 
aircraft delays, while airport traffic volume, which exceeded 
either ATC or terminal area capacities, accounted for 36 
percent. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the relative significance of 
weather as a cause of delay has decreased over the period from 
1985 to 1990 from 68 to 53 percent, while the share of delays 
associated with air traffic volume have tripled from 12 to 36 
percent. Also, from 1987 to 1990 the share of all flights 
experiencing delays of at least 15 minutes has increased from 
8.0 to 10.3 percent. Thus, not only has the number of flight 
delays at the nation's airports increased in recent years, but 
more importantly, the portion of these delays attributable to 
runway, taxiway, and terminal capacity problems has increased 
dramatically. 
One major factor that has contributed to the increase in 
traffic related delays is the deregulation of commercial air 
transportation. Prior to deregulation, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) regulated air carrier rates and routes. This 
regulation limited carriers' ability to adjust flight sched­
ules and service areas. Also, regulation of rates limited the 
ability of carriers to compete on the basis of price, while at 
the same time by guaranteeing profits regulation removed 
carriers' incentives to manage operations in a cost effective 
manner. Consequently, most commercial carriers competed for 
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Table 4.2: Percent of Aircraft Delay Greater than 15 Minutes 
Experienced at U.S. Airports by Cause, 1985 - 1990 
Cause of Delay 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Weather 68 67 67 70 57 53 
Terminal Volume 12 16 11 9 29 36 
ATC Center Volume 11 10 13 12 8 2 
Closed Runways or 
Taxiways 6 3 4 5 3 4 
NAS Equipment 2 3 4 3 2 2 
Other 1 1 1 1 1 3 
Total Operations 
Delayed (1000) 334 418 325 322 392 404 
Notes: 
ATC stands for air traffic control. 
NAS stands for National Airspace System. 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, 1991 - 92 Aviation 
System Capacity Plan 
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passengers on the basis of service, which translated into the 
minimization of travel times between origin and destination 
airports through the offering of non-stop service. 
Deregulation of air passenger service beginning in 1978 
significantly changed the incentive system for commercial 
carrier managers. The elimination of rate and route regula­
tion resulted in price competition among carriers, plus both 
existing and new carriers were permitted to adjust routes, 
service areas and schedules at will following a short transi­
tion period. These changes in the business environment put 
pressure on airline managers to cut operating costs. One of 
the primary results of this change was the reconfiguration of 
routes from a direct point-to-point system of routes to a hub-
and-spoke system of routes. 
Under this new arrangement carriers established hub 
operations at selected airports which serve as gathering and 
transfer points for their operations. To facilitate this 
change required that landings and departures at hub airports 
be coordinated so as to minimize the time passengers are 
required to wait between connecting flights. As a result, air 
traffic at hub airports both increased and flight schedules 
became more concentrated which increased congestion during 
peak activity 
periods. 
In reviewing the changes brought about by deregulation, a 
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recent Transportation Research Board study makes the following 
two observations. 
First, ... the public sector's response to the increased 
demand for airway and airport capacity that was stimulat­
ed by deregulation has been inadequate. Second, ... 
given the difficulties with expanding the supply of 
airway and airport capacity, the existing system should 
be used more efficiently. Assets have been used more 
efficiently by the private sector in aviation by greater 
reliance on the price mechanism, [and] this approach 
deserves experimentation in the public sector (TRB, 1991: 
202-203). 
However, to date the use of demand sensitive pricing as a 
means for modifying how airport infrastructure is used or as a 
means for generating additional funds for airport expansion 
has been rare. Only, the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey (PANY), which operates John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia and 
Newark airports, and Massport, which operates Logan airport in 
Boston, have attempted to modify their airport usage fees as a 
means to reduce airport congestion. In 1968, PANY raised 
peak-period landing fees for small aircraft in order to en­
courage the shifting of general aviation activity to off-peak 
times of the day. In 1988, Massport took an even more aggres­
sive approach by raising landing fees for all general aviation 
use of Logan Airport in an effort to divert smaller aircraft 
to reliever airports in the area. 
Both of these experiments with congestion pricing faced 
legal challenges from general aviation aircraft operators. In 
the PANY case the United States District Court found in favor 
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of the Port Authority, ruling that "the defendants were justi­
fied in distinguishing classes of aircraft, on the grounds of 
safety and that the fee was meant to induce aircraft operators 
to use other times of the day or other facilities (CBO, 1992: 
44)." On the other hand, Massport's attempt at congestion 
pricing was found to unduly discriminate against small air­
craft and was terminated. However, in ruling in the Massport 
case, the administrative law judge indicated that a fee struc­
ture of the sort employed at the PANY airports would likely be 
acceptable (CBO, 1992: 44-45). 
However, to date neither Massport nor any other major 
airport in the United States, aside from the three PANY facil­
ities, have adopted peak-period pricing as a means for allevi­
ating airport congestion. To some extent this may be attrib­
uted to some remaining confusion over the legality of such 
fees. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 
case of Evansville Vanderburgh Airport Authority District et 
al. versus Delta Airlines et al. states that airports may not 
charge aeronautical users more than the airport's historic 
cost for providing capacity. This ruling would appear to 
allow congestion pricing if the revenues raised through the 
assessment of such fees are invested in airport capacity 
improvements. However, given the current state of airport 
financial management in which airport revenues are often 
intermingled with other municipal funds and under which fees 
89 
assessed aircraft operators generally are not directly related 
to the cost of providing aviation services leaves the legal 
status of such fees in question. Also, tradition and long-
term contractual arrangements between airports and air carri­
ers, plus the role of the federal government in providing 
funding for capital improvements, has inhibited the incorpora­
tion of congestion pricing into airport fee structures. 
To gain a better understanding of how existing airport 
fees promote the inefficient investment in and use of airport 
infrastructure, one needs to explore current pricing and 
financial practices of the domestic airport industry. The 
next section describes these practices. 
Financing and Pricing of Airport Services 
The federal government shares with local governments the 
responsibility for financing airport capital improvements in 
the United States. Operating costs, on the other hand, are 
generally funded locally through user fees, rent payments, 
concession fees, special taxes, or general fund appropria­
tions. 
Federal funding of airport capital improvements began in 
1946 with Congress' authorization of the Federal-Aid Airport 
Program. Through this program the federal government has 
provided matching grants ranging from 50 percent to 94 per­
cent. Types of projects eligible for federal assistance 
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include: the development of new airports; the construction or 
upgrading of runways, taxiways and aprons; the construction, 
expansion or rehabilitation of public-use terminal areas; and 
noise abatement projects (CBO, 1984: 5). 
The primary source of revenue for this federal program 
has been excise taxes on passenger tickets, freight waybills 
and general aviation fuel. Since 1970, these tax revenues 
have been deposited in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund which 
serves as the funding mechanism for both airport capital 
grants and for investment in the national air traffic control 
system. Currently, the 10 percent tax on the price of domes­
tic airline tickets provides the major share of revenues for 
the trust fund. During 1991, the passenger ticket tax gener­
ated $4.3 billion and accounted for 88 percent of total avia­
tion tax revenues (CBO, 1992: 35). Other sources of aviation 
trust fund revenues during 1991 include $222 million from a 
6.25 percent tax an the value of freight waybills, $140 mil­
lion from a 15 cent per gallon tax on aviation gasoline and a 
17.5 cent per gallon tax on aviation jet fuel, and $217 mil­
lion from a $6 per passenger departure tax on all internation­
al flights originating in the United States (CBO, 1992: 36-
37) . 
From 1960 through 1982 cumulative pubi ic and private 
investment in the nation's airports totaled $25.1 billion (in 
1982 dollars), of which federal grants accounted for about 
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one-third, or $9 billion. During the 1980s federal annual 
trust fund appropriations for airport improvements increased 
to about $800 million per year. Still the majority of the 
costs of airport capital improvements and all airport operat­
ing costs remain the responsibility of local airport manage­
ment. Funds needed to cover these local cost responsibilities 
are derived from a variety of sources. 
Most large commercial airports raise funds for investment 
purposes by issuing either general obligation bonds, which are 
backed by the full faith, credit and taxing power of the 
issuing government, or revenue bonds, which are backed solely 
by revenues generated from airport operations. Options for 
financing capital improvements at small general aviation 
airports are more limited. Due to their limited ability to 
raise revenues through user fees, the issuance of revenue 
bonds is often not feasible. Consequently, funding of im­
provements for these facilities must be provided from issuing 
general obligation bonds or through direct appropriations from 
the general funds of the government jurisdiction which owns 
the airport. Similarly, commercial airports generally possess 
adequate sources of revenue to cover operating costs without 
requiring support from the general fund revenues of their 
owning jurisdictions. However, many general aviation airports 
require operating subsidies (CBO, 1984; 17-28). 
since traffic congestion experienced by large commercial 
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airports is the primary focus of this chapter, it is instruc­
tive to explore further how present practices associated with 
the pricing of airport airside services contributes to the 
problem. Most United States commercial airports follow one of 
two approaches in setting fees for the use of airport runways, 
taxiways, apron areas, terminal gates, and baggage handling 
areas. These two approaches are known as residual cost pric­
ing and compensatory pricing. 
Under the residual cost pricing approach the airlines 
that use the airport assume a significant portion of the 
airport's financial risk by agreeing to pay any costs associ­
ated with operating the airport that are not covered by fees 
collected from other sources, such as terminal space rentals 
and concessions. Alternatively, under the compensatory ap­
proach the airport owner assiimes the major financial risk 
associated with operating the airport and charges airlines 
fees and rental rates adequate to recover the actual cost 
associated with the provision of airport services (CBO, 1984: 
19) . 
These two approaches to the pricing of airport services 
have significantly different implications for airport infra­
structure investment. These differences are reflected in (1) 
an airport's ability to accumulate retained earnings usable 
for funding capital projects, (2) the nature and extent of the 
role airlines play in making capital investment decisions, and 
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(3) the length of term of airline airport use agreements (CBO, 
1984: 22). 
For example, under the residual cost pricing approach 
airport operators are guaranteed that the cost of airport 
operation will be covered. However, in exchange for the 
airlines assuming much of the airport's financial risk, air­
port operators generally must grant the airlines "majority-in-
interest" rights which gives them a significant degree of 
control over airport investment decisions. Furthermore, since 
most airport capital improvements are initially funded through 
the issuance of bonds, long-term use agreements are required 
to obtain a higher rating for these securities and to guaran­
tee an adequate revenue stream to retire the debt. Thus, 
under this pricing approach the discretion of airport opera­
tors to respond to changing service demands is often sacri­
ficed in exchange for financial security (CBO, 1984: 23-26). 
On the other hand, under the compensatory pricing ap­
proach airport operators have no guarantee that revenues 
generated from operations will cover expenses. But neither is 
their ability to accumulate funds for future investment as 
restricted as under the residual pricing approach. Conse­
quently, this pricing approach affords airport operators 
greater discretion in planning capital improvements. Also, 
the term of usage agreements is generally shorter than at 
airports that employ the residual pricing approach. However, 
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since revenue generated by the airlines is needed to retire 
airport debt, airport operators still need to obtain airline 
support before undertaking major investment projects. 
From an economic efficiency perspective, both of these 
approaches to pricing the use of airport services by commer­
cial carriers and general aviation operators present problems. 
For example, under both approaches landing fees are generally 
set on the basis of gross aircraft weight, which serves as a 
surrogate measure for the wear imposed on runways, taxiways 
and apron areas due to aircraft use. However, by using gross 
weight as the method of cost allocation the fees do not re­
flect how efficiently the aircraft are being used because no 
distinction is made on the basis of load-factor. Neither do 
fees set in this manner account for extra aircraft operating 
costs and passenger travel time costs which result when air­
ports become congested. Nor do weight based landing fees 
adequately reflect the cost associated with the investment in 
extra airside capacity added to accommodate peak period traf­
fic. Furthermore, general aviation aircraft are often exempt­
ed from having to pay these fees, or when they do have to pay 
such fees, they are generally charged substantially below the 
level of cost they impose on the airport (FAA, 1987). 
Similarly, the federal excise tax on passenger tickets 
does not distinguish between passengers traveling during peak 
versus off-peak traffic periods. Furthermore, because the 
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ticket tax is assessed as a percentage of the ticket price, 
the amount of tax varies significantly among different flights 
and even among different passengers on the same flight. Since 
the advent of deregulation, the associated increase in price 
competition among airlines has further accentuated the ineffi­
cient nature of the ticket tax. Specifically, as ticket 
prices are reduced on the most highly contested routes conges­
tion increases while tax revenues decrease. In addition, 
although the majority of federal trust fund revenues is gener­
ated by traffic at the nation's busiest airports, a dispropor­
tionate share of capital improvement grants is awarded to 
general aviation facilities. 
Thus, the present system of airport finance in the United 
States largely fails to promote the efficient use of airport 
infrastructure. Setting usage fees on the basis of average 
historic cost rather than on the basis of current marginal 
cost encourages the overinvestment in new capacity. Ignoring 
differences in the operating characteristics of different 
types of airport users when pricing airport services discour­
ages the efficient use of existing airport facilities. Final­
ly, the separation of service pricing and investment decision­
making prevents the operation of market mechanisms as a means 
for better coordinating the use of and investment in airport 
infrastructure. 
The airport clvib model developed in section four of this 
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chapter provides a theoretical basis for a more efficient 
system of airport infrastructure finance. However, before 
proceeding with development of this model, it is first neces­
sary to explore the relationship between the engineering and 
economic considerations that influence modern airport design. 
Economic Implications of Airport Engineering and Design 
All commercial airports and most large general aviation 
airports consist of a large number of interrelated design 
elements, i.e., access roads, parking areas, lighting and 
communication systems, emergency facilities, aircraft hangers, 
runways, taxiways, terminal buildings, etc. However, to 
simplify the analysis, the theoretical airport model presented 
in this chapter is reduced to the two most basic elements of 
infrastrxicture required to provide air passenger service, 
i.e., runways and a terminal building. Also, these two ele­
ments of infrastructure provide the airport with its fundamen­
tal economic characteristics. 
The engineering of runways incorporates five geometric 
design features that influence the type and amount of aircraft 
traffic an airport can serve. These determinants of airport 
capacity are; the nvimber of rxinways, runway orientation, 
runway length, runway width and pavement depth. The number 
and orientation of runways are the primary design features 
that determine how many aircraft an airport can serve during a 
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given time period. Whereas runway length, runway width and 
pavement depth determine the size of aircraft that can use the 
airport. 
The primary determinant of the maximum number of aircraft 
operations that can be handled by an airport in a given time 
period is its number of runways. However, an airport's maxi­
mum operating capacity is also influenced by various aspects 
of runway orientation, i.e., the spacing between runways, 
orientation relative to the direction of prevailing winds, by 
whether runways are parallel or intersecting, by distance to 
the terminal and by the spacing of exit ramps and taxiways. 
For example, under visual flight rules (VFR) a single runway 
airport which serves only large commercial jet aircraft can 
handle a maximum of 51 operations per hour under ideal condi­
tions. If the number of runways at this airport are doubled 
with a spacing of at least 4,300 feet, then the airport can 
handle 103 VFR operations per hour. However, if the spacing 
between two adjacent parallel runways is only 2,500 feet, then 
the airport's maximum operating capacity is restricted to only 
94 VFR operations per hour. 
Furthermore, under inclement weather conditions when 
aircraft must operate according to instrument flight rules 
(IFR), the impact of runway spacing on airport capacity be­
comes even more pronounced. In this case adding a second 
parallel runway with a spacing of 4,300 feet again about 
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doubles capacity up to 99 operations per hour. However, at 
2,500 foot spacing airport capacity increases by only 20 
percent from 50 to 60 operations per hour (Ashford and Wright, 
1992; 206-207). 
Airport capacity is also affected by the mix of aircraft 
using the facility and by whether take-offs and landings occur 
on the same runway or on separate runways. When large and 
small aircraft use the same runways, the spacing of aircraft 
must be increased to prevent small aircraft from being ad­
versely effected by wing-tip vortices generated by larger jet 
aircraft. Using the same runways for take-offs and landings 
may further reduce airport capacity and result in substantial 
departure delays at busy airports since landing aircraft take 
priority over those waiting to take-off. 
On the other hand, separating large and small aircraft 
can result in a substantial increase in airport capacity. For 
example, an airport with two parallel runways separated by at 
least 4,300 feet can handle up to 126 operations per hour when 
both runways are used by all sizes of aircraft. However, 
separation of large and small aircraft traffic on different 
runways can increase the same airport's capacity to 149 opera­
tions per hour. 
Runway length, runway width and pavement depth also 
influence airport capacity when measured in terms of passenger 
enplanements rather than in terms of aircraft operations. 
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For example, under normal conditions, a Boeing 737-500 air­
craft with maximum capacity of 132 passengers requires a 
runway length of at least 6,650 feet for take-offs, while a 
Boeing 747-400 aircraft with maximum capacity of 660 passen­
gers requires a runway of at least 11,100 feet for take-offs. 
Thus, lengthening runways from 6,650 feet to 11,100 feet (67 
percent) can yield up to a 500 percent increase in the number 
of passengers the airport can theoretically handle. However, 
there are practical limits to the degree of scale economies 
that can be realized from this type of infrastructure invest­
ment. Foremost, few air transportation markets can support 
use of aircraft as large as the Boeing 747-400. Thus, for 
most of an airport's traffic the irunways would be substantial­
ly overbuilt. Also, runway extensions generally require 
corresponding additions to runway width and pavement depth to 
accommodate the increased wheel base and weight of the larger 
aircraft (Ashford and Wright, 1992: 71-79). 
Therefore, most commercial airports exhibit either con­
stant or decreasing economies of scale with respect to the 
number of runways they have in operation. On the other hand, 
due both to the peaked nature of flight operations and the 
fact that airports often construct runways to accommodate 
flight operations under less than ideal conditions, a substan­
tial amount of excess capacity exists during most time peri­
ods. Consequently, to spread the cost associated with an 
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airport's investment in runways, most commercial airports 
serve general aviation, air freight and military traffic, as 
well as provide service to commercial passenger carriers. The 
accommodation of air freight and military aircraft increases 
runway utilization during off-peak traffic periods, plus 
provides additional use of long runways which are well suited 
for serving aircraft carrying heavy payloads or requiring 
extra length for high speed landings. Accommodation of gener­
al aviation aircraft further increases off-peak runway utili­
zation. Thus, most commercial airports are characterized by 
subadditive runway costs. This implies at least some degree 
of economies of scope with respect to the provision of runway 
capacity (Baumel, Panzar and Willig, 1988: 71-72). 
The relationship between the design and economic charac­
ter of airport terminals is less well understood than for 
runways. The primary consideration in the design of most 
modern airport terminals is the accommodation of passenger 
needs. These needs fall in three areas: circulation, process­
ing and holding space (Ashford and Wright, 1992: 287). 
First, to provide efficient circulation, airport terminal 
designers generally strive to minimize the distance passengers 
must travel between landside access and aircraft boarding 
areas and to minimize conflicts between arriving and departing 
passengers. Second, depending on whether the airport serves 
only domestic or both domestic and international flights, 
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terminal space must be allocated to a variety of passenger 
processing functions, which include: airline ticketing, pas­
senger check-in, baggage check-in, baggage pick-up, gate 
check-in, incoming and outgoing customs, immigration control, 
health control, and security. Third, depending on the role 
played by the airport in the national air transportation 
system in terms of the number and size of markets served, 
areas must be designed to accommodate a variety of passenger 
and visitor needs while they wait for flights. Among the 
types of facilities that must be accommodated within these 
holding areas are: waiting areas at aircraft boarding gates, 
passenger service areas which include wash rooms, public 
telephones, nurseries, storage lockers, first aid stations, 
and flight information displays, and concessions which include 
bars, restaurants, vending machines, newsstands, tax and duty­
free shops, retail shops, hotel reservation and car rental 
areas, and areas in which to purchase insurance, exchange 
currencies and access automatic teller machines. 
Thus, because of the wide variety of functions airport 
terminals must serve, the relationship between terminal size 
and the number of passengers served per time period is not as 
precise as the relationship between the number of runways and 
capacity measured in terms of the number of aircraft that can 
be served. And, even though most commercial airports serve a 
variety of different sized aircraft, airport terminal design­
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ers generally resort to using measures of aircraft accommoda­
tion rather than passenger accommodation as the starting point 
for determining terminal space requirements. As a result, the 
number of gates required to serve originating and terminating 
flights often serves as the basis for measuring airport termi­
nal capacity (Landrum and Brown, 1992; 3-3). 
In this regard, the design of airport terminals may be 
thought of as proceeding from the airside/terminal interface, 
i.e., the aircraft boarding gates, and working backward toward 
the terminal/landside interface. In this process the determi­
nation of terminal space requirements begins with forecasting 
the number of aircraft gates that will be required at some 
future planning horizon to accommodate approximately 90 per­
cent of anticipated peak period flight demand. 
However, following this approach will not necessarily 
result in a unique number of boarding gates. Factors which 
introduce variation into the process include the mix of air­
craft which must be accommodated, whether gates will be used 
by more than one size of aircraft, and whether air carriers 
possess exclusive usage rights to specific gates or whether 
gates are open to all carriers. 
Another important determinant of airport terminal capaci­
ty is whether passenger processing is handled in a centralized 
or decentralized manner. Factors influencing this decision 
include the volume of flights, the number of air carriers 
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served, the split of traffic among domestic, international, 
scheduled and charter flights, physical site characteristics, 
available modes of landside access and type of financing 
(Ashford and Wright, 1992; 293). The interplay of all of 
these factors requires designers of airport terminals to make 
a number of critical trade-offs. For example, the greater the 
number of aircraft the terminal is designed to accommodate 
during peak traffic periods, the larger the number of gates 
that will be required. This will result in passengers making 
connections, along with their baggage, having to travel great­
er distances within the terminal between flights which as a 
consequence increases gate occupancy times. Similarly, the 
degree of air carrier concentration at an airport will influ­
ence the number of aircraft that must be accommodated during 
peak traffic periods. As the degree of concentration increas­
es the number of required gates will increase to facilitate 
the transfer of passengers and baggage between connecting 
flights, and consequently, so will gate occupancy times. 
Thus, as most domestic air carriers have restructured flight 
operations into a hub-and-spoke configuration since the dereg­
ulation of air passenger transportation, gate requirements at 
major airports have increased. 
These and other trade-offs often result in substantial 
airport terminal excess capacity during off-peak traffic 
periods. This suggests there is potential for substantial 
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economies of scope with respect to the variety of passenger 
transportation demands that may be accommodated by airport 
passenger terminals. In particular, as air carriers continue 
to adjust to the new economic opportunities and challenges 
presented by deregulation they are finding some route segments 
are best served by hub-and-spoke type operations, whereas 
direct point-of-origin to point-of-destination type flights 
serve other markets better. This continued restructuring of 
air carrier routes lends itself to an associated rescheduling 
of non-hubbing flights to off-peak traffic periods. 
The impact of rescheduling direct point-to-point flights 
to off-peak periods would not only allow a reduction in the 
number of boarding gates required to meet peak period needs, 
but it would also allow a reduction in terminal space require­
ments for most passenger processing and holding activities, 
which in turn would reduce circulation space requirements. On 
the other hand, direct flights are most viable for routes 
carrying a high percentage of business travelers whose time 
preferences for using airport terminals corresponds very 
closely with present hub-and-spoke operation peak traffic 
periods. This suggests that as with runways, a terminal usage 
pricing system sensitive to variations in demand could result 
in a more efficient utilization of facilities. 
Thus, the design of airport terminals does not lend 
itself to the same form of precise numeric measures of ulti­
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mate capacity as does the design of runways. Rather, airport 
terminal designers generally resort to empirically determined 
level of service criteria in developing space requirements for 
the various passenger processing and holding areas of the 
terminal which in turn result in the determination of circula­
tion area requirements. 
Having described the relationships between the major 
design considerations and the associated aircraft and passen­
ger service characteristics of airport runways and terminals, 
it is now possible to develop a theoretical model which will 
provide a basis for testing hypotheses related to the exis­
tence of economies of scale and economies of scope associated 
with commercial airport design and use. The above provided 
information also provides the basis for empirically testing 
the hypotheses suggested by the model. Both the model and 
testable hypotheses are presented in the next section. Test­
ing of selected hypotheses suggested by the model is the focus 
of Chapter 5. 
Airport Club Model 
Model specification 
The airport club model represents a special case of the 
two-period, two user group general transportation facility 
model presented in Chapter Three. Principal modifications to 
that model required to obtain the airport club model include: 
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the incorporation of arguments in the utility function for the 
representative member of the non-user portion of the popula­
tion to permit consideration of the impacts of externalities, 
the inclusion of two club goods — a runway club good and a 
terminal club good, and the explicit recognition of transpor­
tation vehicles, i.e., airplanes, as the means by which air­
port users obtain transportation service. 
In this model the population of the airport service area 
is divided among two user groups and a group of individuals 
who do not use the airport. One group of airport users, 
consisting of H individuals, uses scheduled commercial air 
carriers to meet its transportation needs. Each member of 
this group is assumed to take Vp"" trips during peak traffic 
periods and v^," trips during off-peak traffic periods. The 
other group of airport users, consisting of N individuals, 
uses only general aviation services, e.g., private aircraft or 
air taxis. Members of this second group each take Vp" peak 
traffic period trips and v^" off-peak traffic period trips. 
The remaining members of the airport service area population, 
P-M-N individuals, do not use the airport but they do benefit 
from its existence, while they are adversely affected by its 
use. 
Airport service is assumed to be provided through the 
provision of two club goods. One club good, the airport's 
runways, is used by both groups of airport users. The size. 
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or capacity, of this club good, X,, reflects the number of 
aircraft take-offs and landings accommodated by the airport 
during a giving time period. The other club good, the airport 
terminal is used only by individuals who patronize scheduled 
commercial air carriers. As explained above, the model will 
adopt the convention of representing terminal size, Xg, in 
terms of the airport's number of aircraft gate positions. 
Two different types of aircraft are assumed to serve the 
members of the two user groups. The aircraft serving patrons 
of scheduled commercial air carriers is assumed to carry an 
average payload of A passengers per trip, while the average 
payload for the type of aircraft used in providing general 
aviation service equals B passengers per trip. 
Both the airport runways and the airport terminal are 
subject to congestion. Congestion of the airport's runways is 
assumed to be a function of the number of landings and take-
offs made by both types of aircraft during the two time peri­
ods and the capacity of the rxinways, i.e., c^  = c, (Fp"", F^ , 
F^ ", X,), where Fp"" = Vp"'*M/A, F^ "" = v^ '"»M/A, Fp" = Vp"*N/B and F„" = 
v^"*N/B. Congestion of the airport terminal, on the other 
hand, is assumed only to be a function of use by patrons of 
scheduled commercial air carriers during the two time periods 
and the size of the terminal, i.e., Cg = CgCFp"", F^"", Xg) . In 
both cases congestion increases with use and decreases as 
capacity is expanded. Also, both the runways and the terminal 
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are assumed to be subject to capacity constraints, I.e., Fp"* + 
k'Fp" < X,, + k»F^" < X,, Fp"" < Xg and F^"" < Xg, where k repre­
sents the runway occupancy time ratio between a size B air­
craft and a size A aircraft. 
The costs associated with the provision, operation and 
maintenance of the airport's runways are assumed to be a 
function of use by each group of users during each of the two 
time periods and the total runway capacity of the airport. 
I.e. = C^CFp", F^"", Fp", F^", X,). All first partial deriva­
tives of the runway cost function are assumed to be positive. 
The costs associated with provision, operation and maintenance 
of the airport terminal are assumed to be a function of peak 
and off-peak period use by patrons of scheduled commercial air 
service and the size of the terminal. I.e., Cg = CgCFp", F^ "^, 
Xg). Again, all first partial derivatives of this cost func­
tion are assumed to be positive. 
utility for a user of scheduled commercial air service Is 
a function of the quantity of a composite private good con­
sumed by that Individual, y™, the number of visits to the 
airport during each of the two time periods, and the runway 
and airport terminal congestion functions, 1.e., 
U-n = C, (.) , 0, 0, 0]. 
Utility for a user of general aviation services Is a function 
of the quantity of the composite private good consumed by that 
Individual, y", the number of visits to the airport during 
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each of the two time periods, and the runway congestion func­
tion, i.e., 
U" = U"[Y", Vp", v„", c,(.), 0, 0, 0, 0]. 
Utility for a representative individual who does not use the 
airport is a function of the composite private good consumed 
by that individual, y', the amounts of air traffic at the 
airport during each time period, and the runway capacity of 
the airport, which sesrves as a measure of airport size, i.e., 
= U^Cyl, 0, 0, 0, 0, Fp-" + h-Fp", F^-" + h.F„", X,], 
'adhere h represents a factor which measures the environmental 
impacts of general aviation aircraft in terms of a typical 
commercial aircraft. 
The utility functions for meinbers of all three groups are 
assumed to be of the same functional form. However, they 
differ in regards to how the various function arguments affect 
the utility members of the three groups derive from the 
airport's existence and use. In this manner, the distinguish­
ing characteristics of members of the different groups are 
emphasized. For example, the utility functions for members of 
the two groups of airport users could include the arguments 
representing the beneficial and adverse environmental impacts 
associated with the airport's existence and use. However, to 
emphasize the distinction between users and non-users these 
arguments have been omitted from the utility functions of 
airport users. 
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The marginal utilities of the members of the different 
groups of individuals are the same as presented in the general 
transportation facility models. Airport users derive positive 
marginal utility from their ovm use of the airport, i.e., 
au^/aVp" > 0, au^/v^"" > O, auvavp" > O and au"/av„" > O, while the 
marginal utility of airport users decreases as runway and 
terminal congestion increases, i.e., dlf/dc^ < 0, dJJ^/dc^ < 0 
and dV^/dc^ < 0. The marginal utilities of those individuals 
who do not use the airport are positive with respect to the 
provision of runway capacity, i.e., dU^/dX^ > 0, and negative 
with respect to airport use during each of the two time 
periods, i.e, auVSCFp" +h*Fp") < 0 and auVSCFo"* + h»F^") < 0. 
The first-order conditions for this model are derived by 
maximizing a quasi-concave Benthamite Social Welfare function, 
W = (P-M-N) •ul(y',0,0,0,0,Fj+h- Fj, F%h- F^,Xi) 
+ M- U" [ y™, vj, V^, c, (Fj, Fj;, Fj, F^, X,) , C2(F;, F^, Xg) , 0, 0, 0 ] (1) 
+ N-U"[y",vJ,vS,Ci(F;,F^,F;,F^,Xi),0,0,0,0], 
in which the utility functions of representative members of 
the three components of the airport service area population 
are weighted only by each group's membership size. 
Maximization of the objective function is carried out 
subject to a societal budget constraint. 
Ill 
I = (P-M-N) • + M- Y™ + N- y" 
(2) 
+ Ci(F;, FJ, F^ , X,) + C2(FJ, F^ , X2) , 
Which requires that the total income of the airport service 
area population, I, be expended on the purchase of private 
goods and for the provision, operation and maintenance of the 
airport runways and terminal. 
Also, maximization of the objective function is carried 
out subject to a peak period runway capacity constraint. 
Fj + k- fJ < Xi, 
an off-peak period runway capacity constraint. 
(3) 
F^  + k- F" < X,, (4) 
a peak period airport terminal capacity constraint, 
FJ < Xj, (5) 
and an off-peak period airport terminal capacity constraint, 
F™ < Xg. (6) 
Optimization of this model yields the following first-order 
conditions. 
First-order conditions 
First, optimization of the model with respect of the 
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amount of private good consumed by representative members of 
each of the three segments of the airport service area 
population yields the condition that the marginal rate of 
social substitution must be equal across the entire 
population, 
au^ ^ ^  = ^  = A, (7) 
ayi ay" ' ay" 
Furthermore, this condition represents the valuation each 
population member places on the marginal unit of the private 
good consumed when the social welfare function is 
simultaneously maximize with respect to group membership, 
airport facility provision, and airport facility utilization. 
As a result, this condition provides a common unit of measure 
for comparing how different members of the population value 
the provision and use of airport facilities. 
Second, optimization of the model with respect to the 
number of users of scheduled air carrier service, M, and the 
number of users of general aviation services, N, yields two 
conditions which define the socially optimal levels of airport 
patronage by members of the two groups. The first of these 
membership conditions shows that use of scheduled commercial 
air transportation service should expand up to the point where 
the benefits derived by the marginal member of this group of 
airport patrons just equals the costs that individual imposes 
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on members of the service area population that do not use the 
airport, the costs he or she imposes on other users of 
scheduled commercial air carrier service, the costs he or she 
imposes on users of general aviation service, the additional 
airport runway and passenger terminal operating and capital 
costs associated with this last unit of patronage and an 
adjustment to the marginal users income to maintain the 
equality of the marginal utility of income for all population 
members, i.e., 
n-(.) . n'(.) , . . 8n'/a(F;^h-F;)_ j; 
dxf/dy^ auVsy^ auV^y^ ^ 
auV9(F^ + h-F" F"! 
- (P-M-N) • 1——2 P- _? 
auV5y^ " 
. 30"/8c,. 8c,. f; _ aif/ac,. ac,. i: 
au*"/ay" ar^   ^ au^ /ay™ ar^   ^
au^/acp dcy au^/acp ac, F^ 
- M- 1 ?• f 'JP-M- 1 ? •_?•_? (8) 
au^/ay" aF^ ^ au^/ay™ aF^ ^ 
_ N. a^ F; auyac,^ ac,^ F^ 
au"/5y" arj auv^y" sfI ^ 
^ 8C,(.) . ^  ^ 8C,(.) . F; ^  3C;(.) . F; ^  3C;(.l F: 
gF- K ar: " 8F: " 8F" " p 0 p 0 
Ml Fo ^1 K 5, F^ „ 1 
+  _J-_P + _J'_f + + ( V^-y) 
T M T M T M T M  ^ ' 
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Whereas, the LHS of this first-order condition can 
readily be interpreted as the benefit the marginal user of 
commercial air carrier service derives from use of the 
airport, the RHS (or cost side) of the condition merits 
further explanation. The first two RHS terms represent the 
environmental costs borne by non-users associated with 
additional use of the airport by individuals using scheduled 
commercial air carrier service during peak and off-peak 
traffic periods, respectively. Dissecting the first of these 
terms, the cost imposed on airport non-users is shown to equal 
the product of the number of non-users, P-M-N, the 
representative non-user's marginal rate of substitution 
between additional peak period flight activity and consumption 
of the composite private good, (3uV3F"'p)/(SuVSy^), and the 
average number of peak period flights attributable to a 
representative member of the group of users of scheduled 
commercial air carrier service, F"'p/M. 
The third and fourth RHS terms equal the added congestion 
users of scheduled commercial air carriers experience during 
peak and off-peak traffic periods, respectively, when this 
type of airport use increases. Again dissecting the peak 
period term, one finds the added own-group congestion cost 
associated with the use of scheduled commercial air service 
consists of the product of the marginal user's marginal rate 
of substitution between runway congestion and the composite 
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private good, (3U^/3c^)/(3U*"/3y^), the partial derivative of the 
runway congestion function with respect to the number of peak 
period scheduled commercial air carrier flights, do^/d'F^^, and 
the number of peak period scheduled commercial air carrier 
flights, F"p. Similarly, the fifth and sixth RHS terms equal 
the marginal passenger terminal congestion costs associated 
with added scheduled commercial air carrier use during peak 
and off-peak traffic periods, respectively. And, the seventh 
and eighth RHS terms equal the marginal runway congestion 
costs expansion of scheduled commercial air carrier use 
imposes on users of general aviation services at the airport 
during peak and off-peak traffic periods, respectively. 
The next four RHS terms pertain to the added airport 
runway and passenger terminal operating and maintenance costs 
associated with increased use of the airport by patrons of 
scheduled commercial air carrier service. The first of these 
is the marginal runway operating and maintenance costs 
associated with an increase in peak period scheduled 
commercial air carrier use, which is equal to the product of 
the marginal runway operating and maintenance costs with 
respect to the number of peak period scheduled commercial air 
carrier flights, 3c, (. )/3F'''p, and the average number of such 
flights per member of the group of users of scheduled 
commercial air transportation service, F'"p/M. The other three 
operating and maintenance cost terms have a similar 
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interpretation. 
Next, the thirteenth through the sixteenth RHS terms, 
pertain to the marginal runway and passenger terminal capital 
costs that would arise from peak and off-peak use of the 
airport by one more user of scheduled commercial air 
transportation service. For example, the thirteenth RHS term 
is the marginal cost associated with runway capacity expansion 
needed to accommodate an increase in peak period scheduled 
commercial air service usage, and the other three capital cost 
terms have similar interpretations. However, generally, the 
capital cost terms pertaining to off-peak traffic periods 
would equal zero since most airports experience capacity 
problems only during peak traffic periods. 
As explained in Chapter Three, the last RHS term 
represents an income adjustment required to maintain the 
equality among the marginal utilities of the private good, or 
income, for the three segments of the airport service area 
population. 
The membership condition for users of general aviation 
services follows the same pattern as for users of scheduled 
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excludes congestion costs, operating and maintenance costs, 
and capital costs terms for the passenger terminal. This is 
because users of general aviation services are assumed to not 
use the passenger terminal. 
Third, optimization of the airport model with respect to 
runway and passenger terminal capacity variables yields the 
following two infrastructure provision conditions. The 
provision condition for airport runways. 
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auVsx, au"/aci ac, au"/aci ac, (P-M-N) • ± + M- ! • ^ + N- 1 1 • ^
auVay' au"/ay" au"/ay" 
axi • T " T' 
requires that the population weighted sum of the marginal 
rates of substitution between runway capacity and the 
composite private good equal the marginal cost associated with 
runway expansion minus the peak period and off-peak period 
benefits which would result from runway expansion, i.e. 
capacity shadow prices. Similarly, the provision condition 
for the airport passenger terminal, 
au^/acg^ acg _ dc^i.) _ MZ _ ^2 
au^/ay" ^ T T' 
requires that the aggregate marginal value users of scheduled 
commercial air transportation service place on the reduction 
in terminal congestion equal the marginal cost associated with 
terminal capacity expansion minus the peak period and off-peak 
traffic period benefits which would result from expansion of 
airport passenger terminal capacity. For both runways and the 
passenger terminal the additional benefits associated with 
capacity expansion for the off-peak traffic period will 
generally be zero. 
Fourth, four toll conditions are derived from 
maximization of the model with respect to airport peak period 
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and off-peak period usage rates by members of the two user 
groups. For each of these toll conditions, the benefit 
derived from an additional trip through the airport is equated 
to the sum of changes in environmental costs experienced by 
the segment of the population that does not use the airport, 
congestion costs experienced by airport users, airport 
operating and maintenance costs, and airport capital costs. 
More precisely, for an increase in peak traffic period trips 
by a user of scheduled commercial air carrier service, the 
toll condition, 
au^/av" auV3(F^ + h-F" )  t  
1 B = - (P-M-N) • L_LP LL • ± 
atf/ay" auVay' ^ 
atf-zac,. 3c,. 1 i 
Sf" ^ P P 
- M. 1 ^  , 1 
auvsy" arj ^ aFp ^ 
^ dC^j.) 1 + . 1 + ^^2. 1 
gpin A "X" A A' 
equates the marginal rate of substitution between a trip 
through the airport and the composite private good to the sum 
of eight RHS cost terms. The first RHS term, which represents 
the adverse impact of additional peak traffic period airport 
scheduled commercial air carrier activity, equals the product 
of the size of the non-user population, P-M-N, the marginal 
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rate of substitution between the number of all peak traffic 
period flights expressed in terms of equivalent scheduled 
commercial air carrier flights and the composite private good, 
(3uV5(F^p + h* F"p)) / (3uV9y^) f and the inverse of the average 
passenger load for scheduled commercial air carrier flights, 
1/A. The second RHS term represents the added delay time cost 
experienced by users of scheduled commercial air carrier 
service resulting from increased peak period runway 
congestion. This equals the product of the number of users of 
scheduled commercial air carrier service, M, the marginal rate 
of substitution between runway congestion and the composite 
private good, (3u"/3c^) / (3U"/3f") , the marginal change in 
runway congestion attributable to a change in the number of 
peak period scheduled commercial air carrier flights, and the 
inverse of the average passenger load for scheduled commercial 
air carrier flights, 1/A. Similarly, the third RHS term 
represents the increased cost experienced by users of 
scheduled commercial air carrier service resulting from 
increased peak period congestion of the passenger terminal, 
and the fourth RHS term equals the increased cost experienced 
by users of general aviation service resulting from additional 
peak period runway use by scheduled commercial air carriers. 
The fifth and sixth RHS terms represent the marginal increase 
in runway and passenger terminal operating and maintenance 
costs, respectively, that would result from an increase in 
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peak traffic period use of scheduled commercial air carrier 
service. Finally, the seventh and eighth RHS terms represent 
the increase in runway and passenger terminal capital cost, 
respectively, that would result from an increase in peak 
traffic period use of the airport by travelers using scheduled 
commercial air carriers. 
The toll condition for off-peak traffic period use of the 
airport by users of scheduled commercial air carrier service, 
auV9v^ aui/3(F? + h-f") 1 
1 2 = - (P-M-N) • ' ° 11 • i 
au^/ay" auVsy^ ^ 
-M. 3c,  ^ 1  auyacg^ ac^^ M 
au"/ay" aF^ ^ au'^/ay" ar^ ^ 
(13) 
au"/au" apJI ^ aF^ ^ 
^ acz(.) 1 ^  . 1 ^  «2. 1 
A X A X A 
includes the same number and type of costs on the RHS as the 
condition for peak period airport use by members of this group 
of travelers. However, the values attributable to the runway 
and passenger terminal capital cost terms in this condition 
will be small, or zero, for most airports because generally 
most airports have excess off-peak period capacity. 
The toll condition for peak period use of the airport by 
users of general aviation services. 
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also includes terms representing the cost imposed on that 
portion of the population that does not use the airport, the 
increased delay costs experienced by members of both groups of 
airport users when general aviation activity increases, the 
increased runway operating and maintenance cost that would 
arise from increased general aviation activity, and the 
increased runway capital investment that would be required to 
adequately accommodate an increase of general aviation use at 
the airport. The toll condition for off-peak period general 
aviation activity, 
au"/av" auVa(FT + h-f") i 1 2 = - (P-M-N) • ^ ° 11 -H- ± 
au"/ay" auVay^ ® 
_ M- ^ . 1 _ N- .  1 
au*"/ay" ap" ® au"/ay" ar" ® 
9F" B TT B 
(15) 
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mirrors the condition for peak period general aviation airport 
use, but as with the off-peak period toll condition for 
scheduled commercial carrier use of the airport, the magnitude 
of the capital cost factor is expect to be small, or zero, for 
most airports. 
The major difference between these two latter toll 
conditions and the first two is the omission of terms related 
to congestion cost, operating and maintenance cost, and 
capital cost associated with the airport passenger terminal. 
These terms do not appear in the toll conditions for general 
aviation use of the airport because users of this type of air 
transportation service are assumed to not use the terminal. 
The remaining five first-order conditions result from 
maximization of the airport model with respect to the lagrange 
multipliers for the peak traffic period runway constraint, 
for the off-peak traffic period runway capacity constraint, 
5,, for the peak traffic period passenger terminal capacity 
constraint, for the off-peak period passenger terminal 
capacity constraint, S^, and for the societal budget 
constraint, x. The conditions associated with the capacity 
constraints are expressed in Kuhn-Tucker form. 
The first order conditions for peak traffic period runway 
capacity. 
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X, - Fp + k- fJ > 0 (16) 
^i^> 0 (17) 
Mr (X, - fJ - k- F") = 0, (18) 
and for off-peak period runway capacity, 
X, - F^ - k- F^ > 0 
(19) 
5r  ^ 0  (20) 
<Si- (X, - F^ - k- F^) = 0, (21) 
indicate that if runway use is at capacity the lagrange 
multiplier takes a positive value, otherwise it equals zero. 
The same interpretation holds for the peak traffic period 
passenger terminal capacity constraint, 
Xg - Fp > 0 (22) 
Ma > 0 (23) 
Mz* (Xa - FJ) = 0, (24) 
and for the off-peak traffic period passenger terminal 
capacity constraint, 
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Xg - FJ; > 0 (25) 
S z >  0  ( 2 6 )  
«2- (Xz - F^) = 0 (27) 
However, the conditions for the passenger terminal exclude 
terms related to general aviation use of the airport. 
Maximization of the model with respect to X returns the 
societal budget constraint. 
Having derived these first-order conditions, it is 
possible to identify what conditions must hold for efficient 
pricing of airport services and investment in capital 
improvements. Specifically, the next section investigates to 
what extent economies of scale and economies of scope must 
exist for full user financing to be feasible. The next 
section also discusses conditions under which the non-user 
population can be justifiably taxed for a portion of the costs 
associated with airport operation and when non-users should be 
compensated for adverse impacts associated with airport use. 
Airport financing analysis 
By definition, full user financing of airport operation, 
maintenance and capital investment requires the following 
condition to hold. 
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M- vj- + M- V^- + N- v"' tj + N- V^-
(28) 
Where t'j equals (Su'/Sv'.)/(3uV3y'), i=in,n and j=p,o. This 
condition states that by pricing airport use in such a manner 
that fees equal each user's period specific rate of 
substitution between an airport visit and the composite 
private good revenues will be adequate to cover all airport 
costs. However, this is only a sufficient condition for full 
user financing. This condition does not address the issue of 
whether such a fee structure is efficient. In fact, given the 
existence of externalities that generally accompany the 
existence and operation of airports, full user financing will 
not result in the efficient provision or use of airport 
facilities and services. 
To obtain a fuller understanding of the conditions that 
must exist for efficient airport pricing requires an analysis 
of the implications of the simultaneous optimization of the 
airport model with respect to its use and provision variables. 
Beginning with the four toll conditions, equations (12) -
(15), the substitution of their RHSs for the t'. terms in 
equation (28) yields the following condition. 
This condition states that efficient airport pricing requires 
that non-user externalities, runway congestion, runway 
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= Ci (F;,F^ ,F" F^ ,X,) + C2(F;,I^ ,X2). 
(29) 
passenger terminal congestion, passenger terminal operation 
and maintenance, and passenger terminal capital investment 
costs all be taken into consideration. 
Next, recalling the discussion in Chapter Three, the 
design of transportation infrastructure is generally based on 
the relationship between the forecasted demand for service at 
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some future date and the capability of different size 
facilities to handle the anticipated traffic demand at some 
predetermined level of service standard. Furthermore, level 
of service standards, which reflect different degrees of 
service delay, or facility congestion, are often measured in 
terms of the ratio between forecasted traffic demand and the 
traffic carrying capacity of the transportation facility. 
Consequently, the congestion functions incorporated in the 
airport model can be represented as being homogeneous of 
degree zero. Therefore, by Euler's Theorem, the following 
condition is derived from the runway congestion function: 
dc, m 5ci _jn 3Ci n dc, „ ^C, 
^ l.pm  ^  + —l-F^ = -  (30) 
aF^ SF^ aF" SF" ^ P 0 p o 
similarly, the following condition is derived from the airport 
passenger terminal congestion function: 
d Cp m d cp m d Cp 
—"TSv *2- (31) 
dFl aF^ p o 
Substitution of the RHSs of equations (30) and (31) into 
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(32) 
This substitution transforms the relationships between runway 
and passenger temninal congestion and the volume of different 
types of flight activity into relationships between runway and 
passenger terminal congestion and the size, or traffic 
carrying capacity, of those facilities. 
Now, substituting into the revised third and sixth LHS 
terms of equation (32) from the runway and passenger terminal 
provision conditions, eq[uations (10) and (11), respectively. 
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(33) 
This condition shows that efficient pricing of airport 
services requires that negative and positive non-user 
externalities, as well as operating, maintenance and capital 
costs associated with airport use, be taken into 
consideration. 
More precisely, the first two LHS terms in equation (33) 
pertain to the adverse environmental costs airport use during 
peak and off-peak traffic periods imposes on residents of the 
airport service area. The most common type of such adverse 
cost is the noise generated by aircraft take-offs and 
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landings. And in fact, most major airports have noise impact 
abatement programs under which a variety of measures are taken 
to compensate those most adversely impacted by aircraft noise. 
Among the most common forms of compensation provided to 
residents adversely affected by airport generated noise are 
property buyouts or the purchase of noise easements. 
Alternatively, the third LHS term represents the benefits 
residents of the airport service area derive from the 
airport's existence. These benefits may include an increase 
in economic opportunity associated with a community's 
increased access to national and international markets, or an 
increased resident's sense of well-being associated with an 
enhanced ability of one's family and friends to visit. The 
value of the benefits associated with the existence of an 
airport often are capitalized in the form of increased 
property values, and airport authorities can capture some of 
the added value throughout the establishment of special taxing 
districts. 
The fourth through seventh LHS terms represent the 
changes in runway operating and maintenance costs associated 
with both types of airport use during peak and off-peak 
traffic periods. While the eighth LHS term represents the 
increase in runway capital cost that would be required to 
increase runway capacity, similarly, the ninth and tenth LHS 
terms represent the change in passenger terminal peak period 
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and off-peak period operating and maintenance costs that would 
accompany changes in the use of scheduled commercial air 
carrier service. And the final LHS term represents the 
increase in capital cost that would be required to expand the 
airport's passenger terminal to accommodate more use of 
scheduled commercial air carrier services. 
Overall, equation (33) shows that if non-user 
externalities equal zero, then full user financing of the 
airport would be feasible when both runways and the passenger 
terminal exhibit constant ray economies of scale. However, 
if non-user externalities have a net value which is negative, 
then the airport would exhibit decreasing ray economies of 
scale. In this case user fees set equal to the marginal rates 
of substitution between an airport visit and the private good 
would generate revenues in excess of what is required to fund 
airport operations, maintenance and capital improvements. 
Thus, full use financing of the airport would again be 
possible, and in addition, at least some funds would be 
available to compensate non-users for the adverse impacts they 
suffer due to the airport's use. Furthermore, unless the 
cost associated with the adverse environmental impacts 
generated by airport use on non-users are internalized in the 
airport fee structure, there will be a tendency to over build 
the airport from an overall societal perspective. 
Alternatively, if non-user externalities have a net value 
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which is positive, then the airport would exhibit increasing 
ray economies of scale. In this case setting airport fees 
equal only to the benefits derived by airport users would not 
generate adequate revenues to cover all airport operating, 
maintenance and capital costs. In this case a contribution 
from non-users would be required, and requiring non-users to 
make such a contribution would be justified by the economic, 
social or personal benefits they derive from the airport's 
existence. Otherwise, the airport would likely be underbuilt 
and the benefits to society that would result from the 
existence of the airport would not be maximized. 
Thus, because airports often generate externalities, the 
fees charged users of the airport will often not equal the 
marginal benefits they derive from airport use. However, 
externalities experienced by that portion of the population 
that does not use the airport is not the only source of 
inefficiency in airport service pricing. The fact that 
airports are generally designed to accommodate a very high 
share of peak level demand typically generates a substantial 
amount of excess capacity. To take advantage of this excess 
capacity, commercial airports often offer service to more than 
just commercial carriers. These other users include military 
aircraft, all freight carriers, air taxi operators and private 
aircraft. 
As stated above, charging airport users fees equal to the 
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benefits they derive from each airport visit, i.e., landing 
and take-off, adjusting for whether these visits occur during 
peak or off-peak traffic periods, will generate adequate 
revenues to cover all airport operating, maintenance and 
capital costs in the absence of externalities. However, as 
was shown in the general two user group two-period model 
presented in Chapter Three, this type of marginal cost pricing 
will not necessarily result in a fee structure that is 
economically efficient. Whether marginal cost pricing of 
airport services represents an optimal pricing system depends 
on to what extent there exists economies of scope associated 
with airport use. 
To identify what other conditions must hold for fees 
based on marginal visitation costs to represent an efficient 
pricing system, one needs to investigate the relationship 
between the marginal and average incremental costs associated 
with serving each of the two user groups during both peak and 
off-peak traffic periods. For fees charged members of each 
user group to be efficient, they must equal both the marginal 
cost and the average incremental cost associated with each 
type of flight activity, i.e., scheduled commercial service or 
general aviation service, by time period during which the 
service is provided, i.e., peak period versus off-peak period. 
Letting t'.(*) denote the optimal fee for trips made 
during period j by members of group i, the conditions for 
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optimal pricing of the airport runways and passenger terminal 
are presented in equations (34) through (37). For peak period 
trips taken on scheduled commercial air carriers, the optimal 
per trip fee, or toll, condition is, 
,m _n T-n „/ 
^ Cl (F;. F;, F;, F^, X,) - C, (0, F^, F^, F^, xj ) 
Fj-A 
^ C2(F;,F^,X2) - C2(0,F^,X^) 
Fj-A 
(34) 
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where X,' < X, represents the runway capacity required to serve 
all airport users except peak period users of scheduled 
commercial air carrier service and where < Xg represents 
the terminal capacity required to serve off-peak period users 
of scheduled commercial air carrier service. For the off-peak 
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where X," < X, represents the runway capacity required to 
serve all airport users except off-peak period users of 
scheduled commercial air carrier service and where Xg" < 
represents the terminal capacity required to serve peak period 
users of scheduled commercial air carrier service. 
Similarly, for users of general aviation services, the 
optimal peak period toll condition is. 
137 
q(F;;,F^,Fj,F;;,x,) - Ci(F;,F:,O,F-x;") 
t -
fJ-B 
auV5(f? + h- f") 1 
= - (P-M-N) • 1——B. PI • h- -
auVsy^ ® 
- M. ^ci. 1 _ auyac,. i 
3um/ayn> apj B au"/ay" ^FJ ® 
^ aci(.). 1 ^  Mi.^. 1 
B T ^  1' 
where X,'" < X, represents the runway capacity required to 
serve all airport users except peak period users of general 
aviation services, and for the off-peak period the optimal 
toll condition is, 
_ q(Fj,F^,Fj,FS,Xi) - C,(F;,F^,F;,0,X;''') 
o V ' ~ ;; 
f^-B 
(36) 
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(37) 
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where X^'"' < X, represents the runway capacity required to 
serve all airport users except off-peak users of general 
aviation services. 
These conditions provide the basis for determining to 
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what extent the existence of economies of scope with respect 
to runway and airport terminal use will influence the optimal 
pricing of airport services. First, by summing tolls by user 
group for each time period, one obtains the aggregate 
incremental costs associated with each type of use and time 
period. For users of scheduled commercial air carrier 
services during the peak traffic period total fees must equal, 
tj(*) • F^- A = q (FJ, F^, FJ, F^, X,) - q (0, F^, FJ, F^, XJ ) 
+ C2(FJ,F^,X2) -C2(0,F^,X^) 
auV3(Fp + h- F") (38) 
au"/ay™ aF*" au^/ay"* aF"" " 
P P 
aoV8C|. ^ 3C,(.) 
an"/ay" ar? " arT ' 
+ iElhl • F^  + ijl. F™ + • F^ , P T P T P 
and for the off-peak period the aggregate optimal toll 
condition equals. 
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Similarly, the peak period aggregate optimal toll condition 
for users of general aviation services equals, 
tJ(*)-fj-b= c i(fJ,f^,fJ,f2 ,xi) - ci(f;,f^,0,f^,x;'') 
8uV5(F^ + h- f") _ 
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and for the off-peak period aggregate tolls must equal. 
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Now, by summing tolls over the two time periods for each 
group of users, optimality conditions are obtained for the 
amount of fees each of the two user groups should be expected 
to pay toward the provision and operation of the airport's 
infrastructure, i.e., runways and passenger terminal. 
Focusing on the incremental cost portions of equations 
(38) and (39), the total fees users of scheduled commercial 
air carrier services should be required to pay equals, 
t^. A + t^- F^- A = p p 0 0 
[C,(fJ,F^,FJ,FS,Xi) - CI(0,F™,FJ,F^,X5) 
+ C2(FJ,F™,X2) - C2(0,F^,X^)] (42) 
+ [CI(fJ,F™,FJ,FS,Xi) - CI(FJ, 0, FJ,F^,XJ') 
+ C2(F;,F^,X2) -C2(FJ,0,X^')]. 
similarly, the sum of the incremental cost portions of 
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equations (40) and (41), 
tj- Fj- B + t^- B = 
[Ci(F;,F^,FJ,F2,Xi) - Ci(FJ,F^,0,F^,X;'') (43) 
+ [Ci(fJ,F^,FJ,F^,Xi) - Ci(FJ,F^,FJ, o,XJ'''), 
yields the total fees users of general aviation services 
should be required to pay. 
Equations (42) and (43) provide the basis for evaluating 
the relationship between the degree of scope economies 
exhibited in the use of the airport runways and passenger 
terminal and whether user fees set equal to the marginal cost 
arising from use of these facilities will provide an efficient 
and adequate means of financing for the airport. Focusing 
first on equation (42), one can determine under what 
conditions economies and diseconomies of scope would result 
from the shared use of the passenger terminal over the peak 
and off-peak traffic periods. As stated previously, the 
airport terminal cost function is assumed to be monotonically 
increasing with respect to each of its arguments. Therefore, 
if the sum of the incremental costs associated with use of the 
terminal during the two time periods is less than the joint 
cost associated with the provision and use of the terminal, 
i.e.. 
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[C2(FJ,F^,X2) - C2(0,F^,X^)] 
+ [C2(FJ,F^,X2) - C2(F™,0,X^')] 
< C2(F;,F^,X2), 
(44) 
then the airport terminal exhibits inter-period economies of 
scope. This condition holds because the subadditivity of the 
period specific incremental costs relative to the overall two-
period terminal joint cost results in the joint cost being 
less than the sum of the costs required to provide peak period 
and off-peak period terminal space on a stand alone basis, 
which is the condition for economies of scope. On the other 
hand, if the peak period and off-peak period incremental 
terminal costs are superadditive relative to the two-period 
joint terminal costs, then the airport terminal exhibits 
inter-period diseconomies of scope. 
What determines whether the period specific incremental 
costs are subadditive or superadditive with respect to the 
two-period joint costs is the relationship between the sum of 
the stand alone terminal space requirements for the two 
periods, i.e., Xg'+Xg", and the overall joint two-period 
terminal space requirement, i.e., Xj. If the sum of the two 
i.e.. 
C2(FJ,F^,X2) < C2(FJ,0,X^') + C2(0,F^,X^), (45) 
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period specific space requirements is greater than the joint 
two-period space requirement, then the incremental costs are 
subadditive because this means at least some of the same 
terminal space must be used during the two time periods. 
Alternatively, if X2'+X2"< Xg, then the incremental time 
period specific costs are superadditive relative to the joint 
two-period terminal cost, which means use of the terminal over 
the two periods requires more space than if separate terminals 
were used to provide service for each period on an exclusive 
basis. The first of these situations is more likely to occur 
at most airports. However, the superadditivity case could 
arise at extremely busy airports if peak period traffic so 
congests the terminal that there is a spillover effect on 
travelers trying to use the terminal during the off-peak 
traffic period. 
The airport financing implications of the existence of 
economies or diseconomies of scope relative to passenger 
terminal use are twofold. First, in the more common 
situation, when economies of scope exist, the subadditivity of 
the period specific incremental costs implies user fees set 
equal to marginal costs will be inadequate to fully fund 
provision and operation of the terminal. Alternatively, the 
existence of inter-period terminal diseconomies of scope 
implies that marginal cost pricing would provide more than 
adequate funds to cover passenger terminal provision and 
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operating costs. Second, expressed in the context of club 
theory, airports that have terminals which exhibit inter-
period economies of scope have a financial incentive to 
increase the use of their passenger terminals, or the 
membership of their user groups, particularly during the off-
peak period. While, airports with terminals exhibiting 
diseconomies of scope have a financial inventive to reduce use 
of the passenger terminal, particularly during the peak 
traffic period. 
The determination of what conditions give rise to 
economies or diseconomies of scope relative to runway use is 
somewhat more complicated than for the passenger terminal. 
The added complexity arises from the use of the airport's 
runways by two types of aircraft, which correspond to the 
different user groups, as well as use of the airport over two 
time periods. As a result, both within period and between 
period scope economies must be investigated. 
First, the within period analysis focuses on under what 
conditions the simultaneous sharing of the airport's runways 
by two different user groups results in economies of scope or 
diseconomies of scope. This analysis can be conducted for 
either the peak traffic period or for the off-peak traffic 
period. But since it is generally assumed excess runway 
capacity exists during the off-peak traffic period, and since 
the existence of the possibility of runway congestion is 
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required to illustrate the full range of scope economy issues, 
the analysis is only presented for the peak traffic period. 
As with the analysis for the airport passenger terminal, 
the investigation of what conditions give rise to runway 
economies of scope or diseconomies of scope begins with 
consideration of the relationship between the incremental 
costs associated with each user group's peak period runway use 
and the overall joint cost associated with the simultaneous 
use of the runways by both groups. 
Holding off-peak period traffic constant, the degree of 
runway scope economies depends on the relationship between the 
sum of stand alone runway capacity requirements for the two 
user groups and runway capacity requirements under joint 
operation. If the sum of stand alone runway capacity 
requirements, X,"+ X,"", is greater than the joint operation 
runway capacity requirements, then the sum of group specific 
peak traffic period incremental costs is less than the joint 
cost associated with providing peak period service to both 
user groups simultaneously, i.e., 
- Ci(0,F^,FJ,F^,X{)] 
+ [Ci(FJ,F^, FJ, F^,Xi) - Ci(Fj,F^,0,F^,xj'')] (46) 
< Ci(Fj,F^,Fj,F^,Xi). 
This implies the different types of aircraft used by the 
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two user groups share at least some portion of the airport's 
peak period runway capacity. This sharing of runway capacity 
in turn results in the airport exhibiting peak traffic period 
economies of scope with respect to runway use, i.e., 
Ci(FJ,F™,FJ,F2,XI) < CI(FJ,F^, 0,F^,xj'') + C, (0, F^, FJ, F^, xj) , (47) 
because the joint cost associated with the sharing of runway 
capacity is less than the sum of the costs that would be 
incurred if the airport operated separate runways to serve 
peak period scheduled commercial air carrier and general 
aviation traffic. Since at most airports commercial carrier 
aircraft and general aviation aircraft use the same runways 
during both peak and off-peak traffic periods, this implies 
the existence of economies of scope with respect to runway use 
is the prevailing condition for most United States commercial 
airports. This further implies that landing fees set equal to 
the marginal costs associated with runway use do not provide 
adequate funds to fully finance the provision and operation of 
airport runways and other airside facilities. In fact, as 
presented in the second part of this chapter, the financing of 
airport airside facilities is often subsidized from other 
airport revenues, the federal government, and local special 
district assessments or general taxes. Thus, airport 
management generally has an incentive to accommodate users of 
general aviation services as well as users of scheduled 
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commercial air carriers during both peak and off-peak traffic 
periods. 
However, at a few of the nation's busiest airports, 
commercial carrier operations are so great during peak traffic 
periods that accommodation of general aviation activity during 
these time periods requires runway capacity that exceeds the 
runway capacity that would be required if the two types of 
aircraft traffic were segregated on their own separate 
runways. This situation occurs because greater spacing of 
aircraft during take-offs and landings is required for a 
traffic stream consisting of a mix of large and small aircraft 
than if all aircraft in the traffic stream are of the same 
size. Also, allowing general aviation aircraft to use runways 
constructed to accommodate larger conunercial carrier aircraft 
results in the inefficient use of these runways during peak 
traffic periods. Consequently, in this situation diseconomies 
of scope arise with respect to runway use. But also in this 
situation landing fees set equal to marginal costs provide 
more than adequate funds to finance the expansion of runway 
capacity. 
This analysis of conditions that result in economies of 
scope or diseconomies of scope relative to runway use by the 
two user groups during a single time period suggests 
diseconomies of scope may exist during the peak traffic period 
while economies of scope exist during the off-peak period. If 
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this situation occurs, then logically airport management has 
an incentive to attempt to divert some of the peak period 
demand for runway capacity to the off-peak period. However, 
to determine whether such traffic shifting is feasible, it is 
first necessary to identify what conditions must hold for 
runway use over the two time periods to exhibit economies of 
scope relative to use by the two user groups. 
This analysis first requires a comparison of the sum of 
runway capacities needed to provide scheduled commercial air 
carrier service, X^"", and general aviation service, X,", each on 
a stand alone basis with the runway capacity required to 
provide these services jointly, disregarding the distinction 
between time periods. Again in this case one finds that if 
the sum of the stand alone runway capacities is more than the 
runway capacity required to provide the service jointly, i.e., 
X,*" + X^" > X^, then the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the airport to exhibit economies of scope with respect to 
runway use by the two user groups are established. To prove 
this one notes first that the superadditivity of the stand 
alone runway capacities implies the different types of 
aircraft used to provide service to the two user groups share 
at least some runway capacity under joint operation. This in 
turn implies the subadditivity of user group incremental costs 
relative to the cost associated with providing both types of 
service jointly, i.e.. 
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+ [Ci(FJ,F^,FJ,F^,XI) - C,(F;,F^, 0,0, X^)] (48) 
< q(Fj,F^,Fj,F^,Xi). 
As a result, the existence of between group economies of scope 
is established, i.e., 
Ci(F^,F°'",FJ,FS,XI) < CI(FJ,F^, 0,0,x'y) + Ci(0,0,Fj,F^,X:^) . 
However, in addition, if for each user group separately 
economies of scope exist with respect to runway use over the 
two time periods, then the airport exhibits overall economies 
of scope with respect to runway use, i.e., 
Ci(F™ F^,F" F^,Xi) < Ci(F™, 0,0,0, x7) + C, (0, F^, 0, 0, X^) 
(50) 
+ Ci(O,O, FJ,O,X7) + Ci(0,0,0, F^,X7) , 
where X,"^, X^"", X,"P and X,"° represent the stand alone runway 
capacities required to serve peak period scheduled commercial 
air traffic, off-peak period scheduled commercial air traffic, 
peak period general aviation traffic and off-peak period 
general aviation traffic, respectively. The necessary and 
sufficient conditions required for overall economies of scope 
to exist are that the sums of between time period stand alone 
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runway capacity requirements be greater than the joint runway 
capacity requirements for each user group separately, i.e., 
for scheduled commercial air carrier service + X,"** > X^ "* 
and for general aviation service X,"p + X,"° > X,". Thus, for 
overall economies of scope relative to runway use to exist 
there must be at least some sharing of runway capacity within 
each period by commercial carrier aircraft and general 
aviation aircraft and some sharing of runway capacity between 
periods by each type of aircraft. 
However, under these conditions, setting landing fees or 
other airside facility users fees equal to the marginal costs 
which arise from each type of runway use over the two time 
periods will yield inadequate revenues to finance the 
provision and operation of the required runway capacity. On 
the other hand, when diseconomies of scope exist during the 
peak traffic period relative to the shared use of the 
airport's runways by scheduled commercial air carriers and 
general aviation aircraft, and economies of scope exist both 
during the off-peak traffic period and between periods for at 
least one of the types of airport users, then marginal cost 
pricing of runway use may provide the means for shifting 
traffic from the peak period to the off-peak period. Such a 
shift of runway service demand would result in the more 
efficient use of airport facilities and reduce or delay the 
need for future runway expansion. 
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Policy Implications 
This theoretical analysis of the conditions which must 
exist for full user financing of airport airside services to 
be feasible, suggests marginal cost pricing has the potential 
for improving the efficiency with which airport infrastructure 
is used. However, the benefits of marginal cost pricing will 
vary among airports depending on traffic volume, traffic mix 
and the available capacity of runways and passenger terminals. 
Thus, the degree to which the efficiency with which airport 
infrastructure may be improved through marginal cost pricing 
is an empirical issue which depends on each airport's cost 
structure. An analysis of this type is presented in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Empirical Research Issues and Approach 
The model presented in Chapter 4 provides the theoretical 
framework for addressing a variety of policy issues related to 
the pricing of and investment in airport infrastructure. 
Principal among these issues is the level of fees, or tolls, 
required for runway and passenger terminal facility use and 
investment to be optimized. A related pricing issue addressed 
by the airport model is to what extent should side payments be 
made to or be received from individuals who do not themselves 
use the airport facilities to insure that infrastructure 
investment is optimized. The answers to these questions were 
shown in the previous chapter to depend on the cost charact­
eristics of the airport facilities being analyzed. For ex­
ample, in the absence of non-user externalities or if the net 
impact of non-user externalities approaches zero, the model 
implies full user financing of the airport through fees set 
equal to marginal cost requires cost functions that exhibit 
constant economies of scale and the absence of scope econo­
mies. On the other hand, the existence of externalities that 
result in a net negative impact on individuals who do not use 
the airport requires an airport cost structure characterized 
by decreasing economies of scale and diseconomies of scope in 
order for user fees set equal to marginal cost to internalize 
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all costs arising from airport use. 
Consequently, the following empirical analysis focuses on 
the nature of airport costs. Specifically, the empirical 
research presented in this chapter attempts to identify under 
what conditions airports are characterized by increasing or 
decreasing economies of scale and by the existence of 
economies or diseconomies of scope. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Observation of the pattern of airport use in the United 
States suggests that whether individual airports are 
characterized by increasing, constant or decreasing economies 
of scale depends on the size of the airport and the volume of 
flights served by the airport. Alternatively, scope economies 
appear to depend on the degree to which airport facilities are 
shared by different types of users and the degree to which 
airport use is distributed over different time periods. These 
observations suggest the following testable hypotheses. 
First, regarding the issue of economies of scale, it is 
hypothesized that most of the nation's commercial airports 
operate within the range where their cost functions are 
characterized by constant economies of scale. However, there 
are a small number of airports that are so large as to exhibit 
decreasing economies of scale. Alternatively, the nation's 
smallest commercial airports, as well as most of its general 
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aviation airports, exhibit increasing economies of scale. 
Second, regarding the issue of scope economies, it is 
hypothesized that most of the nation's commercial airports, as 
well as almost all of its general aviation airports, exhibit 
economies of scope. However, the nation's busiest commercial 
airports exhibit cost structures characterized by diseconomies 
of scope. 
The rationale behind the first hypothesis is that once an 
airport has two runways the addition of more runways only 
results in a proportional increase in the amount of traffic 
the airport can serve. Also, once airports get beyond a 
certain size, airspace rather than airport infrastructure 
becomes the critical factor which limits airport traffic. 
Small airports, on the other hand, exhibit increasing 
economies of scale due to the large minimum investment 
required to initiate operation. Also, since a large share of 
operating and maintenance cost for small airports is 
environmental or time related, the average cost of airport use 
decreases as the volume of flight activity increases. 
For the hypothesis regarding airport economies of scope, 
the demand for air transportation service tends to be tempor­
ally peaked rather than uniformly spread throughout the day. 
Also, most airports are designed to serve fortieth highest 
hour traffic demands (Walters, 1978). Therefore, for much of 
each day a substantial amount of excess capacity is available. 
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Consequently, the attraction of general aviation, military and 
all freight carrier activity to off-peak periods is generally 
desired by the management of most commercial airports. How­
ever, a few of the nation's large hub airports have become so 
busy serving commercial passenger carriers they have very high 
levels of traffic during much of the day. Also, many large 
hub airports are surrounded by other land uses which limit the 
space available for expansion and this often results in limit­
ations on daily hours of operation due to noise impact consid­
erations. As a result, in these cases operations of other 
than scheduled commercial passenger carriers are discouraged. 
Empirical Research Approach 
Empirical testing for the existence of economies of scale 
and economies of scope in airport operations has been 
conducted by analyzing the relationship between airport costs 
and measures of flight activity and airport size, or capacity, 
for a sample of FAA tower controlled airports. The model used 
for this analysis is an adaptation of the quadratic form cost 
function recommended by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988), 
where C denotes total annual airport operating cost including 
depreciation, Fj denotes the annual number of operations for 
different types of flight activity (i.e., commercial carrier. 
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air taxi, general aviation and military), and denotes the 
size, or capacity, of airport runways and passenger terminals 
measured in terms of VFR (visual flight rule) capacity and 
number of passenger loading gates, respectively. 
According to Baumol, Panzar and Willig this functional 
form possesses three desirable qualities which support its use 
in the empirical analysis of the cost structure for multi-
product industries. First, it does not prejudge the presence 
or absence of scale or scope economies. Second, it 
accommodates data observations in which one or more of the 
possible firm outputs take a value of zero, which is not the 
case for the more commonly used standard translog cost 
function. Third, this functional form possesses "substantive 
flexibility", which means it is consistent with both economies 
and diseconomies of scope, with both cost subadditivity and 
superadditivity, and it does not prejudge the shapes of ray 
average cost curves, the shapes of average incremental cost 
curves or the properties of the trans-ray cross sections 
(Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1988: 448-450, 453-454). 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig indicate this form of cost 
function may be subject to criticism because it does not 
explicitly incorporate variables for input prices. However, 
they argue that input prices can be assumed to be implicitly 
taken into consideration by the model's parameters. In fact, 
the omission of input price variables in the quadratic form 
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cost function makes it particularly attractive for the 
analysis of airport costs because of the difficulty associated 
with obtaining meaningful measures for these prices. Given 
the complexity of airport operations, the variety of financial 
resources used to fund airport capital improvements, and the 
practice of contracting out and franchising many airport 
services, imputing valid input prices for the cost of labor, 
capital and utilities is not feasible. 
The regression results are used to test for the degree 
of ray economies of scale and the existence of economies of 
scope by using mean independent variable values for the 
airport data to estimate the following measures of scale and 
scope economies presented in Bailey and Friedlaender (1982: 
1031). The measure used to assess the degree of ray economies 
of scale is. 
^ C(YI,Y2, ...,Y,) 
I Sc 5c 5^' 
where values greater than one indicate increasing ray 
economies of scale, a value equal to 1 represents constant ray 
economies of scale, and values less than one represent 
decreasing ray economies of scale. The measure used to 
determine the degree of economies of scope is. 
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I ' • • I 0) + C(0, Y2,0, / • • • » 0 ) +... + C(0 0,Y,-) 
C(Yi,Y2 
where values greater than one indicate the existence of 
economies of scope and values less than one represent the 
existence of diseconomies of scope. 
Data and Data Sources 
Since most airports are publicly owned and since many 
raise funds required for capital investment through the 
nation's bond markets, financial information for the nation's 
airports is generally available to the public. However, this 
type of information is not available through a single source. 
Therefore, letters were sent to the 100 busiest airports as 
identified using 1989 aircraft operation statistics published 
by the Federal Aviation Administration. Each letter requested 
financial statements, i.e, balance sheets, income statements, 
statements of change in financial position and accompanying 
notes, for the years 1989 through 1992. Also requested was 
information on the number and dimensions of airport runways, 
number of terminal gates, and VFR (visual flight rule) and IFR 
(instrument flight rule) saturation capacities. 
Fifty-five airports provided either some or all of the 
requested information. Table 5.1 lists these airports along 
with their 3-character identification codes, state locations 
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Table 5.1: Sample of United States Airports 
Type Fiscal 
Air­ of Year 
port Hub ( 
Class^ -
Opera Ending Sam 
Airoort Name State ID •tion^ Date 
-1 ple^ 
Albuquerque International NM ABQ Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Baltimore/Washington Intl MD BWI Medium C/GA Sep 30 0 
Boise Air Terminal ID BOI Small C/GA Sep 30 3 
Charleston International SC CHS Small C/GA Jun 30 3 
Greater Cincinnati Intl KY CVG Medium C/GA Dec 31 3 
Cleveland Hopkins Intl OH CLE Large C/GA Dec 31 3 
Columbus International OH CMH Medium C/GA Dec 31 2 
Dallas Love Field TX DAL Large C/GA Sep 30 3 
Dallas/Ft. Worth Intl TX DFW Large C/GA Sep 30 0 
Denver Stapleton Intl CO DEN Large C/GA Dec 31 3 
Denver Centennial CO APA Large GA Dec 31 2 
Des Moines International lA DSM Small C/GA Jun 30 0 
Detroit Metro/Wayne Co MI DTW Large C/GA Nov 30 3 
Fort Lauderdale Intl FL FLL Large C/GA Sep 30 1 
Grand Fork International ND GFK Nonhub C/GA Dec 31 3 
Grand Rapids MI GRR Small C/GA Sep 30 2 
Hilo International HI ITO Medium C/GA Jun 30 0 
Honolulu International HI HNL Large C/GA Jun 30 0 
Houston Intercontinental TX lAH Large C/GA Jun 30 3 
Indianapolis International IN IND Medium C/GA Dec 31 2 
John F. Kennedy Intl NY JFK Large C/GA Dec 31 3 
Kansas City International MO MCI Large C/GA Apr 30 3 
La Guardia NY LGA Large C/GA Dec 31 3 
Las Vegas McCarran Intl NV LAS Large C/GA Jun 30 3 
Little Rock Regional AR LIT Small C/GA Dec 31 1 
Los Angeles International CA LAX Large C/GA Jun 30 3 
Louisville Regional KY SDF Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Memphis-Shelby Co Airport TN MEM Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Miami International FL MIA Large C/GA Sep 30 0 
Milwaukee Mitchell Intl WI MKE Medium C/GA Dec 31 3 
Minneapolis/St. Paul Intl MN MSP Large C/GA Dec 31 0 
Nashville International TN BNA Medium C/GA Jun 30 2 
Newark International NJ EWR Large C/GA Dec 31 3 
Norfolk International VA ORF Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Oklahoma city Will Rogers OK OKC Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Omaha Eppley Field NE OMA Medium C/GA Dec 31 3 
Ontario International CA ONT Small C/GA Jun 30 3 
Orlando International FL MCO Large C/GA Sep 30 2 
Philadelphia International PA PHL Large C/GA Jun 30 3 
Phoenix/Sky Harbor Intl AZ PHX Large C/GA Jun 30 2 
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Table 5.1: (continued) 
Type Fiscal 
Air­ of Year 
port Hub Opera Ending Sam 
Airport Name State ID Class -tion Date •pie 
Portland International OR PDX Medium C/GA Jun 30 2 
Raleigh-Durham Airport NC RDU Medium C/GA Mar 31 3 
Reno Cannon International NV RNO Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Richmond Byrd Intl VA RIC Small C/GA Jun 30 0 
Salt Lake City Intl UT SLC Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
San Francisco Intl CA SFO Large C/GA Jun 30 3 
San Jose International CA SJC Small C/GA Jun 30 2 
Sarasota Bradenton Airport FL SRQ Small C/GA Sep 30 3 
St. Louis/Lambert Intl MO STL Large C/GA Jun 30 3 
Tampa International FL TPA Large C/GA Sep 30 0 
Tulsa International OK TUL Medium C/GA Jun 30 3 
Washington Dulles Intl VA IAD Large C/GA Sep 30 1 
Washington National DC DCA Large C/GA Sep 30 2 
Wichita Mid Continent KS ICT Small C/GA Jun 30 3 
Santa Ana/Orange County CA SNA Large C/GA Jun 30 1 
Notes: 
1. The Federal Aviation Administration designates hub 
classifications for airports based on the percentage of 
the total enplaned revenue passengers of U.S. 
certificated route carriers served by an air traffic 
control (ATC) area, which may include one or more 
airports. Under this classification system large hubs 
serve 1.000 percent or more of annual enplanements, 
medium hubs serve 0.250 to 0.999 percent, small hubs 
serve 0.050 to 0.249 percent, and nonhubs serve under 
0.050 percent of annual enplanements. 
2. For the purposes of this analysis airport operations have 
been divided into two groups, commercial carrier (C) or 
general aviation (GA), which consists of all other types 
of air traffic including air taxi, private and military. 
3. Of the 55 airports that responded to the request for 
information, nine did not provide adequate information to 
be included in any of the statistical analysis (sample 
code 0), four provided neither VFR capacity nor gate 
information (sample code 1), and ten did not provide VFR 
capacity information (sample code 2). However, 33 
airports (sample code 3) provided adequate financial and 
airport infrastructure information to be included in all 
statistical analyses. 
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hub area classifications, whether they serve commercial 
traffic, general aviation traffic or both, fiscal year ending 
dates, and the types of data provided. A complete listing of 
the financial data for these airports is provided in Appendix 
B. Information regarding each responding airport's number of 
runways, length of longest runway, VFR capacity, IFR capacity, 
and number of terminal gates is provided in Appendix C. 
Information on airport use is available from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) on a federal fiscal year basis 
for tower controlled airports. This airport use information, 
which is classified by six types of aircraft operations (i.e., 
commercial carrier, air taxi, itinerant general aviation, 
local general aviation, itinerant military and local 
military), was obtained from issues of the FAA Air Traffic 
Activitv report for fiscal years 1989 through 1992. The 
flight operation data for the 55 airports included in this 
analysis is provided in Appendix D. 
To facilitate and simplify the analysis the financial and 
aircraft operations data had to be modified in two ways. 
First, as indicated in Table 5.1, airport fiscal years end on 
a variety of different dates while aircraft operation data 
were only available on a consistent basis for federal fiscal 
years which run from October 1 through September 30. 
Therefore, the airport financial data were converted to a 
federal fiscal year basis. This was accomplished by 
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apportioning airport financial statistics between the federal 
fiscal years to which they correspond. For example, for an 
airport with a fiscal year ending date of June 30, three 
quarters of that year's financial amounts were assigned to the 
current federal fiscal year with the remaining quarter of 
financial data taken from the next airport fiscal year. One 
consequence of this transformation of airport financial data 
was a reduction in the number of years of observations 
available for making model estimates. Second, airport 
operation statistics of similar type flight activity were 
grouped to reduce the number of independent variables, reduce 
the problem with data collinearity and better replicate the 
structure of the theoretical model presented in Chapter Four. 
Specifically, commercial carrier and air taxi flight activity 
were combined into one group, referred to as commercial 
traffic, and general aviation and military flight activity 
were combined into a second group, referred to as non­
commercial traffic. Flight activity was grouped in this 
manner because both commercial carrier and air taxi flight 
activity are positively correlated with the total annual 
airport operating expenses, while general aviation and 
military flight activity are negatively correlated with total 
annual airport operating expenses. These relationships are 
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Model Estimation 
Three sets of models using three years of data for each 
of 45 airports were estimated. The three sets of models 
reflect the inclusion of different explanatory variables. The 
first model (MODEL 1) includes only flight activity 
explanatory variables. The second model (MODEL 2) includes 
flight activity plus a measure of airport terminal capacity as 
explanatory variables. And the third model (MODEL 3) includes 
flight activity plus measures for both airport terminal and 
runway capacity as explanatory variables. The dependent 
variable for all three models is total airport operating 
expenses including depreciation. A list of variables for all 
of the models is presented in Table 5.2. 
For each of the models separate regressions were carried 
out on data for federal fiscal years 1989, 1990 and 1991, as 
well as for mean values of the data for the three years. Each 
year of observations includes aircraft operation and financial 
statistics for 46 airports. This number is less than the 55 
airports from which information was received due either to the 
providing of less that three years of usable financial data or 
because information on depreciation expenses was missing. 
Furthermore, due to missing terminal gate and VFR capacity 
information, the number of airports providing usable 
observations for MODEL 2 and MODEL 3 estimates was reduced to 
42 and 32, respectively. 
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Table 5.2; List of Regression Variables 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
TOTOPEXP = Total operating expenses, operating expenses 
including depreciation 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
COMM = Annual coininercial carrier and air taxi flight 
operations 
NONCOMM = Annual general aviation and military flight 
operations 
VFRCAP = Hourly airport take-off and landing capacity 
when operating under visual flight rules (VFR) 
GATES = Nuxtiber of airport passenger terminal loading 
gates 
COMMSQ = Number of commercial flights squared 
NONCOMSQ = Number of non-commercial flights squared 
VFRCAPSQ = Hourly VFR runway capacity squared 
GATESSQ = Number of terminal gates squared 
COMM_NON = Product of the number of annual commercial and 
non-commercial flights 
COMM_VFR = Product of the number of annual commercial 
flights and hourly VFR runway capacity 
COMM_GAT = Product of the number of annual commercial 
flights and number of passenger terminal gates 
NON_VFR = Product of the number of annual non-commercial 
flights and hourly VFR runway capacity 
NON_GAT = Product of the number of annual non-commercial 
flights and number of passenger terminal gates 
VFR_GAT = Product of hourly VFR runway capacity and the 
number of passenger terminal gates 
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Since the data exhibits increased variance as the amount 
of total operating expense increases each model was estimated 
using a weighted least squares procedure to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. The number of annual commercial flights 
was used as the weight in each case. Also, since the data 
observations used in the analysis consist of both cross-
sectional and time series data, initial model regressions were 
estimated using a pooled error-components generalized least 
squares (GLS) procedure. However, due to the fact that runway 
capacities and the number of passenger terminal gates remained 
stable over the study period for most of the airports included 
in the sample, use of this technique was not possible for 
MODEL 2 or MODEL 3 because the second stage of the procedure 
resulted in the matrices of explanatory variables being 
singular or nearly singular. 
Regression Results 
In MODEL 1, total annual airport operating expense 
(TOTOPEXP) was regressed on the number of commercial flights 
(COMM), the number of non-commercial flights (NONCOMM), the 
number of commercial flights squared (COMMSQ), the number of 
non-commercial flights squared (NONCOMSQ) and the product of 
the numbers of commercial and non-commercial flights 
(COMM__ NON) . The results of these regressions are summarized 
in Table 5.3. 
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Commercial and Non-commercial Aircraft Operations 
MODEL 1 



















































N 46 46 46 46 
ADJ R-SQ 0.907 0.896 0.884 0.898 
F 107.802 96.032 84.764 98.326 
WEIGHT COMM COMM COMM COMM 
NOTES: 
1 .  (*) denotes regression coefficient estimate is significant at 
at the 0.01 level of siginificance,(**) denotes regression 
coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance, and (***) denotes regression coefficient estimate 
is significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
169 
For each year of data, as well as for the data means, the 
model explained approximated 90 percent of the variation in 
total annual operating expenses as reflected in the adjusted 
R-square statistic. Also, the F-statistic indicates the 
regression model as a whole is highly significant. However, 
the T-statistics, provided in parentheses below each 
coefficient estimate, indicate that only the number of 
commercial flights variable is individually significant at the 
0.01 level of significance. Focusing on the means regression, 
since only the COMM coefficient estimate is significant, each 
additional commercial flight is estimated to add approximately 
$358 to annual airport operating costs. 
MODEL 2 includes the same explanatory variables as MODEL 
1 plus the addition of the GATESSQ variable to account for the 
impact of passenger terminal capacity on annual airport 
operating expenses. In addition to the version of the model 
for which results are reported in Table 5.4, alternative 
versions of this model including the GATES, COMM_GAT, and 
NON_GAT variables were also estimated. However, none of these 
versions of the model performed as well as the one including 
only the GATESSQ form of the terminal capacity variable. The 
deficiencies encountered with the other versions of MODEL 2 
can generally be attributed to a high degree of collinearity 
among the various forms of the measures of terminal capacity 
and between the COMM and GATES variables. 
170 
Table 5.4: Regression of Total Operating Expenditures on 
Commercial and Non-commercial Aircraft Operations 
Plus Measure of Terminal Capacity 
MODEL 2 






















































































1. {*) denotes regression coefficient estimate is significant at 
at the 0.01 level of siginificance,(**) denotes regression 
coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance, and (***) denotes regression coefficient estimate 
is significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
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By including the GATESSQ variable the share of variation 
in total annual operating expenses explained increases to 
between 92 and 94 percent. The overall significance of the 
model also increases. More importantly, for each year's data 
and for the data means, most individual coefficient estimates 
are significant at the 0.05 level of significance or better. 
Focusing on the means regression, the COMM coefficient 
increases to 388.07207 from 357.61042 in MODEL 1. However, 
now that the coefficients for the COMMSQ and COMM_NON 
variables are also significant, the change in annual airport 
operating cost that would result from increasing commercial 
traffic by one operation per year would be only between $95 
and $132 based on traffic mix and activity levels for the 
least and most busy airports included in the sample, Los 
Angeles International and Charlestown Municipal, respectively. 
This decrease in the marginal cost associated with increased 
commercial aircraft operations is likely attributable to the 
inclusion of the GATESSQ variable. Again focusing on the 
means regression version of MODEL 2, the addition of one more 
passenger terminal gate would increase annual airport 
operating costs by approximately $338,000 for an average size 
airport with 48 existing gates. 
MODEL 3 builds on MODEL 2 by including the VFRCAPSQ 
variable to provide a measure of runway capacity. The results 
of this model are summarized in Table 5.5. With the addition 
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Table 5.5: Regression of Total Operating Expenditures on 
Coininercial and Non-commercial Aircraft Operations 
Plus Measures of Both Runway and Terminal Capacity 
MODEL 3 































































































1.  (*) denotes regression coefficient estimate is significant at 
at the 0.01 level of siginificance,(**) denotes regression 
coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance, and (***) denotes regression coefficient estimate 
is significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
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of the VFRCAPSQ variable the overall explanatory power of the 
model increases to from 92 to 95 percent as reflected by the 
adjusted R-square statistic. On the other hand, the overall 
significance of the regression reflected by the F-statistic 
decreases below the levels for all four of the data sets for 
MODEL 2 and below all except the 1990 data set for MODEL 1. 
Furthermore, in evaluating the significance of the individual 
coefficient estimates for the VFRCAPSQ variable, the 
regression on the 1991 data set results in an estimate with 
below a O.lO level of significance, the regressions on the 
1990 and means data sets yield estimates with only between 
0.05 and 0.10 levels of significance, and the regression on 
the 1989 data set yields a estimate with only a 0.05 level of 
significance. Thus, addition of this measure of runway 
capacity does not improve on the results of MODEL 2. Other 
forms of the runway capacity measure were also tested and the 
results of those regressions were inferior to the results 
reported in Table 5.5. 
Focusing again on the coefficient for the COMM variable, 
there is a substantial increase in magnitude for all four 
MODEL 3 regressions compared to the corresponding estimates 
for MODEL 2. Correspondingly, there is a substantial increase 
in the difference between the estimates for the marginal cost 
associated with an additional commercial flight for Charleston 
Municipal Airport and Los Angeles International Airport. 
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Using the means data set, for Charleston Municipal Airport the 
marginal cost of an additional commercial flight decreases 
from $132 for MODEL 2 to $42, and for Los Angeles 
International Airport the marginal cost increases from $95 to 
$235. On the other hand, the estimated cost of adding another 
passenger gate at an average size terminal increases only by 
about $4,000 to $342,000. 
Further comparison of the three models shows in all cases 
the sign on the coefficient estimates for the COMM variable is 
positive. While except in one case, for the COMMSQ variable 
the sign of the coefficient estimate is negative. These signs 
imply that airport operating costs increase as the number of 
commercial flights increases, but at a decreasing rate. The 
opposite situation holds for the signs of the coefficient 
estimates for the NONCOMM and NONCOMSQ variables. The 
negative signs on the NONCOMM coefficient estimates imply that 
the cost of airport operations decreases as the number of non­
commercial flights increases, while the positive signs on the 
coefficient estimates for the NONCOMSQ variable imply a 
reduction in the rate of decrease. These signs on the non­
commercial flight variables' coefficient estimates are 
opposite what would normally be expected. Airport operating 
costs would not be expected to decrease as airport use 
increases regardless of the type of aircraft. More likely, 
the signs on the NONCOMM and the NONCOMSQ variable coefficient 
175 
estimates imply that as the number of non-commercial flights 
increases, the number of commercial flights decreases. And 
since most airport operating costs arise from serving 
commercial aircraft traffic, the crowding out of commercial 
traffic by non-commercial traffic results in a decrease in 
airport operating costs. 
The negative signs on the coefficient estimates for the 
COMM_NON variable imply a decrease in airport operating costs 
when both commercial and non-commercial traffic are served. 
Furthermore, for a given overall amount of aircraft traffic, 
the magnitude of the cost reduction is maximized when the 
volume of the two types of traffic are equal. Generally, the 
negative coefficient estimates on the COMM_NON variable may be 
interpreted as an indication of the existence of economies of 
scope with respect to serving multiple types of airport users. 
However, in this case, because the amounts of commercial and 
non-commercial flight activity are negatively correlated, one 
cannot conclude there exist economies of scope. 
Finally, the positive signs on the coefficient estimates 
for the GATESSQ variable indicate that airport operating costs 
rise at an increasing rate as the capacity of the airport 
terminal increases. In addition, the regression results imply 
that terminal capacity more than any other factor explains the 
magnitude of annual airport operating costs. Evidence of this 
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Figure 5.3: Annual Airport Operating Costs vs Number of 
Airport Terminal Gates 
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airport terminal capacity and total annual airport operating 
costs. 
Now, having described the results of the regression 
analysis, the final part of the empirical analysis focuses on 
to what extent economies of scale and economies of scope 
characterize the cost structures of different size airports. 
Economies of Scale and Scope Analysis 
Based on regression results presented above, the means 
version of MODEL 2 is used to evaluate the extent to which 
different size airports exhibit economies of scale and 
economies of scope. However, in both cases the negative 
relationship between the TOTOPEXP and NONCOMM variables 
prevents the direct application of the measures of ray 
economies of scale (S^) and economies of scope (SC). These 
complications arise because for most of the airports in the 
sample both the marginal cost of additional non-commercial 
flights and the stand alone cost of providing airport services 
to non-commercial flights are negative. 
Focusing first on economies of scale, columns 7 through 9 
of Table 5.6, labelled unconstrained marginal costs, show the 
computed values for the marginal costs associated with an 
additional commercial flight, an additional non-commercial 
flight and an additional passenger terminal gate, 
respectively. These values, which were computed using the 
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Table 5.6: Measures of Economies of Scale Based on Regression 
Model 2 





















EWR L 159,333,333 357,629 23,267 97 240. 30 -1548. 88 687146. 13 
JFK L 298,750,000 306,335 21,438 178 257. 82 -1436. 82 1260948. 56 
LGA L 138,916,667 327,842 23,313 52 247. 77 -1475. 99 368367. 00 
DEN L 108,094,345 438,929 39,300 104 180. 53 -1633. 85 736733. 99 
CVG M 19,387,436 258,293 24,101 43 263. 57 -1300. 99 304611. 17 
LAX L 140,077,917 595,889 58,022 122 94. 94 -1884. 18 864245. 65 
SFO L 113,102,996 394,513 41,008 80 187. 68 -1513. 59 566718. 46 
MCI L 34,165,273 169,351 20,399 56 295. 24 -1110. 41 396702. 92 
STL L 49,847,976 379,306 47,506 78 175. 72 -1430. 71 552550. 49 
MOO L 68,620,667 243,722 35,809 86 238. 75 -1182. 89 609222. 34 
DTW L 74,784,113 330,558 53,084 89 174. 55 -1272. 59 630474. 28 
lAH L 80,542,167 262,225 42,739 82 217 . 16 -1179. 09 580886. 42 
PHL L 70,317,725 334,020 56,318 63 165. 79 -1258. 21 446290. 78 
CLE L 31,781,847 211,629 46,452 42 221. 00 -1029. 63 297527. 19 
DCA L 36,244,925 245,919 65,435 44 166. 02 -979. 26 311695. 15 
MEM M 28,890,397 254,463 74,274 72 142. 31 -937. 72 510046. 61 
ONT S 21,645,417 114,602 35,419 20 272. 59 -871. 07 141679. 61 
PHX L 63,060,083 365,537 126,467 90 -13. 14 -840. 15 637558. 26 
IND M 27,463,036 161,821 58,773 34 203. 67 -821. 37 240855. ,34 
PDX M 33,837,917 192,683 75,463 41 155. 15 -778. 83 290443. 21 
LAS L 56,446,007 276,778 113,767 60 40. 41 -713. 50 425038. ,84 
SLC M 27,214,311 210,032 88,966 54 117. 83 -725. 83 382534. ,96 
SDF M 14,822,760 109,427 46,927 21 245. 87 -777. ,29 148763. ,59 
BNA M 26,027,554 188,318 81,369 46 141. 87 -726. 53 325863. ,11 
RDU M 20,966,351 186,714 88,783 56 124. 21 -670. ,32 396702. ,92 
MKE M 21,008,625 127,375 76,752 42 168. 64 -610. ,62 297527. ,19 
CMH M 20,070,965 124,476 92,268 28 131. 58 -494. ,11 198351. ,46 
DAL L 12,535,667 104,387 107,675 15 99. ,16 -336. ,48 106259. ,71 
ABQ M 18,420,124 107,435 115,575 22 79. 13 -288. ,17 155847. ,58 
SJC S 33,409,902 143,924 180,837 30 -89. ,16 83. .29 212519. .42 
CWA M 11,724,578 67,713 90,755 20 149. ,72 -366. .49 141679. .61 
OKC M 18,265,408 61,151 82,591 17 171. ,28 -408. .09 120427. .67 
ORF M 11,660,666 61,399 92,620 24 146. ,78 -337. .94 170015. .54 
RNO M 16,519,959 63,889 98,239 21 132. .46 -304. .38 148763. .59 
TUL M 17,443,481 65,681 124,177 16 68. ,81 -125. .77 113343. .69 
BOI S 4,815,153 55,056 105,304 9 117, .50 -233, .02 63755, ,83 
GRR S 5,349,624 50,021 113,710 12 98. .30 -161, .45 85007, .77 
ICT S 19,084,347 43,015 129,065 12 62. ,67 -36. .07 85007, ,77 
SRQ S 9,431,091 41,399 127,247 13 67. .52 -44, .95 92091, .75 
CHS S 6,575,643 29,339 101,860 10 132. .44 -194, .66 70839, ,81 
GFK N 2,835,481 8,347 280,669 2 -297, ,85 1117, .84 14167, .96 
APA L 2,741,050 3,823 364,356 0 -500, .58 1719, .20 0, .00 
MEAN 47,053,166 192,261 87,431 48 126, .10 -693, .37 337838. .41 
TOP 3RD 99,123,033 329,303 38,054 84 211. .49 -1375, .56 593030, .38 
MIDDLE 3RD 29,302,430 190,181 80,881 45 142, .58 -734 .50 315237 .14 
BOTTCW 3RD 12,734,036 57,299 143,357 15 24, .22 29. .95 105247 .71 
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Table 5.6: (continued) UNCON­ CON­
STRAINED STRAINED 
CONSTRAINED MARGINAL COSTS ECONC^IES ECONCMIES CCM^ 
AIR­ HUB OF OF TOTAL FLIGHT 
PORT CLS cam NONCCM^ GATES SCALE SCALE FLIGHTS SHARE 
ID (2) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
EWR L 240.30 0.00 687146.13 1,3671 1.0442 380,896 0.9389 
JFK L 257.82 0.00 1260948.56 1,0958 0.9846 327,773 0.934 6 
LGA. L 247.77 0.00 368367.00 2.1055 1.3838 351,154 0.9336 
DEN L 180.53 0.00 736733,99 1.1794 0.6935 478,229 0.9178 
CVG M 263.57 0.00 304611.17 0.3891 0.2388 282,394 0.9147 
LAX L 94.94 0.00 864245,65 2.6587 0.8646 653,911 0.9113 
SFO L 187.68 0.00 566718.46 1.9735 0.9474 435,521 0.9058 
MCI L 295.24 0.00 396702,92 0.6893 0.4731 189,750 0.8925 
STL L 175.72 0.00 552550.49 1.1930 0.4542 426,813 0.8887 
MCO L 238.75 0.00 609222.34 1.0058 0.6205 279,531 0.8719 
DTW L 174.55 0.00 630474,28 1.6167 0.6571 383,642 0.8616 
lAH L 217.16 0.00 580886,42 1.4864 0.7702 304,964 0.8599 
PHL L 165.79 0.00 446290,78 5.5661 0.8422 390,338 0.8557 
CLE L 221.00 0.00 297527,19 2.7788 0.5363 258,081 0.8200 
DCA L 166.02 0.00 311695.15 -3.8006 0.6645 311,354 0.7898 
MEM M 142.31 0.00 510046,61 8.7914 0.3961 328,737 0.7741 
ONT S 272.59 0.00 141679,61 6.7210 0.6353 150,021 0.7639 
PHX L 0.00 0.00 637558,26 -1.1748 1.0990 492,004 0.7430 
IND M 203.67 0.00 240855.34 -3.8531 0.6674 220,594 0.7336 
PDX M 155.15 0.00 290443,21 -1.9940 0.8095 268,146 0.7186 
LAS L 40.41 0.00 425038,84 -1.2688 1.5386 390,546 0.7087 
SLC M 117.83 0.00 382534,96 -1.4196 0,5994 298,998 0.7025 
SDF M 245.87 0.00 148763,59 -2.2994 0,4936 156,354 0.6999 
BNA M 141.87 0.00 325863,11 -1,4949 0,6241 269,687 0.6983 
RDU M 124.21 0.00 396702.92 -1,4864 0,4617 275,497 0,6777 
MKE M 168.64 0.00 297527.19 -1,6299 0.6183 204,127 0.6240 
CMH M 131.58 0.00 198351.46 -0,8484 0,9151 216,743 0.5743 
DAL L 99.16 0.00 106259.71 -0.5162 1.0495 212,063 0,4922 
ABQ M 79.13 0.00 155847.58 -0,8617 1.5440 223,010 0.4817 
SJC S 0.00 83.29 212519.42 3,8820 1.5584 324,761 0.4432 
am M 149.72 0.00 141679.61 -0,5779 0.9039 158,468 0.4273 
OKC M 171.28 0.00 120427.67 -0.8623 1.4587 143,742 0.4254 
ORF M 146.78 0.00 170015.54 -0.6404 0.8906 154,019 0.3986 
RNO M 132.46 0.00 148763.59 -0.9020 1.4258 162,128 0,3941 
TUL M 68.81 0.00 113343.69 -1.8788 2.7544 189,859 0.3459 
BOI S 117,50 0.00 63755.83 -0.2752 0.6837 160,359 0.3433 
GRR S 98.30 0.00 85007,77 -0.4307 0.9010 163,731 0.3055 
ICT S 62.67 0.00 85007,77 -20.3285 5.1357 172,081 0.2500 
SRQ S 67.52 0.00 92091,75 -5.4578 2.3623 168,646 0.2455 
CHS S 132.44 0.00 70839,81 -0.4316 1.4314 131,199 0.2236 
GFK N 0.00 1117.84 14167.96 0.0091 0.0090 289,015 0.0289 
APA L 0.00 1719.20 0,00 0.0044 0.0044 368,178 0.0104 
MEAN 126.10 0.00 337838,41 -2.3216 1.1660 279,692 0.6874 
TOP 3RD 211.49 0.00 593030,38 1.4807 0.8310 367,357 0.8964 
MIDDLE 3RD 142.58 0.00 315237,14 -1.6044 0.7122 271,062 0.7016 
BOTTCW 3RD 24.22 29.95 105247,71 1.7576 1.7576 187,771 0.3052 
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results of the means version of MODEL 2, show that the 
marginal costs associated with an additional non-commercial 
flight are negative for 39 of the 42 airports in the sample, 
and their use in evaluating the degree of airport economies of 
scale yield 23 negative values, which are meaningless. 
These negative values reflect the crowding out of commercial 
flight activity rather than a true reduction in airport 
operating costs when non-commercial flight activity increases. 
Therefore, to obtain a more meaningful test for airport 
economies of scale the S, values were recomputed by setting 
any negative commercial or non-commercial flight activity 
marginal cost values equal to zero. These constrained 
marginal costs computations are presented in columns 10 
through 12 and the adjusted values are presented in column 
14, labelled constrained economies of scale. 
Although constraining all marginal cost values to be 
equal to or greater than zero likely results in the 
overstating of the degree of airport economies of scale, these 
adjusted Sj values provide reasonable approximations of true Sj 
values. These approximations are reasonable because most 
commercial airport operating costs are associated with 
passenger terminal activities, which to a great extent are not 
affected by users of non-commercial aircraft, and costs 
associated with runway use are primarily a function of 
aircraft size and weight meaning most runway costs are 
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attributable to cominercial flight activity. 
Thus, for the overall sample, the constrained value of 
1.166 implies the airports included in the study exhibit 
slightly increasing economies of scale. However, as shown in 
Figure 5.4, disaggregation of the sample of airports according 
to the share of total flight activity accounted for by 
coitonercial flights tells a different story. This more 
detailed look at the sample of airports reveals that the 14 
airports with the highest concentration of commercial flights, 
those with commercial flight shares greater than or equal to 
82 percent, exhibit decreasing economies of scale as reflected 
by an average value of 0.8310. Similarly, the middle 14 
airports, with commercial flight shares between 82 and 49 
percent, also exhibit decreasing returns to scale with an 
average Sj of 0.7122. On the other hand, the 14 airports with 
commercial flights accounting for less than 49 percent of 
total aircraft operations exhibit increasing returns to scale 
with an average S^ of 1.7576. These results tend to confirm 
the theoretical findings of Chapter Four that larger airports 
will exhibit decreasing returns to scale, while smaller 
airports will exhibit increasing returns to scale. The 
theoretical analysis presented in Chapter Four also implies 
very large airports will likely exhibit diseconomies of scope, 
while small airports will exhibit economies of scope. An 
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Figure 5.4: Ray Economies of Scale Index vs Commercial Flight 
Share of Airport Operations 
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Table 5.7; Measures of Economies of Scope Based on Regression 
Model 2 
AIRPORT MEANS DATASET 1989 -91 
AIR­ STAND ALONE COSTS ECONCMIES CCWM 
PORT OF TOTAL FLIGHT 
ID TOTOPEXP C»dM NONCOMM SCOPE FLIGHTS SHARE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EWR 159,333,333 172,863,184 (15,765,660) 0.9860 380,896 0.9389 
JFK 298,750,000 319,427,566 (14,802,773) 1.0197 327,773 0.9346 
LGA 138,916,667 119,006,082 (15,788,923) 0.7430 351,154 0.9336 
DEN 108,094,345 197,886,258 (22,184,462) 1.6254 478,229 0.9178 
CVG 19,387,436 96,342,114 (16,188,808) 4.1343 282,394 0.9147 
LAX 140,077,917 246,246,000 (25,089,962) 1.5788 653,911 0.9113 
SFO 113,102,996 158,795,253 (22,654,523) 1.2037 435,521 0.9058 
MCI 34,165,273 80,630,921 (14,235,047) 1.9434 189,750 0.8925 
STL 49,847,976 153,652,604 (24,066,757) 2.5996 426,813 0.8887 
MCO 68,620,667 131,845,449 (21,095,779) 1.6139 279,531 0.8719 
DTW 74,784,113 156,561,755 (24,803,766) 1.7618 383,642 0.8616 
lAH 80,542,167 131,881,301 (23,088,842) 1.3508 304,964 0.8599 
PHL 70,317,725 129,323,436 (25,030,071) 1.4832 390,338 0.8557 
CLE 31,781,847 83,216,240 (23,878,178) 1.8670 258,081 0.8200 
DCA 36,244,925 93,745,693 (24,873,716) 1.9002 311,354 0.7898 
MEM 28,890,397 118,981,153 (23,602,466) 3.3014 328,737 0.7741 
ONT 21,645,417 43,962,185 (20,963,354) 1.0625 150,021 0.7639 
PHX 63,060,083 165,202,551 6,374,671 2.7209 492,004 0.7430 
IND 27,463,036 64,317,811 (25,103,341) 1.4279 220,594 0.7336 
PDX 33,837,917 77,226,979 (23,347,504) 1.5923 268,146 0.7186 
LAS 56,446,007 113,400,660 (4,457,708) 1.9300 390,546 0.7087 
SLC 27,214,311 90,928,654 (19,050,706) 2.6412 298,998 0.7025 
SDF 14,822,760 42,539,863 (23,965,044) 1.2531 156,354 0.6999 
BNA 26,027,554 79,038,160 (21,784,780) 2.1997 269,687 0.6983 
RDU 20,966,351 85,794,373 (19,126,132) 3.1798 275,497 0.6777 
MKE 21,008,625 57,794,577 (23,048,336) 1.6539 204,127 0.6240 
CMH 20,070,965 49,913,000 (17,608,880) 1.6095 216,743 0.5743 
DAL 12,535,667 39,328,311 (8,846,267) 2.4316 212,063 0.4922 
ABQ 18,420,124 42,181,240 (3,054,503) 2.1241 223,010 0.4817 
SJC 33,409,902 56,952,686 78,471,870 4.0534 324,761 0.4432 
cm 11,724,578 27,943,422 (10,288,755) 0.8235 158,468 0.4273 
OKC 18,265,408 24,825,948 (21,399,886) 0.1876 143,742 0.4254 
ORF 11,660,666 26,947,432 (17,445,765) 0.8148 154,019 0.3986 
RNO 16,519,959 26,878,055 (14,610,544) 0.7426 162,128 0.3941 
TUL 17,443,481 26,203,805 4,253,267 1.7460 189,859 0.3459 
BOI 4,815,153 21,167,341 (10,413,170) 2.2334 160,359 0.3433 
GRR 5,349,624 19,794,561 (4,501,196) 2.8588 163,731 0.3055 
ICT 19,084,347 17,241,666 8,870,981 1.3683 172,081 0.2500 
SRQ 9,431,091 16,826,342 7,113,820 2.5384 168,646 0.2455 
CHS 6,575,643 11,874,805 (12,547,051) -0.1022 131,199 0.2236 
GFK 2,835,481 3,249,700 319,449,419 113.8076 289,015 0.0289 
APA 2,741,050 1,479,748 629,795,166 230.3040 368,178 0.0104 
MEAN 9,948,541 81,308,010 (19,668,874) 1.3100 160,001 0.0000 
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this hypothesis. However, as shown in Table 5.7, and for the 
reasons explained previously, this could not be accomplished 
either on an individual airport basis or for sub-samples of 
airports. 
Several other approaches were also attempted to obtain a 
meaningful tests for economies of scope, but these attempts 
also failed. These alternative approaches included estimating 
separate regressions for commercial and non-commercial 
variables, matching airports with approximately the same 
volumes of total flights but with opposite shares of 
commercial and non-commercial operations, and a two-stage 
regression to filter out the impact of terminal size on total 
annual operating cost. 
However, failure to find statistical evidence of the 
existence of either economies of scope or diseconomies of 
scope does not invalidate this aspect of the theoretical 
analysis in Chapter Four. Rather the theoretical analysis 
suggests the issue of economies of scope should be addressed 
on a time period basis instead of in aggregate. Specifically, 
the analysis in Chapter Four suggested inter-period economies 
of scope may exist with respect to use of the passenger 
terminal, while intra-period economies of scope may exist 
during the off-peak traffic period and intra-period 
diseconomies of space may exist during the peak traffic period 
relative to runway use. To test for these conditions would 
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require aircraft operations data disaggregated by time period. 
This data has not been obtained but may be pursued for future 
follow-up studies. 
Finally, none of the empirical analysis presented here 
addresses issues related to non-user externalities. However, 
to provide a basis for using the models developed in this 
dissertation to help establish airport user fees and non-user 
taxes such research is needed. Types of data required to 
facilitate the estimation of the value of beneficial and 
adverse non-user externalities include airport expenditures on 
noise abatement programs, tax collections from special airport 
taxing districts or airport budget contributions from general 
tax revenues, and home value information. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Although not a new subject, the pricing of and investment 
in publicly provided transportation infrastructure has re­
ceived increased attention in recent years. One explanation 
for this heightened level of interest in transportation in­
vestment and finance is the current debate among politicians 
and economists over to what extent public capital investment 
influences a nation's competitiveness in the "new global" 
economy. A second explanation for the revived interest in 
transportation infrastructure pricing is that because of the 
explosion of the national debt over the past decade and the 
poor financial condition of many states public resources 
available for capital investment have become extremely limit­
ed. Third, new technology makes the imposition of congestion 
tolls feasible at a reasonable cost, while at the same time 
improvements in fuel efficiency for the nation's fleet of 
transportation vehicles makes one major traditional source of 
funding for transportation infrastructure (i.e., fuel taxes) 
less reliable for funding needed system improvements in future 
years. 
In spite of the increased interest in this subject very 
little has been done to expand the theoretical treatment of 
transportation infrastructure pricing beyond the work complet­
ed in the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, advances in the 
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public finance field related to the theory of club goods and 
in the industrial organization field related to the theory of 
multi-product industries have not been incorporated to any 
great extent into the theory of transportation infrastructure 
pricing and investment. This dissertation employs the methods 
of analysis and findings from research in these two relatively 
new areas of economic theory to expand the theoretical founda­
tion for the empirical analysis of transportation financing 
issues. 
Summarv of Results and Findings 
Taking the work of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) as a point 
of departure, this dissertation develops a set of three gener­
al transportation club models. The first model focuses on a 
single, capacity constrained transportation facility used by a 
single group of homogeneous individuals during a single time 
period. This model replicates the findings of Mohring and 
Harwitz that efficient transportation infrastructure invest­
ment requires that fees imposed on users of such facilities 
incorporate the cost associated with the increase in conges­
tion each individual's use of the facility imposes on all 
other users. Furthermore, this model determines that for user 
fees set equal to marginal cost to be adequate to fully fund 
the provision, operation and maintenance of the transportation 
facility, the facility/s cost structure must be characterized 
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by constant economies of scale. 
The second model extends the treatment of the single 
transportation facility model by taking into consideration the 
impact of externalities on individuals who do not directly use 
the transportation facility. This model shows that if the 
existence and use of the transportation facility results in a 
net adverse impact on non-users, then efficient user fees 
should increase from the level found in the first model to an 
amount adequate to compensate non-users. In addition this 
model shows that unless the costs associated with adverse 
external impacts are internalized in user fees the transporta­
tion facility will tend to be overbuilt. Alternatively, if 
the net external impact of the transportation facility is 
beneficial, then non-users of the facility should be expected 
to contribute part of its funding. Otherwise, investment in 
the facility will be below the socially optimal level. 
The third model introduces consideration of the pricing 
and investment implications of having use of the transporta­
tion facility shared by two groups of users. This model also 
incorporates the influence of variation in the level of usage 
of the transportation facilities over time by distinguishing 
between peak and off-peak traffic periods. These extensions 
of the model introduce the concepts of ray economies of scale 
and economies of scope to the analysis. Through the introduc­
tion of these concepts, the model provides a theoretical basis 
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for using market pricing mechanisms to facilitate the more 
efficient use of the transportation facility by shifting 
traffic from the peak to the off-peak traffic period. The 
third model all provides a rationale for sharing high cost 
public infrastructure and for using marginal cost pricing as a 
meaning for determining the optimal level of use by members of 
the different user groups. 
Overall, the three general transportation models devel­
oped in Chapter Three illustrate the flexibility of the club 
theory approach for incorporating a wide variety of policy 
considerations in a single model. The flexibility of this 
approach, as well as its adaptability to special applications, 
is further illustrated in Chapter Four through the customiza­
tion of an two-period, two user group airport pricing and 
investment model. This special application not only incorpo­
rates the consideration of the impact of non-user externali­
ties, multiple user groups, and multiple time periods, but in 
addition, it explicitly translates differences in service 
preferences of members of different user groups through the 
introduction of transportation vehicles (i.e., commercial 
carrier aircraft and general aviation aircraft) and multiple 
transportation facilities (i.e., runways and a passenger 
terminal). 
Regarding the pricing of airport services, this model 
found the requirement that, in the absence of externalities. 
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constant economies of scale is a necessary condition for full 
user financing to be feasible extends to the multiple user 
case. Although in this multiple user group context the full 
user financing condition becomes constant ray economies of 
scale. The airport club model further shows that the degree 
to which a transportation facility's cost structure is charac­
terized by economies or diseconomies of scope may vary by time 
period. For example, the model suggests that an airport that 
experiences a high level of use during the peak traffic period 
may exhibit diseconomies of scope during that period, while 
during the off-peak traffic period it may exhibit economies of 
scope. In such cases, the model implies marginal cost pricing 
of the use of airside facilities may provide an efficient 
mechanism for shifting airport use from the peak to the off-
peak traffic period. 
To test the financing implications of the airport club 
model an econometric analysis of the cost structures of a 
sample of domestic airports was conducted. The focus of this 
empirical analysis was the degree of economies of scale and 
economies of scope exhibited by different size airports. The 
primary focus of this analysis was to determine how the cost 
characteristics of airports vary by size measured in terms of 
VFR (visual flight rule) runway capacity and the number of 
passenger terminal boarding gates. The results of this analy­
sis were somewhat confounded by the discovery of a "crowding 
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out" effect between commercial and general aviation aircraft. 
However, the sample of airports was found to exhibit substan­
tial variation in the degree of economies of scale by size of 
airport. As was expected large airports tended to exhibit 
cost structures characterized by decreasing economies of 
scale, while small airports exhibited costs structures charac­
terized by increasing economies of scale. On the other hand, 
results pertaining to the issue of economies of scope were 
indeterminant. This may be attributed both to the dominant 
influence of terminal related costs, which prevented the 
detection of any possible economies of scope related to runway 
use, and the lack of time period specific aircraft traffic 
data, which would be needed to test for economies of scope 
relative to use of the passenger terminal. 
Policy Implications 
As discussed in Chapter Four the pricing of airport 
airside services is generally not reflective of the costs 
different classes of users impose on those facilities. Al­
though, aircraft landing fees are generally based on aircraft 
gross weight for commercial carriers this method of pricing 
represents only a minimal attempt to relate user fees to 
runway "wear and tear." 
Almost no attempt is made by managers of United States 
airports to make user fees demand sensitive by incorporating 
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the congestion related costs users impose on each other 
through their travel time choices. The costs and benefits 
associated with externalities arising from the existence and 
use of airports are also generally excluded from consideration 
in setting landing fees and aviation fuel taxes. 
The airport club model provides the theoretical justifi­
cation for moving to a cost based pricing system in establish­
ing fees for the use of airport infrastructure. Not only does 
this model provide justification for the incorportation of 
charges related to congestion and non-user externalities, it 
also provides a basis for assigning costs based on which 
elements of the airport's infrastructure different classes of 
consumers use. As a result, the model establishes a framework 
for allocating capital and operating costs among different 
classes of users. Furthermore, it provides a legal foundation 
for differential pricing of services among different classes 
of users and by time period. 
Both the airport model and the general transportation 
facility models suggest a number of additional policy issues 
that could be addressed using club theory and the theory of 
multi-product enterprises. Most significantly, the existence 
of non-user externalities provides only one justification for 
side payments to and from specific airports. Throughout the 
domestic transportation system there exists substantial cross-
subsidization among different system elements. The models 
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presented here provide a foundation for extending the analysis 
to complete networks of facilities. This extension of the 
theory would incorporate issues related to network externali­
ties, multi-jurisdictional cost sharing and a hierarchy of 
clubs. These possible extensions of the theoretical models 
developed in this dissertation provide part of an agenda for 
future research. 
Future Research 
As stated above, the combination of club theory and the 
theory of multi-product enterprises provides substantial 
opportunities for additional extension of the theoretical 
analysis of transportation infrastructure pricing and invest­
ment issues. Through extension of the models from the 
"closed" system of single facilities to the context of entire I 
"open" networks the influence of location and the issues of 
optimal siting and size distribution of facilities are intro­
duced. 
Also, although the current models represent the providers 
of the transportation facilities (i.e., airports, highways, 
etc.) and the providers of transportation services (i.e., 
airlines, motor carriers, etc.) as passive players in the 
infrastructure investment process, the incorporation of 
strategic decision-making by these groups would add another 
significant dimension to the theory of transportation infra­
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structure pricing and investment. 
Another avenue which merits additional research is the 
further empirical analysis of the implications of the airport 
model. Although the current research failed to determine the 
extent to which different size airports exhibit economies of 
scope, the theory suggests that disaggregation of aircraft 
flight information by time period may provide more revealing 
results. It may also be possible to develop an econometric 
procedure that will filter out the effects of terminal costs 
so that tests for economies of scope with respect to runway 
use may be conducted. 
Finally, the model also suggests approaches for measuring 
the implication of airport externalities on surrounding land 
uses and on regional economic activity. In particular, both 
the model and the empirical analysis could be expanded to take 
into consideration multiple groups of non-users. Through this 
sort of disaggregation of the non-user population, estimates 
of side payment which should be made to and collected from 
residents of an airport's service area may be obtained. This 
sort of refinement of the model and accompanying empirical 
analysis would provide the framework for operationalizing the 
pricing of airport generated externalities. Similarly, fur­
ther disaggregation of the elements of airport infrastructure 
would provide a basis for the allocation of airport airside 
costs among different classes of users. Thus, the models 
195 
developed in this dissertation provide a strong and very 
flexible foundation for future research. 
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Part 1: Alternative Objective Function for Two-period. Two 
User Group. Capacity Constrained Single Transportation 
Facility Club Model without Non-user Externalities 
In Chapter 3, those service area residents who did not 
use the transportation facility were represented by a single 
group of P-M-N individuals. Since in the context of this 
model society rather than individuals decides who is and is 
not a user of the transportation facility, a technically more 
correct representation of the non-user population would be to 
have two non-user groups, one each paired with the two user 
groups. This change in the setup of the model would result in 
the following alternative objective function, 
W = (M^ - M) • U"'(y'"^ 0, 0, 0) + (N^ - N) • U"(y"^ 0, 0, 0) 
+ M-U^[y^v^,v^,c(F;,F^,FJ,F^,X)] 
+ N-U"[y",vJ,vS,c(Fj,F^,Fj,F^,X)] , 
where M' represents the total population of individuals with 
type-M preferences and N' represents the total population of 
individuals with type N-preferences. All other variables are 
defined the same as in Chapter 3. 
This modification of the objective function and a 
corresponding change of the budget constraint, will results in 
a slight change in notation for the LHS of the user group 
membership conditions and the RHS income adjustment terms, but 
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these changes have no material impact on the interpretation of 
these first-order conditions. None of the other first-order 
conditions are affected by this change. More inportantly, 
this change has no impact on the financing conditions. 
Therefore, to simplify the development of the model non-
users of the transportation facility have been combined into a 
single group. 
Part 2; Proof that Subadditivitv of Incremental Costs Implies 
Economies of Scope 
Prove: 
If E IC < JC, Then JC < E SAC, where IC denotes incremental 




[CU, Y, Z) - C(0, Y, Z) ] + [CU, Y, Z) - C(X, 0, Z) ] 
+ [C{X, Y, Z) - C(X, Y, 0) ] < C(X, Y, Z) 
(2) Begin with the two output case. 
[C(A, S) - C(0,S)] + [C{A,B) - C(A, 0)] < C{A, B) 
(3) Then, 
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2'C{A,B) < C(A,B) + C{A,0) +C(0,B) 
C(A, B) < C(A, 0) + C(0, B) 
(4) Next, if all three outputs make use of some common 
resource, 
C{X,Y,Z) - C{0, Y, Z) > C{X, Y, Z) -C(0,Y,0) -C(0,0,Z) 
and 
C(.X,Y,Z) -C(X,0,Z) > C{X,Y,Z) - C(Z, 0, 0) -C(0,0,Z) 
and 
Ci^X, Y, Z) - C{X, Y, 0) > C{X, Y, Z) - C(X, 0,0) - C(0, Y, 0) 
(5) So now, 
[C{X,Y,Z) -C{0,Y,0) -C(0,0,Z)] 
+ [C{X,Y,Z) -C{X,0,0) -C(0,0,Z)1 
+ [C{X, Y, Z) - C(X, 0, 0) - C(0, Y, 0) ] 
< Cix, Y, Z) 
(6) Therefore, 
2-Cix, Y, Z) 
< 2'C{X,0,0) + 2'C{0,Y, Z) +2-C(0,0,Z) 
=» C{X, Y, Z) < Cix, 0, 0) + C{0, Y, 0) + C(0, 0, Z) 
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APPENDIX B 
FISCAL YEAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
FISCAL YEAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
OPERATING OPERATING TOTAL 
AIR- EXPENSES INCOME OPERATING NET 
PORT FISCAL OPERATING EXCLUDING BEFORE EXPENSES & OPERATING 
ID YEAR REVENUES DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION INCOME 
ABQ 1989 18,463,826 (8,198,964 10,264,862 (5,372, 623 (13,571,586) 4,892,239 
ABQ 1990 23,970,770 (10,180,582 13,790,189 (10,032, 417 (20,212,998) 3,757,772 
ABQ 1991 27,000,285 (11,066,640 15,933, 646 (10,409, 148 (21,475,787) 5,524,498 
ABQ 1992 
BWI 1989 43,795,613 (27,783,167 16,012,446 
BWI 1990 43,949,613 (29,573,319 14,376,294 
BWI 1991 48,534,333 (30,721,636 17,812,697 
BWI 1992 50,916,975 (30,586,612 20,330,363 
BOI 1989 4,452,178 (2,921,458 1,530,720 (1,123, 013 (4,044,471) 407,707 
BOI 1990 4,868,433 (4,571,602 296,831 (1,168, 260 (5,739,862) (871,429 
BOI 1991 4,674,668 (3,376,973 1,297,695 (1,284, 152 (4,661,125) 13,543 
BOI 1992 4,853,795 (3,692,941 1,160,854 (1,410, 889 (5,103,830) (250,035 
CHS 1989 8,566,859 (3,590,306 4,976,553 (2,403, 036 (5,993,342) 2,573,518 
CHS 1990 8,990,174 (3,895,903 5,094,272 (2,744, 067 (6, 639,970) 2,350,204 
CHS 1991 9,360,612 (4,204,649 5,155,962 (2,888, 967 (7,093,616) 2,266,995 
CHS 1992 
CVG 1989 24,792,778 (12,543,630 12,249,148 (4, 628, 432 (17,172,062) 7,620,716 
CVG 1990 31,384,422 (13,847,051 17,537,371 (4,905, 694 (18,752,745) 12,631,678 
CVG 1991 36,285,000 (16,230,500 20,054,500 (6,007, 000 (22,237,500) 14,047,500 
CVG 1992 39,783,750 (19,264,000 20,519,750 (9,141, 750 (28,405,750) 11,378,000 
CLE 1989 32,875,308 (21,767,580 11,107,728 (7,628, 352 (29,395,931) 3,479,377 
CLE 1990 36,139,352 (23,051,193 13,088,159 (7,978, 139 (31,029,332) 5,110,020 
CLE 1991 36,067,938 (25,896,650 10,171,288 (9,023, 627 (34,920,278) 1,147,661 
CLE 1992 41,131,705 (27,110,000 14,021,704 (10,116, 064 (37,226,065) 3,905,640 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
FISCAL YEAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
OPERATING OPERATING TOTAL 
AIR- EXPENSES INCOME OPERATING NET 
PORT FISCAL OPERATING EXCLUDING BEFORE EXPENSES & OPERATING 
ID YEAR REVENUES DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION INCOME 
CMH 1989 18,967,798 (15,606,325 3,361,472 (2, 693, CO CD 0
0 
299, 814) 667, 984 
CMH 1990 22,063,753 (17,002,376 5,061,377 (2, 793, 187 (19, 795, 563) 2,268, 190 
CMH 1991 22,914,756 (19,130,301 3,784,456 (2, 987, 219 (22, 117, 520) 797, 237 
CMH 1992 27,033,868 (16,629,542 10,404,326 (1, 650, 137 (18, 279, 679) 8,754, 189 
DAL 1989 15,633,000 (8,102,000 7,531,000 (3, 477, 000 (11, 579, 000) 4,054, 000 
DAL 1990 15,353,000 (8,502,000 6,851,000 (2, 968, 000 (11, 470, 000) 3,883, 000 
DAL 1991 14,761,000 (8,704,000 6,057,000 (5, 854, 000 (14, 558, 000) 203, 000 
DAL 1992 15,644,000 (8,503,000 7,141,000 (5, 065, 000 (13, 568, 000) 2,076, 000 
DFW 1989 171,737,000 (75,715,000 96,022,000 
DFW 1990 187,900,000 (81,302,000 106,598,000 (28, 695, 000 (109, 997, 000) 77,903, 000 
DFW 1991 188,479,000 (85,222,000 103,257,000 (29, 085, 000 (114, 307, 000) 74,172, 000 
DFW 1992 
DEN 1989 114,828,518 (59,516,176 55,312,343 (37, 350, 292 (96, 866, 467) 17,962, 051 
DEN 1990 134,212,310 (67,003, 662 67,208,647 (44, 183, 583 (111, 187, 246) 23,025, 064 
DEN 1991 148,696,265 (69,285, 689 79,410,576 (46, 943, 634 (116, 229, 323) 32,466, 942 
DEN 1992 152,592,105 (65,039,887 87,552,219 (47, 515, 534 (112, 555, 421) 40,036, 685 
APA 1989 2,041,282 (944,510 1,096,772 (1, 971, 911 (2, 916, 421) (875, 139 
APA 1990 2,138,991 (831,948 1,307,043 (1, 857, 843 (2, 689, 791) (550, 800 
APA 1991 1,971,422 (982,712 988,710 (1, 634, 228 (2, 616, 940) (645, 518 
APA 1992 1,921,677 (926,415 995,262 (1, 605, 188 (2, 531, 602) (609, 926 
DSM 1989 7,901,548 (7,170,296 731,252 
DSM 1990 8,557,878 (8,033,385 524,493 
DSM 1991 8,375,679 (7,623,283 752,396 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 















































FLL 1989 51, 279, 000 (23, 510, 000 27,769, 000 (6,323, 000 (29, 833, 000) 21,446, 000 
FLL 1990 54, 534, 000 (24, 807, 000 29,727, 000 (7,217, 000 (32, 024, 000) 22,510, 000 
FLL 1991 56, 997, 000 (28, 474, 000 28,523, 000 (6,951, 000 (35, 425, 000) 21,572, 000 
FLL 1992 50, 822, 000 (27, 243, 000 23,579, 000 (6,981, 000 (34, 224, 000) 16,598, 000 
GFK 1989 1, 616, 836 (1, 637, 456 (20, 620 (732, 502 (2, 369, 958) (753, 122 
GFK 1990 2, 105, 371 (2, 153, 094 (47, 723 (864, 109 (3, 017, 203) (911, 832 
GFK 1991 2, 027, 224 (2, 123, 022 (95, 798 (996, 260 (3, 119, 282) (1,092, 058 
GFK 1992 2, 157, 784 (2, 278, 897 (121, 113 (1,107, 536 (3, 386, 432) (1,228, 649 
GRR 1989 6, 493, 596 (3, 989, 585 2,504, Oil (1,063, 458 (5, 053, 044) 1,440, 552 
GRR 1990 6, 860, 228 (4, 246, 080 2,614, 148 (1,101, 262 (5, 347, 342) 1,512, 887 
GRR 1991 6, 926, 685 (4, 548, 855 2,377, 830 (1,099, 630 (5, 648, 486) 1,278, 199 
GRR 1992 8, 468, 674 (4, 866, 178 3,602, 496 (1,179, 793 (6, 045, 971) 2,422, 703 
ITO 1989 
ITO 1990 




HNL 1991 318,348,261 (64,687,633 253,660,628 
HNL 1992 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 -.1992 




















































































































































































UNITED STATES AIRPORT SJU^PLE, FY 1989 - 1992 




























































































































































































UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - .1992 













































































































































































UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 


























































































































































































UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - .1992 
FISCAL YEAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
OPERATING OPERATING TOTAL 
AIR- EXPENSES INCOME OPERATING NET 
PORT FISCAL OPERATING EXCLUDING BEFORE EXPENSES & OPERATING 





























































































































































UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
FISCAL YEAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
OPERATING OPERATING TOTAL 
AIR- EXPENSES INCOME OPERATING NET 
PORT FISCAL OPERATING EXCLUDING BEFORE EXPENSES & OPERATING 
ID YEAR REVENUES DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION INCOME 
STL 1989 58, 586, 866 (31, 558, 542 27, 028, 324 (15,012, 192 (46, 570,734) 12,016, 133 
STL 1990 60, 468, 784 (33, 132, 518 27, 336, 266 (15,664, 126 (48, 796,644) 11,672, 140 
STL 1991 65, 771, 836 (37, 734, 302 28, 037, 535 (16,442, 250 (54, 176,551) 11,595, 285 
STL 1992 
TPA 1989 47, 880, 229 (24, 119, 354 23, 760, 875 
TPA 1990 55, 984, 573 (27, 294, 128 28, 690, 445 
TPA 1991 58, 032, 991 (29, 257, 928 28, 775, 063 (14,463, 618 (43, 721,546) 14,311, 445 
TPA 1992 66, 074, 585 (32, 184, 312 33, 890, 273 (18,095, 319 (50, 279,631) 15,794, 954 
TUL 1989 14, 184, 4 67 (8, 984, 952 5, 199, 515 (8,002, 054 (16, 987,005) (2,802, 539 
TUL 1990 16, 434, 190 (9, 457, 298 6, 976, 893 (8,204, 629 (17, 661,926) (1,227, 736 
TUL 1991 17, 203, 045 (9, 667, 492 7, 535, 553 (8,014, 020 (17, 681,512) (478, 467 
TUL 1992 
IAD 1989 49, 267, 765 (36, 776, 642 12, 491, 123 (5,044, 418 (41, 821,060) 7,446, 705 
IAD 1990 70, 375, 671 (41, 858, 349 28, 517, 322 (6,400, 307 (48, 258,656) 22,117, 015 
IAD 1991 77, 350, 009 (47, 658, 478 29, 691, 531 (6,356, 988 (54, 015,466) 23,334, 543 
IAD 1992 83, 190, 899 (52, 788, 234 30, 402, 665 (6,645, 336 (59, 433,570) 23,757, 329 
DCA 1989 44, 702, 875 (30, 032, 527 14, 670, 348 (864, 948 (30, 897,475) 13,805, 400 
DCA 1990 60, 274, 689 (35, 033, 821 25, 240, 868 (1,379, 905 (36, 413,726) 23,860, 963 
DCA 1991 52, 952, 291 (39, 786, 635 13, 165, 656 (1,636, 938 (41, 423,573) 11,528, 718 
DCA 1992 67, 745, 576 (42, 633, 380 25, 112, 196 (1,790, 574 (44, 423,954) 23,321, 622 
ICT 1989 26, 020, 797 (22, 038, 302 3, 982, 495 (3,766, 151 (25, 804,452) 216, 345 
ICT 1990 16, 000, 736 (12, 358, 342 3, 642, 395 (4,705, 050 (17, 063,391) (1,062, 655 
ICT 1991 11, 562, 211 (7, 960, 899 3, 601, 312 (6,424, 299 (14, 385,198) (2,822, 987 
ICT 1992 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
FISCAL YEAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
OPERATING OPERATING TOTAL 
AIR- EXPENSES INCOME OPERATING NET 
PORT FISCAL OPERATING EXCLUDING BEFORE EXPENSES & OPERATING 
ID YEAR REVENUES DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION DEPRECTION INCOME 
SNA 1989 23,349,750 (11,488,000 11,861,750 (1,475,250 (12,963,250) 10,386,500 
SNA 1990 29,383,500 (14,906,250 14,477,250 (3,196,250 (18,102,500) 11,281,000 





AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
























ABQ 1989 NM M 4 8500 120 45 22 26 
ABQ 1990 NM M 4 8500 120 45 22 26 
ABQ 1991 NM M 4 8500 120 45 22 26 
ABQ 1992 NM M 
BWI 1989 MD M 4 9519 99 99 47 26 
BWI 1990 MD M 4 9519 99 99 47 26 
BWI 1991 MD M 4 9519 99 99 47 26 
BWI 1992 MD M 4 9519 99 99 47 26 
BOI 1989 ID S 2 9763 118 54 9 26 
BOI 1990 ID S 2 9763 118 54 9 26 
BOI 1991 ID S 2 9763 118 54 9 26 
BOI 1992 ID S 2 9763 118 54 9 26 
CHS 1989 SC S 2 9000 79 54 10 26 
CHS 1990 SC S 2 9000 79 54 10 26 
CHS 1991 SC S 2 9000 79 54 10 26 
CHS 1992 SC S 
CVG 1989 KY M 3 10000 115 105 43 
CVG 1990 KY M 3 10000 115 105 43 
CVG 1991 KY M 3 10000 115 105 43 
CVG 1992 KY M 3 10000 115 105 43 
CLE 1989 OH L 6 8999 65 60 42 26 
CLE 1990 OH L 6 8999 65 60 42 26 
CLE 1991 OH L 6 8999 65 60 42 26 
CLE 1992 OH L 6 8999 65 60 51 26 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR- NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID YEAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RUNWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
CMH 1989 OH M 3 10250 28 36 
CMH 1990 OH M 3 10250 28 36 
CMH 1991 OH M 3 10250 28 36 
CMH 1992 OH M 3 10250 28 36 
DAL 1989 TX L 3 8800 72 15 36 
DAL 1990 TX L 3 8800 72 15 36 
DAL 1991 TX L 3 8800 72 15 36 
DAL 1992 TX L 3 8800 72 15 36 
DFW 1989 TX L 6 11400 252 124 113 52 
DFW 1990 TX L 6 11400 252 124 113 52 
DFW 1991 TX L 6 11400 252 124 113 52 
DFW 1992 TX L 
DEN 1989 CO L 4 12000 122 32 104 
DEN 1990 CO L 4 12000 122 32 104 
DEN 1991 CO L 4 12000 122 32 104 
DEN 1992 CO L 4 12000 122 32 104 
APA 1989 CO L 3 10000 0 
APA 1990 CO L 3 10000 0 
APA 1991 CO L 3 10000 0 
APA 1992 CO L 3 10000 0 
DSM 1989 lA S 3 9000 13 26 
DSM 1990 lA S 3 9000 13 26 
DSM 1991 lA S 3 9000 13 26 
DSM 1992 lA S 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR- NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID i'EAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RUNWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
DTW 1989 MI L 4 12000 70 30 89 52 
DTW 1990 MI L 4 12000 70 30 89 52 
DTW 1991 MI L 4 12000 70 30 89 52 
DTW 1992 MI L 
FLL 1989 FL L 26 
FLL 1990 FL L 26 
FLL 1991 FL L 26 
FLL 1992 FL L 26 
GFK 1989 NO N 3 7350 225 35 2 
GFK 1990 ND N 3 7350 225 35 2 
GFK 1991 ND N 3 7350 225 35 2 
GFK 1992 ND N 3 7350 225 35 2 
GRR 1989 MI S 3 10000 12 26 
GRR 1990 MI S 3 10000 12 26 
GRR 1991 MI S 3 10000 12 26 
GRR 1992 MI S 3 10000 12 26 
ITO 1989 HI M 26 
ITO 1990 HI M 26 
ITO 1991 HI M 26 
ITO 1992 HI M - 26 
HNl 1989 HI L 52 
HNL 1990 HI L 52 
HNL 1991 HI L 52 
HNL 1992 HI L 52 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR- NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID YEAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RUNWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
lAH 1989 TX L 4 12000 144 144 82 52 
lAH 1990 TX L 4 12000 144 144 82 52 
lAH 1991 TX L 4 12000 144 144 82 52 
lAH 1992 TX L 
IND 1989 IN M 3 10000 34 36 
IND 1990 IN M 3 10000 34 36 
IND 1991 IN M 3 10000 34 36 
IND 1992 IN M 
JFK 1989 NY L 4 14600 104 80 178 36 
JFK 1990 NY L 4 14600 104 80 178 36 
JFK 1991 NY L 4 14600 104 80 178 36 




MCI 1989 MO L 3 10800 109 105 56 26 
MCI 1990 MO L 3 10800 109 105 56 26 
MCI 1991 MO L 3 10800 109 105 56 26 
MCI 1992 MO L 
LGA 1989 NY L 2 7000 76 73 52 26 
LGA 1990 NY L 2 7000 76 73 52 26 
LGA 1991 NY L 2 7000 76 73 52 26 
LGA 1992 NY L 
LAS 1989 NV L 4 12636 96 82 60 26 
LAS 1990 NV L 4 12636 96 82 60 26 
LAS 1991 NV L 4 12636 96 82 60 26 
LAS 1992 NV L 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
























LIT 1989 AR S 2 7200 52 
LIT 1990 AR S 2 7200 52 
LIT 1991 AR S 3 7200 52 
LIT 1992 AR S 3 7200 52 
LAX 1989 CA L 8 12090 140 122 52 
LAX 1990 CA L 8 12090 140 122 52 
LAX 1991 CA L 8 12090 140 122 52 
LAX 1992 CA L 
SDF 1989 KY M 2 10000 69 57 21 26 
SDF 1990 KY M 2 10000 69 57 21 26 
SDF 1991 KY M 2 10000 69 57 21 26 
SDF 1992 KY M 
MEM 1989 TN M 3 9319 145 120 72 36 
MEM 1990 TN M 3 9319 145 120 72 36 
MEM 1991 TN M 3 9319 145 120 72 36 
MEM 1992 TN M 
MIA 1989 FL L 3 13500 120 113 49 
MIA 1990 FL L 3 13500 120 113 49 
MIA 1991 FL L 
MIA 1992 FL L 
MKE 1989 WI M 5 9690 109 57 42 26 
MKE 1990 WI M 5 9690 109 57 42 26 
MKE 1991 WI M 5 9690 109 57 42 26 
MKE 1992 WI M 5 9690 109 57 42 26 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR- NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID YEAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RUNWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
MSP 1989 MN L 3 10000 36 
MSP 1990 MN L 36 
MSP 1991 MN L 36 
MSP 1992 MN L 36 
BNA 1989 TN M 4 9200 100 46 52 
BNA 1990 TN M 4 9200 100 46 52 
BNA 1991 TN M 4 9200 100 46 52 
BNA 1992 TN M 
EWR 1989 NJ L 3 9300 116 116 97 26 
EWR 1990 NJ L 3 9300 116 116 97 26 
EWR 1991 NJ L 3 9300 116 116 97 26 
EWR 1992 NJ L 3 9300 116 116 97 26 
ORF 1989 VA M 2 9000 103 57 24 26 
ORF 1990 VA M 2 9000 103 57 24 26 
ORF 1991 VA M 2 9000 103 57 24 26 
ORF 1992 VA M 
OKC 1989 OK M 4 9800 125 102 17 52 
OKC 1990 OK M 4 9800 125 102 17 52 
OKC 1991 OK M 4 9800 125 102 17 52 
OKC 1992 OK M 
OMA 1989 NE M 3 8500 146 51 20 26 
OMA 1990 NE M 3 8500 146 51 20 26 
OMA 1991 NE M 3 8500 146 51 20 26 
OMA 1992 NE M 3 8500 146 51 20 26 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR­ NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID YEAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RUNWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
ONT 1989 CA S 2 12200 121 56 20 26 
ONT 1990 CA S 2 12200 121 56 20 26 
ONT 1991 CA S 2 12200 121 56 20 26 
ONT 1992 CA S 
MCO 1989 FL L 3 12000 60 52 
MCO 1990 FL L 3 12000 99 52 
MCO 1991 FL L 3 12000 99 52 
MCO 1992 FL L 3 12000 99 52 
PHL 1989 PA L 3 10500 88 74 63 52 
PHL 1990 PA L 3 10500 88 74 63 52 
PHL 1991 PA L 3 10500 88 74 63 52 
PHL 1992 PA L 
PHX 1989 AZ L 2 11001 90 26 
PHX 1990 AZ L 2 11001 90 26 
PHX 1991 AZ L 2 11001 90 26 
PHX 1992 AZ L 
PDX 1989 OR M 3 11000 41 36 
PDX 1990 OR M 3 11000 41 36 
PDX 1991 OR M 3 11000 41 36 
PDX 1992 OR M 
RDU 1989 NC M 2 10000 100 75 56 36 
RDU 1990 NC M 2 10000 100 75 56 36 
RDU 1991 NC M 2 10000 100 75 56 36 
RDU 1992 NC M 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR- NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID YEAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RUNWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
RNO 1989 NV M 3 10000 130 51 21 26 
RNO 1990 NV M 3 10000 130 51 21 26 
RNO 1991 NV M 3 10000 130 51 21 26 
RNO 1992 NV M 
RIC 1989 VA S 
RIC 1990 VA S 3 9003 100 60 19 26 
RIC 1991 VA S 3 9003 100 60 19 26 
RIC 1992 VA S 
SLC 1989 UT M 3 12003 110 48 54 36 
SLC 1990 UT M 3 12003 110 48 54 36 
SLC 1991 UT M 3 12003 110 48 54 36 
SLC 1992 UT M 
SFO 1989 CA L 4 11870 102 51 80 26 
SFO 1990 CA L 4 11870 102 51 80 26 
SFO 1991 CA L 4 11870 102 51 80 26 
SFO 1992 CA L 
SJC 1989 CA S 3 8900 30 26 
SJC 1990 CA S 3 8900 30 26 
SJC 1991 CA S 3 8900 30 26 
SJC 1992 CA S 
SRQ 1989 FL S 2 7003 90 60 13 26 
SRQ 1990 FL S 2 7003 90 60 13 26 
SRQ 1991 FL s 2 7003 90 60 13 26 
SRQ 1992 FL s 2 7003 90 60 13 26 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CAPACITY STATISTICS 
FAA 
AIR- NUMBER NUMBER IFR 
PORT FISCAL HUB OF LONGEST VFR IFR OF ARRIVAL 
ID YEAR ST CLS RUNWAYS RtWWAY CAPACITY CAPACITY GATES CAPACITY 
STL 1989 MO L 5 11019 112 87 78 26 
STL 1990 MO L 5 11019 112 87 78 26 
STL 1991 MO L 5 11019 112 87 78 26 
STL 1992 MO L 
TPA 1989 FL L 3 11000 140 50 45 52 
TPA 1990 FL L 3 11000 140 50 45 52 
TPA 1991 FL L 3 11000 140 50 45 52 
TPA 1992 FL L 3 11000 140 50 45 52 
TUL 1989 OK M 3 10000 117 73 16 52 
TUL 1990 OK M 3 10000 117 73 16 52 
TUL 1991 OK M 3 10000 117 73 16 52 
TUL 1992 OK M 
IAD 1989 VA L 52 
IAD 1990 VA L 52 
IAD 1991 VA L 52 
IAD 1992 VA L 52 
DCA 1989 DC L 3 6869 60 44 26 
DCA 1990 DC L 3 6869 60 44 26 
DCA 1991 DC L 3 6869 60 44 26 
DCA 1992 DC L 3 6869 60 44 26 
ICT 1989 KS S 3 10300 151 116 12 52 
ICT 1990 KS S 3 10300 151 116 12 52 
ICT 1991 KS S 3 10300 151 116 12 52 
ICT 1992 KS S 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 















VFR IFR OF 





SNA 1989 CA L 26 
SNA 1990 CA L 26 
SNA 1991 CA L 26 
SNA 1992 CA L 26 
227 
APPENDIX D 
AIRPORT FLIGHT OPERATIONS STATISTICS 
UNITED STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 
FISCAL YEAR OPERATIONS 
FISCAL 
AIR­ YEAR ITINERANT LOCAL 
PORT FISCAL TOTAL AIR AIR GENERAL GENERAL ITINERANT LOCAL 
ID YEAR OPERATIONS CARRIER TAXI AVIATION AVIATION MILITARY MILITARY 
;===== II II II II (1 II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II 11 11 11 H II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II I
I II II II II II II =========== II II II n I
I II II II II II II II II II II (I II II 11 II II 
ABQ 1989 231,316 69,776 41,094 79,279 1,930 33,059 6,178 
ABQ 1990 226,153 70,125 39,788 77,396 2,420 31,237 5,187 
ABQ 1991 211,561 64,931 36,590 72,838 3,124 27,083 6,995 
ABQ 1992 211,601 64,951 38,170 72,068 3,326 26,048 7,038 
BWI 1989 306,717 158,792 84,961 60,565 1,010 1,219 170 
BWI 1990 303,502 157,850 88,116 54,700 815 1,883 138 
BWI 1991 282,320 148,637 84,003 46,628 1,211 1,741 100 
BWI 1992 265,844 128,648 85,862 42,986 4,844 2,542 962 
BOI 1989 159,882 18,018 35,121 61,926 22,084 16,292 6,441 
BOI 1990 168,450 18,761 40,140 63,715 24,425 16,576 4,833 
BOI 1991 152,746 18,058 35,069 58,548 22,044 14,836 4,191 
BOI 1992 161,434 18,613 36,420 65,252 22,885 12,829 5,435 
CHS 1989 130,057 26,572 2,466 37,205 2,443 25,271 36,100 
CHS 1990 132,096 28,908 1,939 37,905 2,790 25,679 34,875 
CHS 1991 131,444 26,330 1,802 34,788 3,902 31,090 33,532 
CHS 1992 135,599 23,264 2,646 34,590 4,096 27,047 43,956 
CVG 1989 264,699 128,855 108,502 25,240 561 1,541 0 
CVG 1990 284,519 132,568 127,409 22,264 560 1,718 0 
CVG 1991 297,963 142,438 135,106 18,676 90 1,649 4 
CVG 1992 304,214 151,969 139,412 11,650 0 1,183 0 
CLE 1989 256,537 139,252 64,234 47,692 1,647 3,696 16 
CLE 1990 273,081 152,337 71,713 45,044 644 3,331 12 
CLE 1991 244,626 135,405 71,946 34,355 158 2,668 94 
CLE 1992 237,216 122,026 80,467 31,612 48 3,053 10 
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STATES AIRPORT SAMPLE, FY 1989 - 1992 




























GENERAL GENERAL ITINERANT LOCAL 
AVIATION AVIATION MILITARY MILITARY 
41,217 0 1,030 0 
41,840 0 1,455 0 
41,235 0 1,439 0 
42,473 0 2,007 0 
57,034 2,074 2,376 248 
55,603 1,705 2,263 113 
51,811 1,312 1,697 83 
49,651 780 1,483 68 
24,339 0 705 0 
20,094 0 664 0 
16,470 0 2,043 0 
16,111 0 466 0 
17,404 1,116 1,170 1,240 
16,845 1,182 1,134 1,124 
16,559 1,410 1,157 857 
14,783 719 1,125 506 
26,904 0 454 0 
23,129 0 482 0 
18,542 0 427 0 
16,754 0 321 0 
88,519 20,503 6,176 857 
91,822 19,900 5,029 245 
85,054 18,217 4,766 214 
86,768 16,745 6,952 150 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FISCAL YEAR OPERATIONS 
AIR 
CARRIER 
AIR 
TAXI 
ITINERANT 
GENERAL 
AVIATION 
LOCAL 
GENERAL 
AVIATION 
ITINERANT 
MILITARY 
LOCAL 
MILITARY 
SNA 
SNA 
SNA 
SNA 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
533,522 
522,833 
550,602 
557,442 
62,302 
60,497 
65,388 
61,887 
27,727 
32,596 
30,886 
27,978 
241,383 
254,687 
276,392 
276,992 
196,778 
173,609 
177,370 
189,990 
5,086 
1,442 
566 
595 
246 
2 
0 
0 
to 
to 
-~1 
